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In this Ph.D. thesis we analyze the composition of the board of 
directors as key corporate governance mechanism in Europe. In the first 
chapter we present stylized features of firms’ corporate governance in the 
main Western European Economies (the group E-17), comparing economic 
determinants, governance structures and institutional frameworks among 
countries, and along the time dimension. We describe the evolution of the 
European Corporate Sector in the last decade, stressing the importance of the 
harmonization process that has been going on since the beginning of this 
century. We also present key academic contributions in the field of corporate 
governance studies, both worldwide and in Europe. In the second chapter we 
analyze how the use of committees improves board efficiency and how it 
contributes to increase firm value. In the third chapter we analyze how 
European firms use board independence and CEO compensation as alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms. In our study, we find that firms that 
combine independent advising committees and independent boards are those 
with higher firm value. We also find a positive relation between board 
independence and the use of CEO equity linked compensation. Overall in our 
study we show that although board independence alone is not statistically 
related to firm value, the use of independent board of directors combined with 
additional instruments (such as advising committees and equity linked 
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To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and 
adapt their corporate governance practices so that they can meet new 
demands and grasp new opportunities”. 
 














(En cumplimiento con la normativa de doctorado de la Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid relativa a las tesis presentadas en otra lengua 
oficial, la introducción se redacta en español y se concibe como un 





















El consejo de administración es, sin duda, el órgano de gobierno 
corporativo más importante al alcance de las empresas cotizadas. Como tal, ha 
recibido la atención de empresarios, reguladores, académicos, y del público en 
general. En la última década hemos asistido a una corriente reguladora en 
ambos lados del Atlántico que promueve la formación de consejos de 
administración independientes del poder ejecutivo, como elemento generador 
de valor empresarial. Así, la ley de Sarbanex-Oxley, promulgada en el año 2002 
en EE.UU. para mejorar el gobierno corporativo de empresas cotizadas 
americanas, obliga a contar con una mayoría de consejeros independientes en 
los consejos de administración. Los códigos de buen gobierno de las principales 
economías europeas (que no son de obligado cumplimiento, pero sí son 
seguidos normalmente por las empresas) abogan también por la creación de 
consejos de administración independientes del poder ejecutivo. Estas 
recomendaciones en Europa surgen como respuesta al esfuerzo de la Comisión 
Europea para modernizar las legislación existente y promover el buen gobierno 
corporativo en la Unión, lo que desemboca en la redacción en el año 2003 del 
“Informe para la modernización del derecho de sociedades y la mejora del 
gobierno corporativo”, y la Directiva de modernización (Modernization 
Directive 2003/51/EC). En este informe, la Comisión Europea aboga por el 
incremento de la transparencia informativa en cuanto a informes anuales, 
balances contables, retribución a directivos y miembros del consejo de 
administración, convergencia de los códigos de gobierno nacionales, y, lo que 
es más importante para nuestro estudio, aboga por la mejora del desempeño 
de la función de los consejeros no ejecutivos y supervisores, así como el 
establecimiento de unos estándares mínimos en la creación y grado de 




En respuesta a este aparente consenso en la necesidad de 
independencia de los consejos de administración, cabe hacerse las siguientes 
preguntas: ¿Existe realmente una relación de causalidad directa entre el grado 
de independencia del consejo de administración y el valor de la empresa? 
¿Cuáles son los argumentos económicos de dicha relación de causalidad? ¿Es 
esta relación lineal y monotónica? Si es así, ¿por qué no están los consejos de 
administración formados únicamente por consejeros independientes? ¿Cual es 
el papel de los consejeros no independientes, y cómo afectan al valor de la 
empresa? 
Estas cuestiones han recibido recientemente una renovada 
atención por parte de investigadores y académicos, que han analizado dos 
aspectos fundamentales del consejo de administración: el desempeño de las 
funciones de control y asesoría del consejo, y la relación entre la composición 
del consejo y el valor de la empresa. En última instancia, estos estudios tienen 
como objetivo entender cómo las empresas diseñan sus consejos de 
administración para llevar a cabo dichas labores de control del equipo directivo 
y apoyo en el diseño de la estrategia empresarial, de forma que contribuyan a 
la maximización de la renta empresarial.  
Entre las principales conclusiones de trabajos recientes se detecta 
una ausencia de relación consistente entre diferentes medidas del valor de la 
empresa y el nivel de independencia del consejo de administración (Adams y 
Mehran, 2012, y Wintoki, Linck y Netter, 2012). Esta carencia de relación 
estable puede ser atribuible a diversas causas entre las que cabe mencionar la 
necesidad de transmisión de información que llevan a cabo los consejeros no 
independientes, los problemas de endogeneidad inherentes al proceso de 
formación del consejo (que enmascaran en las regresiones la relación positiva), 




necesaria para ejercer el control y el asesoramiento al equipo directivo y el 
papel que desempeña el consejero delegado, entre otros.  
Nuestra investigación tiene como objetivo contribuir a esta rama de 
la literatura (que analiza la eficiencia del consejo de administración de las 
empresas cotizadas) añadiendo dos elementos diferenciales que pueden ser 
determinantes en la relación entre independencia del consejo de 
administración y valor de la empresa, y que pueden ayudarnos a entender 
mejor esta relación. Estos dos elementos son la estructuración interna del 
consejo de administración en comités, y la estructura de la retribución al 
consejero delegado, como instrumento alternativo de gobierno corporativo. 
Tras un breve recorrido por las características del gobierno corporativo en 
Europa (capítulo 1), nuestra investigación intenta dar respuesta a dos 
preguntas de investigación (capítulos 2 y 3). En la primera de ellas, capítulo 2, 
introducimos el trabajo del consejo en comités, y analizamos si, al introducir 
información acerca de los comités en un modelo de valor, podemos predecir 
mejor el impacto de la independencia del consejo de administración sobre el 
valor de la empresa. Adicionalmente, también analizamos cómo las empresas 
adecúan la independencia de sus consejos de administración y su estructura de 
trabajo en comités a sus requerimientos de control del ejecutivo y participación 
en el diseño de la estrategia empresarial. Dependiendo de estas necesidades 
relativas de supervisión y asesoría las empresas no sólo deciden la composición 
agregada del consejo y su grado de independencia, sino también, y de forma 
interrelacionada, el número e independencia de sus comités de trabajo. 
Estudiar la composición conjunta de comités y consejos puede contribuir a 
encontrar regularidades empíricas que mejoren nuestro entendimiento del 
funcionamiento interno de los consejos de administración y su relación con el 




independientes tienen una estructura interna que cuente con un gran número 
de comités (o con comités más o menos independientes), de forma que sea a 
nivel de comité (en lugar de a nivel de consejo) donde la transmisión de 
información entre miembros del poder ejecutivo y consejeros externos se 
realice de forma más eficiente.  
Para entender mejor el funcionamiento interno de los consejos de 
administración de las empresas cotizadas europeas, analizamos en detalle las 
siguientes cuestiones: (1) ¿Ayuda a entender mejor la relación entre el nivel de 
independencia del consejo de administración y el valor de la empresa la 
información acerca los comités de trabajo en que está organizado dicho 
consejo? (2) ¿Adecúan las empresas europeas la estructura de sus comités (el 
número, la independencia y la naturaleza asesora o de control de los mismos) a 
las necesidades relativas de asesoramiento y control de las empresas?  
Para responder a la primera pregunta comparamos los resultados 
de analizar un modelo de creación de valor de referencia, donde el valor de la 
empresa depende de la independencia del consejo de administración como 
elemento más relevante, y de otros elementos de control (condiciones 
específicas de la empresa, de su estructura de gobierno y de los mercados en 
los que opera), con un modelo aumentado, donde incluimos información 
acerca de las características de los comités y acerca del diseño conjunto de 
comités e independencia global de la empresa. La comparación de la magnitud 
y la significación estadística de los coeficientes resultantes, nos permitirá 
realizar inferencias acerca de la relación entre comités y valor, independencia 
del consejo y valor, y acerca de los determinantes principales del uso intensivo 




Para responder a la segunda pregunta introducimos en el análisis 
factores que afecten a los requerimientos de asesoría y control por parte del 
consejo de administración, e incluimos en el análisis técnicas econométricas 
que corrijan el posible sesgo de no aleatoriedad en el diseño de los comités en 
la empresa. También estudiamos el impacto de la independencia del consejo 
en el valor de la empresa, de forma diferenciada, para empresas en sectores 
con un gran potencial de crecimiento, frente a aquellas en sectores más 
tradicionales, o aquellas empresas con un mayor tamaño que la media 
europea, frente a empresas de menor tamaño. 
La segunda pregunta de investigación a la que pretendemos dar 
respuesta en la presente tesis doctoral, recogida en el capítulo 3, analiza la 
composición del consejo de administración y su relación con la retribución al 
consejero delegado, considerada ésta última como un instrumento alternativo 
de gobierno corporativo. En concreto, analizamos si las empresas emplean la 
composición del consejo de administración y la retribución al consejero 
delegado como instrumentos de gobierno corporativo complementarios y cuál 
es la relación entre las funciones que desempeña el consejo de administración 
(supervisión y asesoría), y la estructura de pago al consejero delegado. 
La primera cuestión se refiere a si las empresas utilizan la 
independencia del consejo de administración y el pago de acciones y opciones 
sobre acciones al consejero delegado como elementos de gobierno corporativo 
complementarios o sustitutivos. En este caso, contrastamos dos modelos 
económicos clásicos: los modelos económicos de agencia tradicionales1 que 
postulan una relación de sustitución entre ambos instrumentos, y los modelos 
de captura o atrincheramiento2 que abogan por el uso de ambos instrumentos 
                                                     
1
 Como los modelos de Holmstrom (1979) y Holmstrom y Milgrom (1991) 
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de forma complementaria. Según los modelos de agencia clásicos una 
estructura de pago muy ligada a resultados permite alinear los intereses de 
accionistas y administradores de la empresa, minimizando la necesidad de 
supervisión por parte del consejo de administración. Por el contrario, los 
modelos de captura sugieren que, sin un sistema de supervisión adecuado, los 
consejeros delegados intentarán extraer rentas de las empresas que dirigen, 
eligiendo (para ellos y su equipo directivo) una retribución más alta y menos 
ligada a los resultados de la empresa de la que en otro caso fijaría el mercado.  
Con nuestra segunda pregunta nos cuestionamos si la concesión o 
no de incentivos (opciones sobre acciones y acciones de la empresa) al 
consejero delegado está ligada de forma diferente a las distintas funciones del 
consejo de administración. Para analizar esta segunda pregunta desglosamos 
nuestro análisis inicial y estudiamos la relación entre el pago de incentivos y las 
variables que miden la necesidad de supervisión y de asesoría del consejo de 
administración. Si estas variables son relevantes, podemos afirmar que tanto la 
relación entre la retribución al consejero delegado como la composición del 
consejo de administración vendrán determinadas por la importancia relativa de 
las funciones de asesoría y supervisión en dicho consejo.  
Para la elaboración de la investigación empírica hemos compilado 
una base de datos que contiene las principales empresas cotizadas de Europa 
Occidental. Esta base de datos contiene información detallada de las 
características de gobierno corporativo, proveniente del proveedor de datos 
BoardEx, e información contable y de mercado de las empresas obtenida de la 
base de datos Thomson.  
Para el capítulo 2, en el que usamos información sobre comités, 




que contiene 2029 empresas europeas, y 11 517 observaciones. Se trata de 
empresas cotizadas suficientemente representativas de catorce economías de 
Europa Occidental, para las que se contempla un periodo de estudio 
comprendido entre los años 1999 y 2009. Toda la información acerca de los 
comités, consejo y remuneración ha sido obtenida trabajando con la base de 
datos original de BoardEx, mientras que los datos económico-financieros y de 
mercado de las empresas de nuestra muestra han sido obtenidos de la base de 
datos Thomson.  
Para llevar a buen término el segundo objetivo de investigación 
manejamos información detallada de la remuneración al consejero delegado, 
construyendo una segunda muestra que contiene en total 12 362 
observaciones -correspondientes a 2 668 empresas- para el periodo 1999-2007. 
Estas empresas conforman una muestra representativa de quince países 
europeos, aunque del total de 12 362 observaciones de nuestra muestra el 
62.7% (7 751 observaciones) corresponden a empresas con domicilio fiscal en 
el Reino Unido, y el 37.3% restante (4 611 observaciones) corresponden a 
empresas de la Europa Continental. Este sesgo en la representación por países 
se debe al contenido de la base de datos BoardEx, donde la información sobre 
empresas en el Reino Unido es claramente predominante.  
Los resultados de nuestra investigación se pueden resumir en los 
siguientes puntos:  
(1) Encontramos una relación estadística positiva y 
significativa entre el número y la independencia de los comités y el valor de la 
empresa. También encontramos una relación positiva entre el número y la 
independencia de comités que se dedican a labores de asesoría y el valor de la 




Además, usando técnicas econométricas que corrigen el sesgo que pudiera 
derivarse de la no aleatoriedad en la creación de este tipo de comités, nuestros 
datos muestran que, al introducir información sobre comités asesores en un 
modelo de valor de la empresa, la relación entre la independencia del consejo y 
el valor de la empresa se torna en positiva y significativa.  
(2) En general, no encontramos en nuestros datos evidencia 
empírica de una relación estadística significativa entre el nivel de 
independencia del consejo de administración (definido como la proporción de 
consejeros no ejecutivos) y el valor de la empresa (medido como el cociente 
entre el valor de mercado de la empresa y el valor contable). Esta falta de 
evidencia no significa necesariamente que la independencia del consejo no 
tenga impacto en el valor de la empresa, sino que puede deberse a que la 
composición idónea del consejo dependa de factores internos (producción, 
otros elementos de gobierno corporativo), y externos (factores institucionales y 
de mercado) que no siempre es posible especificar en los modelos. De esta 
manera, mientras para cierto tipo de empresas incrementar la independencia 
del consejo puede conllevar incrementos de valor, para otras puede tener el 
efecto contrario especialmente si el nivel de independencia de sus consejos ya 
está situado en su nivel óptimo. Si las empresas han optimizado los niveles de 
independencia en sus consejos, la relación existente puede no aparecer de 
modo agregado en el análisis. Este resultado no difiere de otros estudios 
recientes publicados con datos de EE.UU., y en los que en términos generales 
se sugiere que la relación entre la independencia del consejo y el valor de la 
empresa no es estadísticamente significativa.  
(3) Encontramos evidencia de una relación positiva entre 




consejero delegado reciba acciones u opciones sobre acciones como parte de 
su remuneración.  
(4) Nuestro estudio revela una relación de 
complementariedad entre la independencia del consejo de administración y el 
pago de incentivos (acciones y opciones sobre acciones) al consejero delegado 
de la misma. Esto significa que las principales empresas cotizadas europeas 
combinan mayores niveles de independencia de sus consejos de administración 
con una mayor proporción de incentivos en la retribución anual al consejero 
delegado. Esta relación de complementariedad es más significativa en 
empresas con consejos más numerosos, con estructuras de propiedad más 
concentradas y con mayores rendimientos.  
La aportación del consejo de administración al valor de la empresa 
es difícilmente cuantificable, puesto que depende de elementos cualitativos, 
como el capital humano de los consejeros, la transmisión de información entre 
consejeros externos y miembros del equipo ejecutivo, la confianza entre los 
miembros del consejo, y entre éstos y el consejero delegado, etc. Es por ello de 
gran relevancia, para el diseño de modelos de consejos de administración 
eficientes, encontrar regularidades empíricas que nos ayuden a entender los 
mecanismos internos de funcionamiento de dichos consejos, y creemos que, el 
estudio sobre cómo las empresas combinan la independencia del consejo con 
otros elementos de gobierno corporativo a su alcance mejora nuestro 
conocimiento acerca del funcionamiento interno de los consejos, y facilita la 
comprensión de su aportación a la creación de valor en la empresa.  
Además de contribuir al análisis del funcionamiento de los consejos 
de administración, otra de las aportaciones relevantes en la tesis doctoral 
consiste en el uso de datos europeos. En general, los estudios empíricos acerca 




administración y al pago a ejecutivos, se han concentrado en el sector 
corporativo americano, debido sin duda a la mayor transparencia informativa 
en lo que a datos sobre gobierno corporativo se refiere, así como a la mayor 
tradición investigadora en este campo. Los estudios existentes usando datos 
europeos son muy escasos, y por norma general suelen estar centrados en un 
único país. En nuestro estudio, las principales economías de Europa Occidental 
están representadas. De esta manera, al abarcar varios países, podemos sacar 
conclusiones que no estén condicionadas por factores institucionales o de 
mercado que afecten a un país en concreto. El análisis de datos europeos es 
también importante en la actualidad, dado que en la última década hemos sido 
testigos de la mayor actualización y homogeneización que se haya dado jamás 
entre los códigos de buen gobierno de los diferentes países de Europa 
occidental. Usar una muestra representativa de los países europeos en nuestro 
análisis permite conocer mejor el sistema corporativo europeo, estudiar cómo 
se han adaptado las empresas a los importantes cambios institucionales, 
económicos, y empresariales ocurridos en los últimos diez años, y analizar si 
estos cambios han propiciado la mejora de los sistemas de gobierno 
corporativo para los que fueron diseñados.  
 
EL GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO EN EUROPA 
Una de las características más relevantes del gobierno corporativo en 
Europa es la coexistencia, en un mismo espacio económico (el mercado único 
europeo), de marcos institucionales tan diversos como el anglosajón, que tiene 
su máximo exponente en el Reino Unido; el escandinavo, propio de los países 
nórdicos; el gérmanico, prevalente en Austria y Alemania; y el francés, propio 




el marco regulatorio de gobierno corporativo se basa en una combinación de 
legislación, de obligado cumplimiento, y soft law, recomendaciones 
voluntarias, que si bien no son de obligado cumplimiento, sí son seguidas de 
forma mayoritaria por las empresas europeas.  
Aunque hemos sido testigos en la última década del mayor esfuerzo de 
modernización y armonización de las diversas legislaciones y códigos referentes 
al gobierno corporativo de la empresas en Europa, la realidad económica 
sugiere que existe una gran diversidad, tanto entre países como dentro de los 
países entre empresas de diversos sectores económicos3. Estas disparidades 
tienen su origen en diferentes realidades económicas, ordenamientos jurídicos 
dispares, y diversas tradiciones legales y culturales que han de ser tenidas en 
cuenta al abordar el estudio del gobierno corporativo en Europa. 
De esta forma, no existe un código de buen gobierno unificado que sirva 
de referencia para todos los países de la Unión Europea, sino que cada país ha 
publicado su propio Código de Buen Gobierno, basado en el principio 
internacionalmente conocido como ”cumplir o explicar”, donde las empresas 
pueden no seguir las recomendaciones del código pero han de revelar los 
motivos que justifican dicha desviación. En el año 2002, la Comisión Europea 
publicó un informe ”A Comparative Study of Corporate Governance Codes 
Relevant to the European Union and its Member States” donde se analizaba el 
estado de la convergencia de los diferentes códigos. De este estudio se 
concluye que no es necesario desarrollar un código pan-europeo, ya que los 
rasgos convergentes de los diferentes códigos son mucho más relevantes que 
los rasgos divergentes. Este informe corroboraba el hecho de que los códigos, 
junto con las tendencias de mercado, actúan como fuerza motor de la 
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convergencia real. De este informe también se concluye que las diferencias 
más importantes en las prácticas de gobierno corporativo entre empresas 
europeas se deben a diferencias en legislación mercantil y regulación bursátil, 
más que a diferencias en las recomendaciones de los diferentes códigos de 
buen gobierno.  
Es por ello que la Comisión Europea puso en marcha de forma 
simultánea una iniciativa para desarrollar un moderno marco regulatorio en el 
ámbito de legislación comercial dentro de la Unión Europea. Como resultado 
de esta iniciativa se publicó el informe conocido como Winter Report, centrado 
en la mejora de la eficiencia y la competitividad del tejido empresarial europeo. 
Como consecuencia del Informe Winter (llamado así en referencia al autor del 
mismo, Jaap Winter), la Directiva de Modernización (Modernization Directive, 
2003/51/EC), abogó por una mejora del gobierno corporativo de las empresas 
que incluyera, entre otros aspectos, una mayor transparencia informativa y un 
refuerzo del rol de los consejeros independientes y supervisores.  
Desde entonces, la Comisión ha adoptado una serie de recomendaciones 
y regulaciones (directivas) dirigidas a mejora el gobierno corporativo de las 
empresas, y a lograr una armonización de facto del marco institucional de 
gobierno corporativo en el ámbito del mercado único europeo. En el primer 
capítulo de esta tesis presentamos de forma detallada los principales rasgos del 
sector corporativo europeo, los avances en el proceso de armonización de la 
última década, y el estado actual de la cuestión con una detallada transcripción 
de los últimos avances en códigos y legislación vigentes en cada uno de los 
países de nuestro estudio.  
Hoy en día existe una clara conciencia en Europa acerca de la 




instrumento eficaz para lograr una mayor convergencia y crecimiento 
económico. La Unión Europa prioriza así la armonización de códigos de buen 
gobierno y la legislación mercantil para la mejora del gobierno corporativo en 
Europa. Dos recientes informes ”The Green Paper on the EU Corporate 
Governance Framework” y ”The Report on the Reflection Group on the Future 
of EU Company Law” publicados en el año 2011 en nombre de la Comisión 
Europea ponen de manifiesto dicha importancia. El primero de estos informes 
destaca la importancia del consejo de administración (y la figura del presidente 
de dicho consejo) en el diseño de las estrategias empresariales y el crecimiento 
económico de las empresas cotizadas. En este informe la Comisión Europea 
reitera su compromiso por el desarrollo de un mercado único fuerte y 
consolidado, que cuente con el gobierno corporativo y la responsabilidad social 
corporativa como elementos básicos para afianzar la confianza de los 
ciudadanos europeos en el el mercado único europeo.  
El informe del grupo de reflexión sobre el futuro de la legislación 
mercantil (company law) de la Unión Europea, presenta los principales 
problemas que existen en el marco legislativo actual, y sugiere iniciativas que 
aporten elementos diferenciales al debate actual acerca de al armonización 
legislativa a nivel europeo. Este informe comparte el punto de vista de que la 
armonización dentro de la Unión Europea ha de llevarse a cabo dentro de una 
estrategia que tenga en cuenta las diferentes trayectorias históricas, culturales, 
legales y económicas de los diversos estados4 aboga por una armonización que 
enfatice la tendencia hacia una mayor flexibilidad y libertad de elección del 
modelo empresarial, de gobierno corporativo, y de distribución de poder 
dentro de cada empresa, más allá de imposiciones legales de convergencia, que 
pudieran ser incluso contraproducentes.  
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Es por ello que la Unión Europea, con ánimo de enfatizar el proceso de 
armonización de la legislación y códigos del gobierno corporativo europeo, ha 
optado por llevar a cabo dicho proceso de armonización permitiendo una 
mayor flexibilidad entre los diferentes marcos institucionales, y otorgando a las 
empresas una mayor libertad a la hora de elegir su diseño de gobierno 
corporativo. Como resultado (y como mostramos en la sección cuatro del 
primer capítulo de esta tesis), podemos comprobar cómo empresas con 
diferentes mecanismos internos de control y diferentes realidades económicas 
coexisten y compiten en un mismo mercado único europeo (incluso dentro de 
cada país). Esta gran variedad de modelos de gobierno corporativo nos permite 
analizar no sólo la relación entre los diferentes instrumentos de gobierno 
corporativo de las empresas y el valor de mercado, sino que permite además 
estudiar simultáneamente cuáles son los rasgos empresariales determinantes 
en la elección de un determinado modelo de gobierno corporativo frente a otro 
dentro de cada empresa.  
 
HIPÓTESIS CONTRASTABLES Y LITERATURA RELACIONADA 
 
La presente tesis doctoral se apoya en un eje central que versa 
sobre el análisis de la composición del consejo de administración como 
generador de eficiencia y beneficio empresarial, eje que posteriormente se 
articula en dos cuestiones principales o preguntas de investigación. Se postula 
que para entender mejor la relación entre la independencia del consejo y el 
valor de la empresa resulta de sumo interés introducir elementos diferenciales 




administración sobre la toma de decisiones empresariales, y en última 
instancia, sobre el proceso de generación de valor.  
Estos elementos diferenciales son el uso de comités para la mejor 
transferencia de información entre consejeros internos y externos, y el uso de 
incentivos en la remuneración de los consejeros delegados para facilitar la 
alineación de intereses entre propietarios y ejecutivos.  
En conjunto, nuestras dos propuestas de investigación contribuyen 
a ampliar nuestro conocimiento del diseño de la estructura del consejo de 
administración a partir de la independencia del consejo definida como la 
proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos. Partiendo de la relación entre la 
independencia del consejo y el valor de la empresa, ampliamos nuestra visión 
observando como la independencia del consejo interactúa con otros elementos 
de gobierno corporativo, como el pago de incentivos salariales, y analizando la 
microestructura y el funcionamiento interno de los consejos en comités de 
trabajo. Resumimos a continuación cada una de las propuestas de 
investigación. Un mayor detalle sobre las mismas puede encontrarse en los 
capítulos correspondientes. 
  
La independencia del consejo como elemento generador de valor empresarial 
Existe una amplia corriente dentro de la literatura sobre gobierno 
corporativo que en sus primeras etapas ha centrado su ámbito de estudio en la 
función de supervisión de los consejos de administración (Hermalin y 
Weisbach, 1998). La tendencia habitual en dichos estudios consiste en estudiar 
cómo diversas características del consejo, o cómo determinadas acciones 




empresarial5. La justificación de tal proceder descansa en la idea de que dichas 
características reflejan la capacidad de los consejos para disciplinar a los 
directivos, y en que dichas acciones son el elemento central de la acción 
supervisora del consejo. Subyace en este planteamiento la solución de los 
conflictos derivados de la separación entre propietarios y directivos6.  
Entre las propuestas más relevantes de esta corriente de 
pensamiento destacan, en primer lugar, el reforzamiento del nivel de 
independencia en el consejo como medio de mejorar la efectividad de 
determinadas tareas de supervisión (Lipton y Lorsch , 1992) y, por tanto, los 
resultados empresariales, y, en segundo lugar, la elección de consejos con un 
número reducido de miembros como medio de potenciar su capacidad para 
eludir los problemas de coordinación, control y free-riding. Estas sugerencias 
han calado de tal forma que es difícil encontrar un Código de Buenas Prácticas 
que no incluya la recomendación de reducir el número de consejeros o de 
aumentar la presencia de independientes, recomendaciones que, sin embargo, 
no se han visto refrendadas en la contrastación empírica con la obtención de 
resultados concluyentes (Wintoki et al. 2012).  
Ahora bien, aunque la supervisión y control de la actuación de los 
managers es una de las funciones primordiales del consejo, también tienen 
encomendadas otras tareas no menos importantes a las que es necesario 
prestar atención. En este sentido, es parte de la labor del consejo y sus 
consejeros ayudar, asesorar a los directivos en la marcha del negocio, en la 
fijación de la estrategia, en el descubrimiento y valoración de oportunidades de 
inversión, en la incorporación de nuevas líneas de negocio, en las relaciones 
con otros stakeholders, etc. En definitiva, poner a disposición de los directivos 
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el conocimiento general y específico de que disponen los consejeros. Un buen 
número de los trabajos que han aparecido en los últimos años destacan la 
importancia de esta función asesora7, en ocasiones por encima de la 
supervisora. 
Dentro de lo que podríamos calificar de nueva generación de 
trabajos sobre gobierno corporativo podemos destacar la cada vez mayor 
presencia de aportaciones teóricas que tratan de buscar soluciones óptimas al 
problema de gobierno desde la modelización del comportamiento del consejo 
(Raheja, 2005; Adams y Ferreira, 2007; Drymiotes, 2007; Hermalin y Weisbach, 
2003; Harris y Raviv, 2008). Además, una gran mayoría de trabajos incorporan 
la función de asesoramiento junto con la de supervisión, analizando las 
circunstancias en que cada función es prevalente (Coles, Daniel y Naveen 2008; 
Lasfer, 2006; Adams y Ferreira, 2007; Boone, Field, Karpoff y Raheja, 2007; 
Drymiotes, 2007; Markarian y Parbonetti, 2007; Cheng, 2008; Link, Netter y 
Yang, 2008).  
Así, Adams y Ferreira (2007) plantean la existencia de un trade-off 
entre las funciones supervisora y asesora del consejo. Si los directivos 
proporcionan información a los consejeros, el consejo puede asesorar más 
eficientemente, aunque dicha información también revela al consejo las 
opciones disponibles y la posibilidad de interferir en el proceso de adopción de 
decisiones por parte de los directivos de la empresa. Por tal motivo, el 
consejero delegado puede manifestar cierta reticencia a revelar información si 
el consejo es un órgano demasiado independiente de la dirección. Los autores 
plantean, por tanto, un trade-off entre independencia del consejo y 
transmisión de información, de manera que enfatizar sin más la independencia 
de los consejos puede en ocasiones disminuir el valor de la firma. Se hace 
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patente la necesidad de considerar otros factores tales como los beneficios de 
control en poder del consejero delegado, o la alineación de preferencias entre 
éste y el consejo, como parte integrante de un modelo en el que la importancia 
de las funciones de asesoramiento y supervisión conducirá a un tipo de consejo 
de administración u otro en la búsqueda de la eficiencia y, por ende, de la 
creación de valor. La propia Adams (2009) obtiene confirmación de ello en una 
encuesta realizada sobre consejeros delegados y miembros de consejos de 
administración en Suecia, donde constata la percepción de los propios 
protagonistas de que aquellos consejos que más monitorizan pueden no llegar 
a adquirir el suficiente compromiso como para asesorar con efectividad, así 
como que los vínculos personales entre consejeros delegados y miembros del 
consejo permiten vencer el problema de confianza, fomentan el intercambio de 
información y potencian el valor.  
Song y Takor (2006) coinciden en esta misma idea de que es el 
consejero delegado quien controla la información que pone a disposición de los 
miembros del consejo, quienes no sólo monitorizan al CEO sino que además, y 
más importante, evalúan y prestan asesoramiento sobre los proyectos que éste 
presenta. Teniendo en cuenta la interacción entre el consejero delegado y los 
consejeros, concluyen que no siempre un consejo fortalecido en independencia 
es más efectivo en el cumplimiento de sus funciones.  
De forma casi contemporánea al trabajo de Adams y Ferreira 
(2007), aunque desde una vertiente más empírica, tres interesantes trabajos 
(Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008 y Link et al., 2008) comparten la idea de 
que las funciones de supervisión y de asesoramiento son elementos centrales 
de la acción de los consejos, y que ambas funciones presentan una serie de 
beneficios y costes que hacen que su desempeño eficiente y, en definitiva, el 




del entorno o de la configuración de otros mecanismos de gobierno. 
Entre dichos factores destacan, en primer lugar, el alcance y 
complejidad de las operaciones de la empresa. Los tres trabajos coinciden en 
que la necesidad de recibir asesoramiento por parte del CEO aumenta con el 
nivel de complejidad empresarial, complejidad que está relacionada con 
variables como el grado de diversificación, el tamaño, el nivel de 
endeudamiento o la edad empresarial. La propuesta, unánime en este caso, es 
que los consejos tenderán a incorporar un mayor número de consejeros 
independientes. 
En segundo lugar, los requerimientos específicos en la obtención de 
información por parte de los consejeros independientes para el desarrollo 
eficiente de sus funciones obligan a incurrir en altos costes de verificación 
dando pie a consejos menos numerosos y con un menor grado de 
independencia. Así es reconocido por los autores citados, aunque Boone et al. 
(2007) lo vinculan específicamente a la actividad de monitorización mientras 
que Coles et al. (2008) y Link et al. (2008) extienden el razonamiento a la 
actividad de asesoramiento. Empresas con elevados niveles de crecimiento8, 
intensivas en I+D, o con elevada variabilidad en el rendimiento de sus acciones 
resultan más costosas de monitorizar y asesorar y el diseño del consejo tiende 
a ser más reducido y con menor proporción de independientes.  
Como contrapunto al planteamiento anterior, existe un factor que 
estimula el esfuerzo de los independientes como es la capacidad de extracción 
de beneficios privados por parte de la dirección. Efectivamente, cuanto mayor 
este potencial de expropiación, mayores ventajas son las que se derivan de una 
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 El trabajo de Lehn, Patro y Zhao (2009) llega a idénticas conclusiones a las de los autores previamente citados, 
si bien el foco de atención reside en este caso en las oportunidades de crecimiento y en el tamaño empresarial 
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intensificación en este caso de la función de supervisión (Boone et al, 2007 y 
Link et al., 2008).  
Y en tercer lugar, aunque estrechamente vinculado al factor 
anterior, es ineludible referirse a las características del consejero delegado y 
del grupo de dirección. Su capacidad de influencia, su capacidad de negociación 
y de ejercer el control, la existencia de incentivos alineados o no alineados con 
el consejo o con los propios accionistas, o su participación en la propiedad 
empresarial son variables a tener en cuenta y que contribuyen a conformar el 
complejo entramado de relaciones de agencia y de poder en el seno de la 
organización afectando de forma decisiva al desempeño de las funciones de 
asesoramiento y control. 
Una buena prueba de las modelizaciones teóricas que sustentan 
esta evidencia empírica la podemos encontrar en los recientes trabajos de 
Raheja (2005) y Harris y Raviv (2008), quienes en una línea similar a Adams y 
Ferreira (2007), aunque con una consideración no tan explícita de la función de 
asesoramiento, inciden de nuevo en la idea de que tanto el tamaño como la 
composición de los consejos son determinados de forma endógena y dependen 
de ciertas características de los consejeros y de la empresa a la que 
representan. En ambos modelos es digna de mención la interacción planteada 
entre consejeros que no son miembros del ejecutivo y aquellos que sí lo son. 
Así, los consejeros externos con un cierto nivel de independencia, y en aras de 
maximizar el interés de los accionistas, deben embarcarse en la búsqueda de 
información de la que carecen a un cierto coste. Por el contrario, los consejeros 
que sí son miembros del ejecutivo son una fuente de información básica para el 
ejercicio de la labor de supervisión por parte de los externos, pero al mismo 
tiempo son capaces de extraer beneficios privados de la comunicación o no 




equilibrio de poder entre unos y otros lo que a su vez determina el control final 
del consejo, la delegación de autoridad de una parte respecto a la otra en 
relación a la comunicación de la información y a la adopción de decisiones y, en 
último término, la estructura óptima del consejo. Raheja (2005), por su parte, 
incorpora a la función de monitorización del consejo la evaluación de los 
consejeros ejecutivo como potenciales sucesores del consejero delegado, para 
acabar infiriendo la existencia de diferentes estructuras óptimas para 
diferentes tipos de firma. 
En resumen, tanto el diseño óptimo del consejo como su 
efectividad en el ejercicio de las funciones asesora y supervisora están 
directamente relacionados con la disponibilidad de información para los 
outsiders, así como con las características del entorno, de la firma, o del propio 
consejo.  
 
El uso de comités, la independencia del consejo y el valor de la empresa 
Existen abundantes ejemplos en la literatura sobre gobierno 
corporativo que muestran cómo la actividad del consejo de administración 
viene determinada por su tamaño y por la proporción de independientes, entre 
ellos y como evidencia más reciente podemos citar a Coles et al. (2008) y a Link 
et al. (2008). En el modelo planteado en la presente tesis doctoral, indagamos 
en el papel desempeñado por los comités como instrumentos que permiten 
abordar la delegación de autoridad y aliviar las barreras a la efectividad global 
del consejo (Reeb y Upadhyay, 2010). Posteriormente trataremos de dilucidar 
las diferencias existentes entre la vertiente supervisora y la vertiente asesora 
de las funciones del consejo, así como si las mejoras en eficiencia son 




supervisión en la empresa. 
 Así, por ejemplo, tanto Coles et al. (2008) como Linck et al. (2008) 
inciden en el tamaño del consejo y su independencia como medio de potenciar 
la efectividad del consejo tanto en tareas de supervisión como de 
asesoramiento. Sin embargo, la excesiva presencia de consejeros no ejecutivos 
puede generar problemas de coordinación, comunicación e información 
asimétrica limitando la efectividad del consejo. Del mismo modo, un número 
excesivo de consejeros también puede afectar a la cohesión y capacidad de 
adopción de decisiones por parte del consejo tanto en su faceta supervisora 
como en su faceta asesora. La utilización de comités posibilita la delegación de 
autoridad y logra mitigar los problemas que pueden llegar a surgir en consejos 
de gran tamaño o con una mayor proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos 
motivados principalmente por la falta de coordinación y por el holgazaneo 
social (Reeb y Upadhyay, 2010). El uso de comités, sin embargo, no está exento 
de costes pudiendo contribuir a la generación de asimetrías informativas 
especialmente en consejos de reducida dimensión o con mayor proporción de 
miembros del ejecutivo. De hecho, los resultados obtenidos por estos autores 
indican una influencia positiva del uso de estructuras subordinadas, tanto si los 
comités son asesores como supervisores, pero exclusivamente cuando los 
consejos se caracterizan por una mayor dimensión o por incluir una mayor 
proporción de independientes.  
En primer lugar, la calidad de la monitorización mejora cuando los 
independientes incrementan su dedicación a este tipo de tareas. La 
participación por parte de este tipo de consejeros en comités de tipo 
supervisor sin duda permite ampliar su comprensión acerca del funcionamiento 




realizar decisiones mejor informadas (Faleye, Hoitash y Hoitash, 2011a)9. Por su 
parte, el asesoramiento efectivo por parte del consejo se beneficiaría de una 
cierta especialización que permitiese que un conjunto de consejeros 
independientes se dedicara prioritariamente a la supervisión mientras el 
consejero delegado pudiera desarrollar una relación de confianza con otro 
grupo de consejeros facilitando de esta manera el intercambio de información 
y la provisión/recepción de asesoramiento (Faleye, Hoitash y Hoitash, 2011b). 
Sus resultados evidencian en primer lugar que el uso de comités de supervisión 
y asesoramiento se traduce en una mejora sustancial en el desempeño de las 
respectivas funciones; sin embargo, y en segundo lugar, también se detecta 
que la existencia de consejos intensivos en monitorización perjudica 
notablemente la confianza con la que el consejero delegado está dispuesto a 
trasmitir información traduciéndose en un peor asesoramiento y en un efecto 
neto negativo sobre la creación de valor. 
Estos argumentos nos llevan a articular nuestra primera hipótesis 
contrastable de manera que el uso de comités en general, y de comités de 
asesoramiento y supervisión en particular, mejora la eficiencia general del 
consejo de administración e implica creación de valor empresarial.  
 
Un segundo paso en el desarrollo de nuestra investigación en el uso 
de comités consiste en analizar la existencia de un posible trade-off entre las 
funciones básicas del consejo, así como la idea de que la relevancia de cada una 
de ellas depende de ciertas características de la empresa y del entorno que la 
rodea. Se trata de poner de manifiesto si la intensidad supervisora y asesora 
llevada a cabo a través de la delegación de los trabajos del consejo en comités 
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tienen una repercusión dispar en contextos donde existen diferentes 
necesidades de asesoramiento o de monitorización. Así, Faleye et al. (2011a y 
2011b) plantean diferentes medidas al respecto como la complejidad en la que 
la firma opera o el poder y la influencia del consejero delegado para detectar 
necesidad de asesoramiento, o como el nivel de free cash flow, la propiedad 
institucional o la cobertura por los analistas para detectar necesidades de 
monitorización. Por su parte, Reeb y Upadhyay (2010) proponen, junto a la 
complejidad, el número de reuniones del consejo como variables clave para 
determinar la existencia de problemas de coordinación y comunicación. En 
definitiva, todos estas variables no son sino concreciones de algunas de las 
características más relevantes bien del entorno, bien de la empresa, bien del 
consejero delegado o del equipo de dirección, que tal y como se argumentó en 
párrafos precedentes se erigen como determinantes básicos de la importancia 
relativa de las funciones asesora y supervisora y, en última instancia, del diseño 
óptimo del consejo.  
Los recientes trabajos de Faleye et al. (2010a y 2010b) demuestran 
cómo la efectividad de los consejos mejora sustancialmente a través del uso de 
comités, tanto en la vertiente supervisora (2011a) como en la vertiente asesora 
(2011b). Sin embargo, estos autores también ponen de manifiesto la 
ambivalencia de este superior desempeño, puesto que un aumento de la 
intensidad supervisora representado por una dedicación de los consejeros 
independientes a este tipo de funciones reduce sensiblemente la efectividad 
del asesoramiento y, aún más importante, la efectividad global del consejo. No 
obtienen, sin embargo, constatación del efecto inverso ya que un aumento de 
la intensidad asesora de los consejeros no hace que la calidad en el ejercicio de 
la supervisión se resienta. 




supervisión como un asesoramiento eficientes los consejeros, especialmente 
los externos, necesitan información del negocio. Y parte de esa información 
nuclear del negocio se genera y transmite en los comités delegados del consejo 
de administración. Esto nos lleva a formular nuestra segunda hipótesis 
contrastable, la cual permite la siguiente constatación empírica: En entornos 
empresariales complejos, donde las necesidades de asesoría son significativas, 
el uso intensivo de comités de tipo asesor genera valor empresarial. En 
entornos empresariales donde las necesidades de control son significativas, el 
uso intensivo de comités supervisores genera valor empresarial. 
 
La independencia del consejo y el pago de incentivos salariales al consejero 
delegado como mecanismos de gobierno corporativo.  
Los consejos de administración detentan la autoridad para, en 
último término, adoptar o vetar las decisiones adoptadas por la dirección de la 
empresa. En este sentido una de sus principales funciones consiste en revisar y 
aprobar estrategias, someter a análisis el funcionamiento de la empresa y su 
financiación. Esta función es importante porque los incentivos de la dirección 
pueden estar guiados por la obtención de beneficios privados y no ser 
convergentes con los objetivos de la propiedad. Esta alineación de incentivos es 
necesaria tanto para que el equipo directivo aporte la información acerca del 
funcionamiento de la empresa necesaria para el diseño de estrategias 
empresariales, así como para que el equipo directivo implemente las 
estrategias empresariales diseñadas por el consejo de administración. 
Según los modelos de agencia clásicos (Homlstrom y Milgrom, 
1994), la retribución al equipo directivo (y al consejero delegado como pieza 




aras de alinear los intereses de propietarios y gerentes. De esta forma, los 
propietarios pueden sustituir parcialmente el control directo al equipo 
directivo con una remuneración ligada al rendimiento empresarial.  
La remuneración del consejero delegado como instrumento de 
gobierno corporativo será tanto mas eficaz cuanto mayor sea la influencia del 
agente (en este caso el consejero delegado) sobre los resultados empresariales 
que sirvan de base a su remuneración (en el caso de acciones y opciones sobre 
acciones el valor de mercado de la empresa). Es por ello que una retribución 
ligada a resultados verdaderamente eficiente ha de estar emparejada con un 
consejo menos independiente, de forma que el consejero delegado tengo 
mayor autonomía -y menor oposición- en el diseño e implementación de la 
estrategia empresarial. 
De esta forma, la inclusión en los modelos de agencia clásicos de la 
figura de un consejo de administración cuya función primordial es el control del 
equipo directivo, se deriva la siguiente hipótesis que podemos someter a 
contrastación: la remuneración del CEO a través de incentivos y la 
independencia del consejo de administración funcionan como elementos de 
gobierno corporativo sustitutivos. 
Aunque esta relación de sustitución es clave en los modelos de 
agencia clásicos, los resultados empíricos que miden la relación entre la 
independencia del consejo y el pago de incentivos a consejeros delegados 
suelen ofrecer resultados contradictorios. Usando datos de EE.UU. Denis y 
Sarin (1999) y Shivdasani y Yermark (1999) obtienen una relación negativa 
entre la independencia del consejo de administración y la propiedad de los 
miembros del equipo directivo, mientras que Ryan y Wiggins (2004), Davila y 




Un modelo teórico alternativo a los modelos de agencia clásicos 
para explicar la relación entre la remuneración incentivada y la independencia 
del consejo es el propuesto por Bebchuck, Fried y Walker (2002). Según estos 
autores, los consejeros delegados ejercen gran influencia sobre los miembros 
del consejo de administración así como sobre los miembros de los comités de 
remuneración que determinan su salario, influencia que es usada para obtener 
una remuneración mayor y menos ligada al resultado de la empresa.  
En su modelo de atrincheramiento, Bechchuck, Fried y Walker 
(2002) desafían el supuesto fundamental en que se basan los modelos de 
agencia clásicos como es el que afirma que la remuneración del consejero 
delegado es el resultado de una negociación “entre iguales”. Bebchuck, Fried y 
Walker (2002) argumentan que el poder que los consejeros delegados son 
capaces de ejercer en la negociación de su retribución genera importantes 
distorsiones en la estructura de la remuneración resultante. Como 
consecuencia, un sistema de gobierno compuesto -entre otros instrumentos- 
por un consejo de administración menos atrincherado (más independiente) y 
una remuneración al consejero delegado directamente relacionada con el valor 
de la empresa, previene la extracción de rentas privadas por parte de los 
miembros del ejecutivo, y repercute positivamente en el beneficio empresarial. 
Ello nos permite plantear una hipótesis alternativa a la anterior, que quedaría 
formulada en los siguientes términos: Las empresas, de acuerdo con los 
modelos de atrincheramiento, utilizan la remuneración incentivada y los 
consejos de administración independientes como instrumentos 
complementarios de gobierno corporativo. 
Apoyando esta proposición, Conyon y He (2004) encuentran una 
relación positiva entre la independencia del comité de compensación y el pago 




utilizan de forma complementaria. Bertrand y Mullainathan (2000) encuentran 
que una menor sensibilidad a los resultados en la remuneración está asociada 
con un gobierno corporativo más débil, y Mehran (1995), y Ryan y Wiggins 
(2004) muestran que la remuneración ligada al valor de mercado de la empresa 
se usa de forma más generalizada en empresas con mayor número de 
consejeros externos.  
En el lado opuesto, Fahlenbrach (2009) afirma que las interacciones 
entre instrumentos de gobierno corporativo y el montante total de la 
remuneración por objetivos y el exceso de remuneración pueden ser explicadas 
por la sustitución de instrumentos de gobierno corporativo en EE.UU. Este 
autor concluye que sus resultados no son consistentes con la corriente de 
pensamiento actual que sugiere que son los directivos atrincherados los que 
diseñan sus propios paquetes retributivos.  
En EE.UU, cuatro estudios recientes -Guthrie, Sokolowsky y Wan 
(2012) Chhaochharia y Grinstein (2007) Wuang (2004) y Chung (2008)- ponen a 
prueba esta relación usando el cuasi experimento natural que supuso la 
promulgación de la Sarbanes-Oxley Law (SOX) en EE.UU. en el año 2002, y que 
obligaba a las empresas cotizadas a contar con una mayoría de consejeros 
independientes en sus consejos de administración. Estos autores obtienen 
resultados dispares, que van desde la complementariedad encontrada por 
Chaocharia y Grinstein (2007), a la falta de evidencia de Wang (2004) y Gurthie 
et al. (2012), o la relación negativa entre la riqueza del consejero delegado y la 
independencia del consejo encontrada por Chung (2008).  
De nuevo, los estudios mencionados anteriormente se centran en la 
labor supervisora del consejo de administración, y en cómo el diseño del 




éste extraiga rentas privadas de la empresa que dirige. Sin embargo, al usar el 
pago de incentivos como instrumento de gobierno corporativo los propietarios 
también han de tener en cuenta los efectos perniciosos de este tipo de 
remuneración, como son la implementación de estrategias que conlleven 
mayor riesgo empresarial del que sería recomendable (dada la asimetría de 
riesgo que asume el consejero delegado), una mayor propensión a priorizar 
objetivos a corto plazo sobre el largo plazo, incentivos para adaptar la 
contabilidad en el tiempo al pago de opciones y acciones, o el camuflaje de 
resultados, entre otros.  
Además, al diseñar el sistema de gobierno corporativo de cada 
empresa, los propietarios han de tener en cuenta que el consejo de 
administración y el equipo directivo interactúan en sus funciones10 y 
obligaciones11. Así, en el diseño de los diferentes instrumentos de gobierno 
corporativo, se ha de tener en cuenta la influencia de cada uno de los 
instrumentos en la efectividad del resto. Por ejemplo, un consejo de 
administración independiente puede tener cierta preferencia por una 
determinada estructura de remuneración ligada a resultados. Esta estructura 
de remuneración influye, a su vez, en la gestión de la empresa llevada a cabo 
por el consejero delegado, en especial con respecto a la asunción de riesgos 
empresariales, política de dividendos, transparencia, etc. Del mismo modo, un 
consejero delegado con una compensación muy ligada a resultados puede 
manifestar su preferencia por un consejo de administración con una menor 
proporción de consejeros independientes, donde el consejero delegado tenga 
                                                     
10
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mayor poder para diseñar e implementar la estrategia empresarial, y puesto 
que los resultados de dicha estrategia afectan al total de su remuneración, 
tendrá un mayor incentivo para hacer que sus estrategias empresariales 
preferidas prevalezcan.  
Recientemente, una nueva generación de artículos que estudia la 
relación entre la independencia del consejo de administración y el pago de 
incentivos al consejero delegado ha intentado incorporar algunos de estos 
elementos en sus modelos teóricos. De esta forma Kumar y Sivaramakrishnan 
(2008) incluyen en su modelo la transmisión de información entre los 
miembros del consejo de administración y la dirección de la empresa. Dada la 
naturaleza endógena de la remuneración incentivada, los autores predicen una 
relación ambigua entre la independencia del consejo y la compensación ligada 
al valor de mercado del consejero delegado. Ozertuk (2005), por su parte, 
presenta un modelo donde es el consejo de administración quien actúa de 
forma no totalmente independiente del consejero delegado, el que establece la 
remuneración de este último. En su modelo, la intensidad con que el consejo 
de administración supervisa al consejero delegado y la sensibilidad de la 
remuneración a los resultados empresariales son mayores cuanto más 
independiente sea el consejo de administración.  
En nuestro estudio incorporamos la labor asesora del consejo de 
administración como elemento fundamental que puede contribuir a 
determinar de forma decisiva la composición del mismo. De esta forma, la 
relación entre la independencia del consejo de administración y la estructura 
de la remuneración al consejero delegado depende del peso relativo de las 
labores de asesoría y supervisión del consejo de administración. Por una parte, 
la labor monitora del consejo de administración puede verse facilitada por la 




negativa entre la intensidad supervisora del consejo de administración y la 
remuneración por incentivos. Al mismo tiempo, el apoyo de los miembros del 
consejo de administración al diseño de la estrategia empresarial beneficia al 
consejero delegado al hacer aumentar el valor de su remuneración en forma de 
acciones y opciones sobre acciones, lo que nos induciría a esperar una relación 
positiva entre la intensidad asesora del consejo de administración y la 
remuneración por incentivos. 
En resumen, el diseño del paquete retributivo del consejero 
delegado depende de la estructura del consejo de administración, la cual, a su 
vez, viene determinada por las necesidades de asesoría y control de la 
empresa. Todo ello nos permite proponer para su contrastación el siguiente 
bloque de hipótesis: En un modelo de agencia esperamos encontrar una 
relación negativa entre la labor supervisora del consejo y el pago de incentivos, 
y una relación positiva entre la labor asesora y la remuneración incentivada al 
consejero delegado. En un modelo de atrincheramiento, esperamos encontrar 
una relación positiva entre ambas funciones y el pago de incentivos.  
 
DISEÑO EMPÍRICO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN 
 
Para nuestra investigación hemos compilado una amplia base de 
datos representativa de las principales economías de Europa Occidental12 
durante el periodo 1999-2009. Esta base de datos contiene información 
detallada de las características de gobierno corporativo proveniente del 
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proveedor de datos BoardEx, e información económico-financiera obtenida de 
la base de datos Thomson. 
Hemos creado dos paneles de datos independientes, uno para cada 
uno de los objetivos de investigación planteados. Para el primero de ellos 
incluimos información sobre comités, consejo de administración, remuneración 
y valor de la empresa, obteniendo un panel de datos que contiene 2 029 
empresas europeas, y 11 517 observaciones. Se trata de empresas cotizadas 
pertenecientes a catorce países de Europa Occidental13 durante el periodo 
comprendido entre 1999 y 2009. Toda la información acerca de los comités, 
consejo y remuneración ha sido obtenida trabajando con la base de datos 
original de BoardEx, mientras que los datos contables y de mercado de las 
empresas de nuestra muestra provienen de la base Thomson.  
Para nuestra segunda pregunta de investigación hemos recabado 
información detallada relativa a la remuneración al consejero delegado, 
obteniendo un segundo panel de datos con un total de 12 362 observaciones 
correspondientes a 2 668 empresas durante los años 1999 a 2007. Este panel 
conforma una muestra representativa correspondiente a quince países de 
Europa Occidental. Del total de 12 362 observaciones de la muestra, el 62.7% 
(7 751 observaciones) corresponden a empresas con domicilio fiscal en el Reino 
Unido, y el resto (4 611, el 37.3%) corresponden a empresas de Irlanda y 
Europa Continental14.  
 La diferencia principal entre las muestras utilizadas en ambos 
capítulos radica en que la primera de ellas contiene información de dos años 
adicionales de la muestra -los años 2008 y 2009- mientras que los datos del 
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 Este sesgo en la representación por países se debe al contenido de la base de datos BoardEx, donde la 




segundo estudio recogen el periodo 1999-2007 y un país adicional, 
Luxemburgo, que no está recogido en el análisis de comités. A pesar de estas 
diferencias, las bases de datos son similares en tamaño, representación de los 
principales países europeos, sectores económicos, y tipo de empresa. De 
hecho, la estadística descriptiva de ambas muestras revela una gran 
homogeneidad en sus valores agregados contables y de mercado lo que sin 
duda nos permite combinar los resultados obtenidos y extrapolar nuestras 
conclusiones al sector corporativo de Europa Occidental.  
 Respecto a la base de datos de comités, nuestra labor 
fundamental, además de eliminar valores erróneos o repetidos, consistió en 
generar variables suficientemente informativas, y en convertir una base de 
datos original con observaciones por comité/empresa/año (61 714 
observaciones) en una base de datos con estructura de panel donde cada 
empresa aparezca recogida en una sola observación por año (con un total final 
de 11 517 observaciones). Así, la información sobre comités, de la que se 
dispone para comité/empresa/año ha sido transformada en información a nivel 
de empresa/año generando nuevas variables. En primer lugar generamos la 
variable que mide el número de comités, variable construida como la suma de 
veces que cada empresa aparece recogida en la muestra original, lo que 
coincide con el número de comités de los que la empresa dispone. En segundo 
lugar, generamos la variable que mide la independencia media de los comités, 
variable planteada únicamente en aquellas empresas para las que disponemos 
de información sobre el número de miembros y el número de ejecutivos por 
comités. En tercer lugar se ha calculado el número medio de puestos directivos 
presentes en los diferentes comités de la empresa. En cuarto lugar, hemos 
creado variables binarias que informan acerca de si las empresas cuentan con 




informan de la participación del consejero delegado en comités, de la 
existencia de comités de tipo asesor, etc. Y, por último, también hemos 
clasificado los comités de la base de datos original en los subgrupos de comités 
supervisores, asesores y mixtos, dependiendo del tipo de función 
desempeñada del consejo. Esta detallada clasificación será clave en el análisis 
llevado a cabo con posterioridad.  
La estructura de la base de datos original de BoardEx que contiene 
información de compensación a ejecutivos es tal que cada empresa aparece 
repetida cada año tantas veces como informes haya publicado ese mismo año. 
Así, una empresa que publicara solamente el informe anual, donde aparecen 
los informes de remuneración y la composición del consejo, contendría una 
sola entrada, pero aquellas empresas que hubieran publicado además informes 
trimestrales aparecerían cuatro cinco o mas veces en el mismo año en nuestra 
base de datos.  
La primera limpieza de la base de datos consistió en recoger toda la 
información de los diversos informes en una sola entrada. Esta labor se hizo 
mediante programación informática (Stata) cuando fue posible. Por ejemplo, 
cuando en un informe aparecía el nombre y titulo dado al consejero delegado, 
y en otro su remuneración. En aquellos casos en que diversos informes 
recogían información divergente como diferentes datos de compensación a 
ejecutivos o diferentes títulos dados al consejero delegado, esa compilación se 
hizo de forma manual: eligiendo el informe más completo en algunos casos, 
agregando la información recogida en ambos informes en otros e incluso 
eligiendo el dato que pareciera mas correcto en casos marginales15. 
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La siguiente criba consistió en eliminar datos repetidos, datos 
claramente erróneos (outliers) o datos contradictorios. Así, por ejemplo, en 
algunos casos la misma empresa aparece con dos consejeros delegados 
diferentes, o con diferentes niveles de experiencia o tiempo trabajado en la 
empresa. Además, en los casos en que hubo cambio de consejero delegado a lo 
largo de un determinado año, la empresa aparece recogida dos veces en ese 
periodo. Para crear nuestro panel hemos elegido al consejero con mayor 
retribución de los dos asumiendo que es quien más tiempo ha asumido las 
funciones ejecutivas.  
Por último, hay muchas de las empresas en BoardEx donde la 
retribución al consejero delegado aparece con importe cero. Esto puede ser 
debido a varios factores: (1) porque BoardEx no haya transcrito la información 
correctamente desde los informes anuales u otra publicación donde aparezca 
la retribución al consejero delegado. (2) Porque la empresa no revela dicha 
información. A este respecto conviene tener en cuenta que la transparencia 
informativa acerca de la remuneración es opcional en la mayoría de países 
europeos y no está tan extendida como en EE.UU. (3) Porque la retribución al 
consejero delegado en esa empresa sea precisamente cero. Con la información 
de la que disponemos, no es posible conocer cual de los tres motivos es el 
motivo de la aparición de cero en la retribución, por lo que finalmente optamos 
por incluir en la muestra las observaciones con retribución cero. Una 
contrastación de una muestra aleatoria de nuestros datos nos lleva a la 
conclusión de que la mayor parte de estas observaciones corresponden a 
empresas que eligen no revelar los datos de retribución a sus ejecutivos en sus 
informes anuales, mientras que en otros casos las empresas simplemente no 
pagan retribución alguna a consejeros delgados que tienen una gran 




Este último caso es frecuente en empresas más pequeñas y de sectores 
tecnológicos, mientras que la ocultación de datos es común en países 
germánicos como Austria y Alemania.  
En el capitulo 3, donde la retribución al consejero delegado es un 
elemento esencial del análisis, hemos llevado a cabo análisis de robustez con 
muestras donde se eliminan aquellas empresas con retribución cero, otros 
donde se elimina los países como Alemania y Austria de donde provienen la 
mayoría de estas observaciones, y otros donde se elimina todas las 
observaciones de cada empresa cuando en algún año aparezca una retribución 
de importe de cero. Estos análisis de robustez muestran que nuestras 
conclusiones no cambian sustancialmente con la inclusión o exclusión de dichas 
observaciones. Dado por lo tanto que es imposible discernir con la información 
a nuestro alcance a qué se debe la remuneración cero, hemos optado por 
incluir dichas observaciones en la versión final del trabajo y referir los diversos 
análisis de robustez practicados.  
La información económica-financiera y de mercado ha sido 
obtenida del proveedor de datos Thomson. En este caso la tarea fundamental 
ha consistido en la criba y limpieza de datos. Por motivos de computación, 
dada la extensión de nuestra muestra, hemos tenido dificultad para obtener 
todas las variables, para todas las empresas y durante todos los años. Por lo 
tanto, la primera criba ha consistido en eliminar variables que no recogían 
ninguna información y seleccionar variables que eran necesarias para nuestro 
estudio.  
Además de la anterior tarea, ya de por sí suficientemente compleja, 
se ha realizado un gran esfuerzo en la eliminación de variables y observaciones 




valores claramente erróneos (outliers), o remplazándolos por su aproximación 
mas certera, realizando labores de acotación de las variables (winsorización), y 
transformando los datos para la creación de variables informativas. Entre estas 
últimas podemos destacar la construcción del ratio valor de mercado entre 
valor contable (como medida de creación de valor), el índice o nivel de 
apalancamiento financiero o las diversas transformaciones logarítmicas 
representativas del tamaño de la empresa. A través de la fusión de cada una de 
las bases de datos mencionadas se ha llegado a la obtención de los paneles 
finales de datos. La muestra original de Thomson usada posteriormente en la 
fusión contiene 68 400 Observaciones con una única observación por empresa 
y año. Por su parte, la base de comités, elaborada a partir de la información 
proporcionada por BoardEx, y una vez trabajada para incluir una sola 
observación por empresa y año, contenía 11 517 observaciones. Por último, la 
muestra con información sobre compensación directiva asciende a 14 107 
observaciones.  
Con esta información se han generado sendos paneles que servirán 
para dar respuesta a cada una de los objetivos de investigación abordados en la 
presente tesis doctoral. Así, para el estudio de la influencia de los comités en la 
eficiencia del consejo de administración y en el valor empresarial hemos 
contado con todas las empresas de la muestra de comités. En cambio, en la 
sección donde se analizan las relaciones entre retribución e independencia del 
consejo, la información más crítica ha sido la relativa a la compensación de 
ejecutivos determinando la composición final del segundo panel.  
La fusión se ha realizado en dos pasos. En un primer lugar se han 
fusionado las bases de datos de comités y compensación usando uno de los 
códigos proporcionados por BoardEx así como el nombre de la empresa. Para 




aquellas observaciones en que estuviera disponible. En el resto de casos la 
fusión ha sido totalmente manual, cotejando los nombres de empresas, países 
de cotización y sectores de actividad, cuando estos datos estaban disponibles. 
Sobre el panel final, hemos practicado un último filtrado y transformación de 
datos, creando y acotando variables, deflactando datos de compensación, 
realizando transformaciones logarítmicas y eliminando observaciones erróneas.  
Los paneles finalmente resultantes, y que han sido utilizados en la 
investigación, contienen un total de 11 517 observaciones (en el caso del panel 
que contiene información detallada acerca de comités) y 12 362 (en el caso del 
panel que contiene información detallada de remuneración a consejeros 
delegados).  
Esta importante pérdida de datos en la fusión se debe 
principalmente a la información proporcionada por BoardEx. Así, algunas de las 
observaciones de la base de datos original de BoardEx corresponden a 
empresas que ya no cotizan en bolsa, otras empresas (sobre todo del Reino 
Unido, donde BoardEx tiene mayor presencia) corresponden a sectores de 
seguros, o financieros y no están incluidas en la muestra disponible de 
Thomson.  
El importante sesgo de los dos paneles hacia empresas del Reino 
Unido se debe a la mayor presencia de información de este país en los datos 
proporcionados por BoardEx. Mientras la base de Thomson tiene una cobertura 
más extensa en el resto de países, la base de datos de BoardEx tiene cobertura 
limitada en países no anglosajones, especialmente en el periodo que abarca 
desde 1999 a 2004.  
Por último, hemos puesto especial atención en completar por todos 




que tenemos un menor número de datos (como Austria, Dinamarca o 
Finlandia) de forma que estén suficientemente representados en nuestra 
muestra.  
En resumen, hemos creado dos muestras, a partir de nuestra base 
de datos, representativas de las principales economías europeas durante la 
primera década de este siglo. Esta base de datos se caracteriza por su 
extensión (recoge información en la que los principales países de Europa 
occidental están suficientemente representados), su horizonte temporal (desde 
1999 hasta 2009), y la calidad de sus datos ya que contienen amplia 
información tanto de carácter cuantitativo (acerca de remuneración, 
capitalización etc.) como cualitativo (nombre de consejeros, puesto en la 
empresa, nombre exacto de comités, nombre de accionistas mayoritarios, etc.).  
Según la información disponible en nuestra muestra de datos, las 
empresas europeas cuentan por término medio con 9.1 miembros en sus 
consejos de administración, de los cuales el 60% no forma parte del equipo 
ejecutivo de la empresa. Además, el consejo de administración en una empresa 
media cuenta con 3 comités (el 43% de las observaciones de nuestra muestra 
corresponden a empresas que cuentan con tres comités en su consejo de 
administración), siendo los más frecuentes los comités de auditoría, 
remuneración y nombramientos. El consejero delegado de una empresa de 
nuestra muestra tiene una edad promedio de 50 años y lleva 4 años y medio en 
el cargo. Su salario medio es de 1 233 916 dólares y recibe acciones u opciones 
sobre acciones de su compañía en el 42% de los casos.  
En los últimos años hemos observado una mayor concentración de 
la propiedad, de manera que el porcentaje medio de capital en manos de 




como mayores niveles de endeudamiento (el índice de apalancamiento pasa 
del 15% al 19% en el periodo 1999-2009). También hemos observado un 
crecimiento en el tamaño medio de las empresas de nuestra muestra, que pasa 
de 17.5 millones de dólares en volumen de activos totales en el año 1999 a 26 
millones en el año 2009.  
A pesar del intenso desarrollo del marco regulatorio e institucional 
en el ámbito del gobierno corporativo en Europa desde el inicio de la década 
pasada, la información disponible nos permite constatar que los cambios en el 
gobierno corporativo de las empresas cotizadas europeas, en relación a la 
estructura de los consejos de administración y al pago a consejeros delegados, 
han sido sutiles y graduales a lo largo de la década. En nuestro estudio se 
evidencian como tendencias más significativas las siguientes: (1) una clara 
progresión hacia consejos de administración más independientes y con un 
menor número de miembros, (2) estabilidad en la estructura de organización 
de los consejos de administración en comités, con un número constante a lo 
largo de los años, (3) una mayor volatilidad en la remuneración de los 
consejeros delegados, dado que se conceden opciones sobre acciones de forma 
menos frecuente aunque una vez concedidas suelen ser de mayor importe (con 
respecto a la retribución total del consejero delegado).  
En lo que al tamaño y composición de los consejos de 
administración se refiere, el tamaño medio de los consejos en nuestra muestra 
ha descendido de 10.34 miembros en el año 1999 a 8.74 en el año 2009, 
mientras que el promedio de consejeros no ejecutivos (outsiders) ha 
aumentado del 59% en 1999 a un 63% en el año 2009. La reducción en el 
tamaño medio de los consejos de administración, sin embargo, fue más 




consejos se redujo un 5.1% (pasando de 10.34 miembros a 9.81), la reducción 
entre el año 2003 y 2007 fue del 11,72% (de 9.81 a 8.66 miembros). 
Por su parte, el crecimiento en el nivel de independencia de los 
consejos de administración ha sido menos pronunciado, y se dio 
principalmente durante los años previos a la aparición de la “Directiva de 
Modernización” (Modernization Directive, 2003/51/EC) en el año 2003, que 
incluía entre sus recomendaciones, precisamente, el refuerzo en la 
independencia de los consejos de administración. La proporción media de 
consejeros no ejecutivos de acuerdo con la información contenida en nuestra 
muestra aumentó de 58.6% en 1999 hasta un 63.1 % en el año 2009, lo que se 
traduce en un incremento total del 7.6%. En los años previos a la publicación de 
la Directiva de Modernización, la proporción de consejeros externos aumentó 
un promedio del 5.8% (del 58.6% en 1999 hasta el 62% en 2003). En los seis 
años posteriores a la promulgación de la directiva, este crecimiento fue tan 
sólo de un 1.7% (del 62% en 2003 al 63.1% en el año 2009). Estas cifras 
corroboran una corriente de opinión bastante extendida según la cual el marco 
institucional de gobierno corporativo en Europa tiene como objetivo establecer 
estándares mínimos de gobierno corporativo, de carácter orientativo, de 
manera que cuando los Códigos en Europa incorporan o reforman 
recomendaciones, éstas ya están ampliamente en vigor en las empresas, bien 
porque ya han sido anticipadas y asumidas por las empresas, o bien porque el 
cambio en los Códigos responde a una realidad ya existente en la economía 
real.  
Uno de los datos que nuestra información revela es que a pesar de 
observarse cambios significativos en la composición agregada de los consejos 
de administración (en la independencia y el tamaño), la estructura interna de 




de estudio. El consejo de administración de una empresa representativa 
europea tiene una media de tres comités, siendo los comités de auditoria 
(aproximadamente un 90% de empresas tiene comité de auditoria), 
nombramiento (presente en el 45% de las empresas), y remuneración y 
nombramiento (en el 12% de las empresas) los más comunes en nuestra 
muestra. La Comisión Europea recomienda (Recomendation on the Role of 
Non-Executive/Supervisory Directors and Supervisory Board Committees, 
Febrero 2005) el establecimiento de comités de nominación, remuneración, y 
auditoria. Cabe destacar que menos del 25% de las empresas recogidas en 
nuestra muestra han establecido algún comité de tipo asesor (como comités de 
estrategia, organización, o gestión de riesgos).  
Del mismo modo, en nuestra muestra se observa una disminución 
del tamaño promedio de los comités de 3.66 a 3.33 miembros, y una 
disminución promedio del 4.3% en la proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos 
dentro de los comités (del 62% en 1999 al 59.3% en 2009). Dada su naturaleza, 
los comités de supervisión son en promedio más independientes que los 
comités asesores, donde tan sólo el 14% de sus miembros son consejeros 
externos.  
Estos rasgos, aunque relativamente estables en promedio a lo largo 
del tiempo, varían considerablemente entre los diferentes países de la 
muestra. Es evidente que, al menos hasta la fecha, coexisten importantes 
diferencias institucionales, económicas, de marco regulatorio y de carácter 
histórico que el proceso de convergencia de los sistemas de gobierno en el que 
los países europeos están inmersos no han conseguido eliminar (Goergen, 
2007). En nuestra muestra, Suecia es el país que cuenta con consejos de 
administración con un menor número de comités (en promedio 2.08 comités, 




asesores de promedio), mientras que, en el extremo contrario, Alemania es el 
país con mayor número de comités (en promedio 3.18 comités, 1.53 comités 
supervisores y 1.6 comités asesores). Suecia cuenta además con los comités 
más independientes (con un promedio por empresa de 67% de consejeros 
externos), mientras que Grecia tiene las empresas con comités menos 
independientes (39% de externos de media). En el caso del Reino Unido, sus 
empresas cuentan con un promedio del 59% de consejeros externos en la 
composición de sus comités.  
Uno de los puntos fuertes de nuestra base de datos reside 
precisamente en el hecho de recoger información de países con sistemas de 
gobierno tan dispares como Reino Unido, máximo representante del modelo de 
gobierno anglosajón, o Alemania, Austria y Dinamarca donde impera el modelo 
de gobierno continental, con rasgos radicalmente diferentes al primero. Así, a 
título de ejemplo, los consejos de administración alemanes y austriacos tienen 
una estructura de “doble capa” (two-tier), con un consejo supervisor encargado 
de monitorear la labor del equipo directivo, mientras que los consejos unitarios 
(con una estructura de una sola capa, o one-tier) están formados por miembros 
del ejecutivo y consejeros externos conjuntamente. Este rasgo influye 
significativamente, por ejemplo, en los tamaños de los consejos, como se ve 
reflejado en la figura 1, donde se presenta la composición del consejo de 
administración por países. En ella podemos observar que países con sistema de 
doble capa (two-tier) como Alemania y Austria tienen consejos mas numerosos 
(medidos como la suma de consejeros externos u outsiders más miembros del 
equipo ejecutivo o insiders), mientras que países como Reino Unido o Finlandia, 
donde la estructura de consejo unitaria (one-tier) es norma común, son 





FIGURA 1. COMPOSICIÓN DEL CONSEJO POR PAÍSES  
 
En nuestra muestra, el consejero delegado representativo ganó un 
promedio de 1 470 000 dólares en el año 2007. Los consejeros delegados 
recibieron remuneración ligada a la evolución en la cotización de las acciones 
(equity linked compensation) en el 42.52% de las observaciones, mientras que 
en el 57.48% de los casos su remuneración no incluía ningún tipo de opciones 
sobre acciones o acciones. Cuando recibieron remuneración ligada a acciones, 
esta constituyó en promedio un 45.9% de su compensación total.  
En la figura 2 podemos observar que la evolución del pago en 
acciones durante la década pasada evolucionó en paralelo al debate público en 
ambos lados del Atlántico sobre la compensación a ejecutivos. Así, el importe 
total de la remuneración ligada a acciones (acciones y opciones) se redujo 
considerablemente en el año 2000, después del estallido de la burbuja 
tecnológica a finales de los años 90 y del que el fuerte incremento en la 












FIGURA 2. COMPENSACIÓN AL CONSEJERO DELEGADO 1999-2007 
 
El declive en la concesión de acciones y opciones sobre acciones 
como parte de la remuneración a los directivos se mantuvo hasta finales del 
año 2001, fecha en la que se destapa el escándalo del fraude contable ligado a 
la remuneración incentivada de ejecutivos en la empresa americana Enron. 
Como consecuencia de este suceso, los planes de opciones se comenzaron a 
asociar con la distorsión de los incentivos empresariales y con la manipulación 
contable y del volumen de ingresos declarados. Políticos, reguladores y 
académicos cuestionaron la efectividad este este tipo de remuneración. A 
pesar de esta mala prensa y del debate en la opinión publica acerca de la 
bondad de las opciones sobre acciones, el pago de este tipo de remuneración 
aumentó durante el periodo 2002-2007 debido probablemente al crecimiento 
económico y al incremento en la cotización bursátil de las empresas. Tanto el 
incremento del pago ligado a acciones como el volumen total de la 
compensación a ejecutivos han llevado a cuestionar amargamente los niveles 
de compensación a miembros del equipo ejecutivo en empresas cotizadas, 





















REMUNERACIÓN DEL CONSEJERO DELEGADO 1999-2007 




empezaron a notar, recrudeciéndose a medida que ha ido empeorando la 
situación de la economía mundial.  
También observamos en la figura 2 que la evolución de la 
remuneración ligada a acciones en la pasada década siguió la misma trayectoria 
que la remuneración directa (salario base más los bonos por consecución de 
objetivos) y que la remuneración total, obteniendo en el año 2007 los niveles 
mas altos y en 2002 su nivel mínimo.  
Aunque la cantidad de remuneración ligada a acciones ha 
aumentado desde el año 2002 hasta el 2007, en la figura 3 observamos que la 
proporción de empresas que conceden remuneración ligada a acciones ha 
disminuido desde el año 2002, como podemos observar en la línea que 
muestra los planes de opciones y acciones. Esta línea muestra la proporción de 
consejeros delegados que reciben algún tipo de compensación ligada a 
acciones. Así, en el año 1999, el 40% de los consejeros delegados de nuestra 
muestra recibió remuneración ligada a acciones. En el año 2002, el 45% de los 
consejeros delegados recibió este tipo de compensación. A partir de esa fecha 
la proporción de empresas con ese tipo de planes disminuye hasta alcanzar de 
nuevo el 40% en el año 2007. Aun así, las empresas que conceden este tipo de 
remuneración pagan una mayor proporción de la remuneración del consejero 
delegado en este tipo de acciones. Como vemos en la figura 3, la proporción de 
la remuneración total del consejero delegado en forma de acciones 
(denominada proporción de incentivos en el gráfico) se ha incrementado 







FIGURA 3. COMPOSICIÓN RELATIVA DEL CONSEJO Y LA REMUNERACION  
 
 
A diferencia de los datos de consejos (en los que observamos una 
gran dispersión entre empresas, pero no tanto entre países o a lo largo del 
tiempo), los datos de remuneración se caracterizan por una gran dispersión y 
volatilidad, tanto entre países y empresas (cross section), como a lo largo de los 
años (time series), en incluso dentro de cada empresa a lo largo del periodo de 
estudio.  
Esta dispersión se evidencia en la figura 4 donde se pueden 
observar las grandes diferencias existentes en compensación a consejeros 
delegados entre todos los países de la muestra. Así, en promedio, los 
consejeros delegados de las empresas finlandesas, italianas y francesas son los 
que obtienen una mayor remuneración, mientras que los consejeros delegados 
de las empresas griegas, portuguesas y danesas se sitúan en niveles mínimos. 
Hay que destacar el hecho de que los valores medios y medianos de 
remuneración por países varían mucho (dando una medida de la gran 
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mediano de compensación (ver figura 5), los consejeros delegados de las 
empresas austriacas, finlandesas e italianas serían los que mayor remuneración 
obtienen, mientras que los consejeros delegados de las empresas suecas, 
españolas y griegas son los que reciben menor remuneración.  
 
FIGURA 4. COMPENSACIÓN AL CONSEJERO DELEGADO, MEDIA POR PAISES 
 
 
El hecho de que el Reino Unido no sea uno de los países donde 
observamos valores superiores puede deberse a la forma en que la muestra 
esta construida. Las empresas que cotizan en el Reino Unido constituyen un 
total del 62.7 % de los datos provenientes de BoardEx, lo que quiere decir que 
tanto empresas grandes como aquellas de menor tamaño han sido incluidas en 
la muestra. El número de observaciones correspondientes al resto de los países 
es mucho menor, lo cual quiere decir que mayoritariamente las mayores 







COMPENSACIÓN AL CONSEJERO DELEGADO- MEDIA POR PAÍSES 




posible que la inclusión de empresas de menor tamaño pueda reducir los 
valores de remuneración medios y medianos en el Reino Unido.  
 
FIGURA 5. COMPENSACIÓN AL CONSEJERO DELEGADO, VALORES MEDIANOS 
 
 
Finalmente, en la figura 6, se muestra el uso conjunto de 
remuneración incentivada y proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos en los 
diferentes países de nuestra muestra. Vemos que países dentro de la tradición 
legal escandinava (como Suecia) son aquellos en los que se observa una mayor 
correlación inversa en el uso de ambos instrumentos, es decir, consejos más 
independientes junto con remuneración menos ligada a incentivos. En el lado 
opuesto encontramos países dentro de la tradición legal anglosajona (Reino 
Unido, Irlanda) con altos niveles de compensación ligada a incentivos y menor 
proporción de consejeros externos en sus consejos de administración. En 
promedio, la complementareidad es más acentuada en países de la tradición 











COMPENSACIÓN AL CONSEJERO DELEGADO- VALORES MEDIANOS 




conceden remuneración ligada a la evolución de las acciones en el 3%, 29% y 
9% de las observaciones. Hay que tener en cuenta que estos datos representan 
únicamente promedios por países, y dada la dispersión de la remuneración en 
Europa es preciso interpretarlos con sumo cuidado, pues las características 
especificas de las empresas que conforman la muestra (y que estudiamos más 
adelante) son las principales responsables de la forma y definición de este tipo 
de información.  
 
FIGURA 6. INTENSIDAD DE INCENTIVOS E INDEPENDENCIA DEL CONSEJO  
 
 
De cualquier manera, estos datos sí son representativos de las 
principales economías europeas y nos muestran las grandes disparidades 
existentes entre países, lo que nos permite afirmar que la convergencia 
regulatoria no se ha traducido aún en una convergencia real en la forma en que 







































Estas divergencias tienen sin duda su origen en las distintas 
realidades económicas y en las diferencias culturales y de tradición legal que no 
pueden ser desestimadas cuando se aborda la armonización del gobierno 
corporativo en Europa. En este contexto cobra fuerza la teoría de 
“convergencia como proceso” (path dependence convergence) expuesta por 
Hopt y Leyens (2005). Se permite así a las empresas adaptarse y competir de 
forma que evolucionen hacia un sistema de gobierno corporativo híbrido que 
sea el resultado de la armonización de la economía real más que de la 
imposición de un modelo de gobierno corporativo sobre otro. La Unión 
Europea ha optado, por lo tanto, por incrementar la flexibilidad dentro del 
marco institucional, de forma que las empresas tengan mayores posibilidades 
de elegir el diseño de su gobierno corporativo (por ejemplo, en cuanto a 
estructura del consejo de administración) como medio de converger hacia un 
mercado más armonizado, donde diferentes empresas, con diferentes modelos 
de gobierno corporativo, coexistan y compitan en un mercado unificado y 
eficiente a nivel europeo. La filosofía subyacente es que otorgando flexibilidad 
a las empresas para que elijan entre los diferentes modelos de gobierno la 
convergencia se realizará de forma más efectiva. La convergencia de las 
distintas realidades económicas hará converger a su vez los distintos modelos 
de gobierno corporativo que las empresas eligen de forma más efectiva que si 
se impone “desde arriba” un modelo único de obligado cumplimiento. El hecho 
de que en países como Francia, Italia y Finlandia se permita a las empresas 
elegir entre los diferentes modelos de Consejos de Administración, y de que 
diferentes estructuras de gobierno coexistan simultáneamente, no hace más 






Diseño empírico, avance de resultados, y contribución a la literatura 
Para analizar si la introducción de información acerca de comités 
nos ayuda a entender mejor la relación entre la independencia del consejo de 
administración y el valor de la empresa, comparamos los resultados de una 
ecuación clásica del valor con los resultados de una ecuación aumentada o 
extendida, donde además de los elementos característicos de la ecuación de 
referencia se incluye información acerca de la composición y naturaleza de los 
comités en que organiza el consejo de administración su trabajo. Con este 
procedimiento, podemos medir tanto el impacto directo del uso de comités 
sobre el valor de la empresa, como su repercusión en la relación ampliamente 
estudiada entre nivel de independencia del consejo y valor. 
El método econométrico utilizado es el modelo llamado “Heckman 
Two step Maximum Likelihood Estimation” (en adelante modelo de Heckman). 
Este método tiene en cuenta el posible sesgo en las estimaciones debido al 
hecho de que la creación de comités dentro del consejo no es aleatoria, sino el 
resultado de un proceso de optimización del sistema de gobierno corporativo 
de la empresa (sesgo de autoselección). 
Con el método de Heckman la estimación se realiza en dos etapas. 
En un primer paso se estima cuáles son los factores que afectan al diseño del 
consejo en comités, obteniéndose una estimación de la propensión de la 
empresa a usar comités de forma intensiva. En una segunda etapa se incorpora 
la anterior información en la ecuación de valor, de forma que se elimina el 
sesgo de autoselección consiguiendo una estimación consistente de los 
coeficientes que centran nuestro interés.  






+ β5OWNERSHIPit+ β6LEVERAGEit+ β7LNASSETSit+ β8-18INDUSTRYit+ β19-
30YEARit+σρ1λit(Xit)+εit     (1)  
Pr(COMMITTEEit=1)=γ0+γ1OUTSIDERSit+γ2LNBOARDSIZEit+γ3OWNERS
HIPit + γ4CHAIRMANit + γ5INTERLOCKINGit + γ6LNASSETSit + γ7-17INDUSTRYit + γ18-
19YEARit+μit      (2) 
En la ecuación de resultados (ecuación 1), que es la ecuación que 
centra nuestro interés, el valor de la empresa se estima en función de variables 
que expresan ciertas facetas del gobierno corporativo de la empresa, así como 
características específicas de la propia empresa y de los mercados donde ésta 
opera. Así, en la ecuación 1 el valor de la empresa, medido por el cociente 
entre el valor de mercado de la empresa entre el valor contable (Q financiera), 
depende de la proporción de miembros del consejo de administración que no 
pertenecen al equipo directivo de la empresa (OUTSIDERS), de la información 
sobre comités (COM), del tamaño del consejo (LNBOARDSIZE), de la 
sensibilidad de la remuneración al consejero delegado al resultado empresarial 
(WEALTHDELTA), del índice de apalancamiento (LEVERAGE) y la estructura de 
propiedad (OWNERSHIP), del tamaño de la empresa (LNASSETS) y de variables 
binarias relacionadas con la industria y el periodo temporal. Además se incluye 
el término σρ1λit (Xit), que corrige el sesgo de autoselección en los modelos de 
Heckman. Por último, εit es el término de error.  
La ecuación de selección (ecuación 2) nos proporciona una 
estimación de cuáles son los determinantes del uso intensivo de comités. En la 
ecuación de selección la variable dependiente (COMMITTEE) es una variable 
binaria, que toma el valor uno si la empresa usa de forma intensiva los comités. 




la empresa. Estas variables son la independencia del consejo (OUTSIDERS), el 
tamaño del mismo (LNBOARDSIZE), la concentración de propiedad 
(OWNERSHIP), una variable binaria que toma el valor uno si el consejero 
delegado es también presidente del consejo (CHAIRMAN), la interconexión de 
los consejeros (INTERLOCKING) medida como la media de puestos o asientos 
en consejos de administración de los miembros de consejo, el tamaño de la 
empresa (LNASSETS), variables binarias sectoriales y temporales, y el término 
de error, μit . 
En un primer momento estimamos el modelo base o modelo de 
referencia suprimiendo la información sobre comités (variable COM) de la 
ecuación de resultados. En la ecuación de selección utilizamos como variable 
dependiente (COMMITTEE) una variable binaria que toma el valor uno si la 
empresa cuenta con más de tres comités en su consejo de administración y 
cero en caso contrario. Este modelo de referencia nos permite medir el 
impacto producido por la utilización de comités al comparar sus resultados con 
los del modelo aumentado o extendido, donde sí es incluida la información 
sobre comités. Para medir si el uso de comités mejora la eficiencia general del 
consejo de administración comparamos la magnitud y “significación 
estadística” del impacto estimado de la variable que mide la independencia del 
consejo sobre el valor de la empresa en ambos modelos. Es decir, comparamos 
el valor y la significación del coeficiente β1 en el modelo base, donde no se 
incluye la variable de comités, con la estimación obtenida al incluir dicha 
información. Si el uso de comités es importante para la transmisión de 
información dentro de los consejos de administración y contribuye a mejorar la 
eficiencia de los consejos independientes, deberíamos observar una mayor 
magnitud y un mayor nivel de significación estadística del coeficiente que mide 




aumentado, donde la información sobre comités sí es tenida en cuenta. 
Adicionalmente podremos observar si la información sobre comités mejora la 
significación estadística conjunta del modelo planteado.  
De los resultados del modelo de referencia (sin información acerca 
de comités en la ecuación de resultados) se desprende una relación positiva 
entre el valor y el tamaño del consejo de administración y una relación negativa 
entre valor y el tamaño de la empresa (activos totales) y el nivel de 
apalancamiento (LEVERAGE). La estimación del coeficiente de la variable 
OUTSIDERS (β1), es positiva con un valor de 0.516 aunque no estadísticamente 
significativa (p-value de 0.211), lo cual viene a confirmar en nuestra muestra la 
ausencia de relación significativa entre la independencia del consejo y el valor. 
Este resultado, muy en línea con los obtenidos recientemente por Wintoki et al 
(2012) o Palia (2011), no significa necesariamente que no exista una relación 
económica entre ambos conceptos, pudiéndose explicar bien por motivos 
económicos (como que las empresas siempre adapten el diseño de sus 
consejos de administración para que tengan el nivel óptimo de independencia), 
econométricos (por problemas de endogeneidad en las regresiones), de 
medición (que las variables utilizadas no midan correctamente los parámetros 
de interés), o de planteamiento del modelo (que haya variables fundamentales 
omitidas). En la sección de resultados del capítulo 2 (sección 4) explicamos con 
más detalle esta falta de significación en la ecuación de referencia, las posibles 
explicaciones y soluciones al mismo, así como la adecuación de nuestra 
metodología al problema de la medición del valor empresarial.  
En cuanto a los determinantes del uso intensivo de comités, 
observamos que la propensión a usar comités de forma intensiva aumenta con 
el tamaño del consejo y de la empresa, y disminuye con el nivel de 




del consejero delegado, y con la interconectividad de los miembros del consejo. 
La interpretación de la relación positiva entre el tamaño del consejo y el uso 
intensivo de comités reside en el hecho de que los consejos más numerosos 
tendrán mayor predisposición y capacidad para crear comités, comités que 
podrán proporcionar importantes beneficios a nivel organizacional al permitir 
mejorar la división de tareas, la colaboración y la transmisión de información. 
Por su parte, la relación positiva entre tamaño de la empresa y el uso intensivo 
de comités puede fundamentarse en la idea de que un mayor tamaño implica 
una mayor complejidad organizativa y operacional, complejidad con la que es 
más fácil lidiar a través de la superior capacidad de control y asesoramiento 
que proporciona el uso de comités.  
La evidencia de que la utilización de mecanismos alternativos de 
gobierno como la dualidad del consejero delegado, la interconectividad de los 
miembros del consejo, o la concentración de propiedad tienen un impacto 
notable sobre el uso de comités viene a reafirmar la hipótesis que las empresas 
diseñan sus estructuras de gobierno corporativo como un sistema global en el 
que las interrelaciones entre los instrumentos de gobierno son tenidas en 
cuenta. De esta forma, empresas con gran concentración de propiedad, con 
consejos más independientes, o con consejeros mejor interrelacionados, harán 
un uso menos intensivo de los comités. Otro de los fenómenos observables 
consiste en la menor tendencia al empleo de comités en empresas donde el 
consejero delegado es también presidente del consejo de administración; en 
este tipo de empresas el diseño de la estrategia empresarial reside no tanto en 
el consejo como en el propio equipo de dirección, y la transmisión de 
información desde éste hacia aquél pierde relevancia. Puede tener lugar 
además un proceso de atrincheramiento si el consejero delegado utiliza la 




control ejercido por los propietarios de la empresa a través de los comités de 
supervisión.  
En general los resultados obtenidos en la estimación del modelo 
base o de referencia se pueden resumir de la siguiente manera: (1) la relación 
entre el valor de la empresa y la independencia del consejo de administración 
es positiva aunque no estadísticamente significativa, (2) el uso intensivo de 
comités por parte del consejo de administración está positivamente 
relacionado con el tamaño del consejo y de la empresa, y negativamente 
relacionado con la independencia del consejo, la dualidad del consejero 
delegado, la interconectividad de los miembros del consejo y la concentración 
de propiedad.  
 
Comités y creación de valor 
Una vez estimado el sistema de ecuaciones de referencia, añadimos 
a nuestro estudio información sobre los comités añadiendo a la ecuación de 
resultados el término β2COMit, que es el que recoge directamente la 
información sobre comités. La variable COMit recoge alternativamente el 
número de comités en la empresa y el nivel medio de independencia. 
Utilizamos el modelo de Heckman en la estimación del sistema formado por las 
ecuaciones (1) y (2). 
Puesto que pretendemos estudiar tanto el impacto directo del uso 
de comités en el valor de la empresa, como su repercusión en la incidencia que 
otras variables relacionadas con el gobierno (por ejemplo grado de 
independencia) tienen sobre el valor, realizaremos dos tipos de análisis 
diferentes. En el primero de ellos se incluye directamente la variable con 




magnitud y significación estadística del correspondiente estimador (β2). Si el 
uso de comités mejora el resultado empresarial esperamos obtener un 
coeficiente de signo positivo y estadísticamente significativo,  
En segundo lugar se estudia el impacto comparativo de los 
resultados del modelo aumentado con el modelo base o modelo de referencia, 
comprobando si la nueva información acerca de comités comporta o no una 
mejora global de la estimación realizada. Especial atención merece la magnitud 
y significación estadística del impacto estimado de la variable que mide la 
independencia del consejo sobre el valor de la empresa (OUTSIDERS) en ambos 
modelos. Si el uso de comités es esencial para la transmisión de información 
dentro de los consejos de administración y ayuda a mejorar la eficiencia de 
consejos independientes, debiéramos constatar una mayor magnitud y un 
mayor nivel de significación estadística del citado coeficiente.  
En general los resultados obtenidos confirman la primera hipótesis 
de nuestro modelo de comités, que establece que el uso de comités en general 
es beneficioso para la empresa, al encontrar un impacto positivo del uso de 
comités sobre el valor de la empresa. El coeficiente estimado del impacto del 
numero de comités sobre el valor de la empresa es 0.122 (Tabla 8 columna 2, 
situada en el capitulo 2), mientras que el coeficiente de la variable que mide la 
independencia de los comités sobre el valor de la empresa es 0.564 (Tabla 9 
columna 2 del capítulo 2). Ambos coeficientes son positivos y significativos.  
Sin embargo, la introducción de la información sobre comités en 
nuestras regresiones no ayuda a explicar la relación entre independencia del 
consejo de administración y valor de la empresa, que sigue siendo no 
significativa. La introducción del término β2COMit en la ecuación de valor, no 




No podemos constatar, por lo tanto, que la introducción de información sobre 
comités en general mejore el modelo de referencia a partir de una mejora en la 
eficiencia de los consejos de administración independientes.  
El análisis se completa en las siguientes subsecciones investigando 
de forma diferenciada el impacto de los comités de tipo supervisor y de los 
comités de tipo asesor sobre el valor de la empresa.  
 
Comités de supervisión y creación de valor 
Para analizar cómo el uso de comités de tipo supervisor ayuda a 
generar valor, repetimos la estimación del sistema de ecuaciones (1) y (2), 
utilizando información sobre comités supervisores en la ecuación de resultados 
(ecuación 1), y analizamos los determinantes de un uso intensivo de comités de 
tipo supervisor en la ecuación de selección (ecuación 2). Para ello procedemos 
a utilizar de forma alternativa el número y la independencia de comités 
supervisores como variables explicativas en la ecuación de resultados (COM); 
en la ecuación de selección utilizamos como variable dependiente la variable 
COMMITTEE, variable binaria que toma el valor uno si la empresa cuenta con 
más de dos comités de tipo supervisor en su consejo de administración y cero 
en caso contrario. Los resultados de dichas regresiones se encuentran en la 
Tabla 8 columna 3, y en la Tabla 9 columna 3 del capítulo 2.  
Los resultados no arrojan evidencia empírica significativa (de signo 
positivo o negativo) acerca de la influencia del uso de comités de tipo 
supervisor en el valor de la empresa. Esta falta de evidencia se constata tanto 
en el impacto directo sobre el valor como en el impacto sobre el coeficiente 
que refleja la incidencia del nivel de independencia sobre el valor.  




control (ecuación de selección), es reseñable la relación negativa y significativa 
entre el uso intensivo de comités de tipo supervisor y el tamaño del consejo de 
administración. Este resultado, junto con la relación positiva encontrada entre 
el uso intensivo de comités en general y el tamaño de consejo, hace suponer 
que empresas con consejos de administración más numerosos utilizan este 
mayor tamaño como trampolín para disponer de un mayor número de comités 
de tipo asesor, como podemos comprobar en la siguiente subsección.  
 
El uso de comités de tipo asesor y el valor de la empresa 
En esta ocasión se estima de nuevo el modelo de Heckman a través 
de sus dos ecuaciones incluyendo información relativa al número y la 
independencia promedio de los comités asesores de la empresa como variable 
explicativa en la ecuación de resultados, así como una variable binaria que 
toma el valor uno si la empresa cuenta con al menos un comité de tipo asesor 
en el consejo y cero en caso contrario como variable dependiente en la 
ecuación de selección.  
En los resultados obtenidos, que se muestran en la tablas 8 
columna 4 y en la tabla 9 columna 4 del capítulo 2, encontramos una relación 
positiva y significativa entre el número de comités de tipo asesor y el valor de la 
empresa, una vez tenida en cuenta la no aleatoriedad en la creación de comités 
asesores. De la ecuación de selección se desprende que la independencia del 
consejo de administración está positivamente relacionada con la existencia de 
comités de tipo asesor. Además, también constatamos una repercusión 
indirecta, puesto que al introducir información acerca de comités asesores en 
nuestras regresiones el impacto de la variable OUTSIDERS sobre el valor de la 




hipótesis según la cual las empresas con consejos de administración más 
independientes son las más beneficiadas con la creación de comités de tipo 
asesor, pues es en este tipo de comités donde la transmisión de información 
entre consejeros internos y externos se produce de forma más eficiente.  
En general estos resultados apoyan las hipótesis de nuestro modelo 
acerca del uso de comités asesores: (1) encontramos evidencia empírica de la 
relación positiva entre el uso de comités asesores y el valor de la empresa, (2) 
también constatamos que la introducción de información sobre los comités de 
tipo asesor proporciona poder explicativo (significancia estadística) al nivel de 
independencia del consejo de administración sobre el valor de la empresa, (3) 
por último, apoya parcialmente nuestra segunda hipótesis según la cual en 
entornos donde las necesidades de asesoramiento son mayores el uso 
intensivo de comités asesores contribuye a la creación de valor.  
Con objeto de reforzar nuestra contribución empírica llevamos a 
cabo tres análisis de sensibilidad de carácter complementario. En primer lugar 
dividimos la muestra por industrias y seleccionamos aquellas empresas que 
pertenecen al sector de nuevas tecnologías con objeto de compararlas con 
empresas que pertenecen a sectores tradicionales, estimando las ecuaciones 
(1) y (2) de forma separada para cada uno de los grupos. Con este análisis 
tratamos de obtener evidencia empírica para la hipótesis de nuestro modelo 
que afirma que empresas con mayores necesidades de asesoramiento se 
benefician en mayor medida de la constitución de comités en general, y de 
comités asesores en particular. Los resultados obtenidos apoyan parcialmente 
este supuesto ya que el impacto del número de comités en general sobre el 
valor de la empresa es positivo y significativo para las empresas en los sectores 
de las nuevas tecnologías, mientras que no lo es en el caso de empresas 




comités no está estadísticamente relacionada con el valor empresarial en los 
sectores tecnológicos, sí estándolo en el caso de las empresas pertenecientes al 
resto de la muestra.  
Para el segundo análisis de sensibilidad se divide la muestra en 
función del tamaño de la empresa y estimamos las ecuaciones (1) y (2) de 
forma separada para entidades con un tamaño menor o mayor que la mediana 
muestral. En el grupo empresas de mayor tamaño el uso de comités monitores 
sí implica una mayor generación de valor, efecto por otra parte ausente en las 
empresas de menor dimensión. Las estimaciones revelan, en el grupo de mayor 
tamaño, una relación positiva y significativa entre el valor, el número de 
comités y el número de comités de tipo monitor. Además, la inclusión de 
información sobre comités supervisores en las regresiones implica que la 
relación entre la independencia del consejo y el valor se torna positiva y 
significativa en el grupo de empresas de mayor dimensión. En general estos 
resultados corroboran nuestra suposición de que en entornos empresariales 
con mayores necesidades de supervisión el uso intensivo de este tipo de 
comités contribuye a la creación de valor.  
Por otra parte observamos que la independencia de los comités en 
general, y de los comités de tipo supervisor en particular, no está 
estadísticamente relacionada con la creación de valor sea cual sea el tamaño 
empresarial. Este resultado confirma la evidencia obtenida en la sección 
anterior en cuanto no se detectó interrelación alguna entre independencia de 
comités supervisores y valor para la estimación efectuada sobre la totalidad del 
conjunto muestral.  
Por último, realizamos un test de robustez de nuestro modelo 




de la empresa utilizando un panel dinámico con el método de momentos 
generalizado (GMM system estimator). Este método ha sido ampliamente 
utilizado en estudios anteriores para analizar la relación entre diferentes 
instrumentos de gobierno corporativo y el valor de la empresa. Usamos el 
método de momentos generalizados con el objetivo de controlar el posible 
sesgo en los resultados debido a la heterogeneidad no observada, a la 
endogeneidad corriente, y a la endogeneidad dinámica. La precisión de este 
método, por otra parte, depende de la selección de los instrumentos más 
adecuados para el control de esta endogeneidad. En el análisis de robustez 
seguimos el método propuesto por Wintoki et al. (2012) estimando la siguiente 
ecuación referida al valor:  
Qit = α + β0LagQit + β1AOUTSIDERSit+ β1BOUTSIDERSCOMit + 
β2LNBOARDSIZEit + β3INTERLOCKINGit + β4WEALTHDELTAit+ β5LEVERAGEit + 
β6OWNERSHIPit + β7CHAIRMANit + β8LNASSETSit + β9-17INDUSTRYit + β18-
28YEARDUMMYit +νi. +εit    (3) 
Al igual que en nuestro estudio anterior, primero estimamos una 
ecuación de referencia donde la información sobre comités (OUTSIDERSCOM) 
no está incluida en el análisis. Al igual que en ocasiones precedentes, no 
encontramos, en la ecuación de referencia, una relación significativa entre la 
independencia del consejo de administración y el valor de la empresa. Para 
comprobar si el uso intensivo de comités conlleva un incremento de valor, 
extendemos la ecuación de referencia para incluir (de forma secuencial) la 
siguiente información: (1) el uso de comités, (2) la independencia de comités, 
(3) la participación del consejero delegado en comités, y (4) el tamaño de 
comités. Esta información es incluida de forma multiplicativa, de manera que la 
variable OUTSIDERSCOM es el producto de OUTSIDERS por una variable binaria 




comités que la mediana de la muestra, (2) comités cuyo nivel medio de 
independencia es mayor que la mediana de la muestra, (3) comités donde en 
promedio el consejero delegado participa en mayor medida, y (4) comités de 
mayor tamaño medio que la empresa mediana de la muestra.  
En general nuestros resultados de la ecuación de valor usando el 
método de momentos generalizados muestran que las variables que miden las 
características de la empresa y el mercado donde opera (resultados del periodo 
anterior, índice de apalancamiento, activos totales y dummies de industria y 
año) tienen una mayor repercusión en el valor de la empresa que las variables 
que miden el gobierno corporativo (nivel de independencia, uso de comités, 
interconexión de miembros del consejo, dualidad, remuneración al consejero 
delegado o concentración de propiedad) que mantienen ausencia de relación 
con la variable dependiente.  
Esta falta de significación estadística no implica necesariamente una 
falta de relación económica. Como hemos indicado anteriormente, puede 
deberse a varios factores, entre ellos la especificación del modelo 
econométrico utilizado. En concreto, el uso de un modelo dinámico “Two-Step 
GMM system estimator” tiene –a nuestro parecer- dos desventajas: la primera 
de ellas se refiere a la dificultad de encontrar instrumentos adecuados para 
controlar la endogeneidad; la segunda se refiere a la propia metodología de 
datos de panel. Los modelos econométricos de panel utilizan para efectuar sus 
estimaciones desviaciones con respecto a la media aritmética de cada empresa 
o primeras diferencias. Para variables que varían muy poco a lo largo del 
tiempo (como es el caso de aquellas que miden el uso y composición de 
comités y consejos de administración), las variables transformadas tomarán el 
valor cero en la mayoría de los casos. Esta escasa variabilidad puede conducir a 




estructura de panel.  
Con respecto a los instrumentos, y aunque no existe un único 
criterio para evaluar su idoneidad, los valores obtenidos en los tests de Sargan 
y Hansen (p-values próximos a cero) no permiten rechazar con claridad la 
hipótesis de endogeneidad de nuestros instrumentos. Esta desventaja, junto 
con la imposibilidad de controlar el sesgo de autoselección hacen que el 
modelo de Heckman sea el método econométrico al que hemos otorgado 
prioridad en nuestro análisis principal.  
 
La independencia del consejo y el pago de incentivos al consejero delegado 
como instrumentos alternativos de gobierno corporativo.  
En el estudio de la relación entre la independencia del consejo de 
administración y el pago de incentivos al consejero delegado, usamos dos 
variables que ya han sido previamente utilizadas en la literatura con cierta 
profusión: la proporción de consejeros que no son miembros del equipo 
directivo respecto al numero total de consejeros como medida de 
independencia del consejo, y el pago de acciones y opciones sobre acciones 
como medida de la retribución incentivada.  
A su vez, en el análisis de la retribución incentivada al consejero 
delegado, centraremos nuestra atención en tres aspectos fundamentales: la 
existencia, la proporción y el importe total de dicha retribución. La existencia se 
refiere a si el consejero delegado ha recibido o no ha recibido en un 
determinado año remuneración en forma de acciones y opciones sobre 
acciones; la proporción se refiere a la proporción de la remuneración total del 




refiere al montante total de acciones y opciones sobre acciones que el 
consejero delegado recibe cada año.  
Esta diferenciación se debe a que el uso de remuneración ligada a 
valores de mercado (como acciones y opciones sobre acciones) no está tan 
extendido en Europa como en EE.UU., constituyendo un porcentaje 
sensiblemente menor de la remuneración total del consejero delegado. 
Además, no todas las empresas europeas utilizan este tipo de remuneración, y 
aquellas que lo hacen no la conceden cada año de forma sistemática. El sesgo 
de autoselección surge claramente en esta investigación al elegir las empresas 
inicialmente si utilizar o no incentivos en forma de acciones u opciones sobre 
acciones.  
Es por ello que planteamos de nuevo un sistema de ecuaciones 
simultáneas siguiendo el modelo de Heckman, donde la remuneración 
incentivada del consejero delegado depende de la composición del consejo de 
administración (que es quien en última instancia aprueba dicha remuneración), 
junto con características de la empresa, del consejero delegado, de su gobierno 
corporativo, y de los mercados donde opera.  
Las regresiones correspondientes a la ecuación de resultados y de 
selección características del modelo de Heckman quedan así definidas:  
INCENTIVEit = δ0+ δ1OUTSIDERSit+ δ2AGE it + δ3CEOWEALTHit+ 
δ4TIMEINROLEit + δ5CEOOWNERSHIPit + δ6LNASSETS it + δ7VOLATILITY it + δ8YEAR 
it+ ρσ1λit(Zit) + εit     (4) 
Pr(INCENTIVEit=1)=ϕ0+ϕ1OUTSIDERSit+ϕ2LNASSETSit+ϕ3OWNERSHIPi
t+ϕ4LEVERAGEit+ϕ5TIMEINROLEit+ϕ6Qit+ϕ7INDUSTRYit+ϕ8BOADSIZEit+ϕ9MDit 
+ϕ10INTERLOCKINGit+ϕ11YEARit+ϕ12COUNTRYit+νit  (5) 




automática en Europa, utilizamos tres variables distintas para nuestras tres 
medidas de incentivos. La existencia de incentivos queda expresada a través de 
la variable binaria (INCENTIVE=1) que adopta el valor uno cuando se observa 
una remuneración incentivada positiva. La intensidad de incentivos se mide 
mediante la variable EQUITY RATIO definida como el cociente entre el importe 
de la remuneración incentivada y la remuneración total anual. Por último, el 
nivel de incentivos (LNEQUITY) se refiere al importe total otorgado de acciones 
y opciones sobre acciones, que incluimos en nuestras ecuaciones a través de su 
transformado logarítmico. Las variables que expresen el nivel y la proporción 
de incentivos las incluimos de forma alternativa como variable dependiente en 
la primera ecuación (ecuación 4), mientras que la variable binaria 
(INCENTIVE=1) la utilizamos como variable dependiente en la ecuación de 
selección (ecuación 5). 
La primera de las ecuaciones de nuestro sistema (ecuación 4) es la 
ecuación que concita nuestro mayor interés (outcome equation o ecuación de 
resultados). Como variables explicativas del nivel de utilización de incentivos se 
incluyen el grado de independencia del consejo (OUTSIDERS), cierta 
información acerca del consejero delegado y, por último, características de la 
empresa y del mercado donde ésta opera. Respecto al consejero delegado se 
tiene en cuenta su edad (AGE), la riqueza mantenida en acciones y opciones de 
la empresa (CEOWEALTH), los años que lleva desempeñando su función 
(TIMEINROLE) y la proporción de acciones de la empresa en su poder 
(CEOOWNERSHIP). El resto de variables son el tamaño de la empresa 
(LNASSETS), la volatilidad de las acciones de la empresa (VOLATILITY), el efecto 
temporal (YEAR), y el término que corrige el sesgo de autoselección, ρσ1λit(Zit). 





En la ecuación de selección (ecuación 5) estimamos la influencia de 
ciertos factores sobre la decisión de remunerar al consejero delegado con 
instrumentos ligados a la evolución del valor. La variable dependiente toma el 
valor uno si se otorga al consejero delegado este tipo de remuneración y cero 
en caso contrario. Como variables explicativas incluimos, junto con la 
independencia del consejo, el tamaño de la empresa (LNASSETS), la 
concentración de propiedad (OWNERSHIP), el índice de apalancamiento 
(LEVERAGE), los años que lleva el consejero delegado en el puesto 
(TIMEINROLE), las oportunidades de crecimiento de la empresa (Q), el tamaño 
del consejo (BOARDSIZE), el número de posiciones adicionales del consejero 
delegado en consejos de administración de empresas cotizadas 
(INTERLOCKING), variables binarias de industria (INDUSTRY), año (YEAR) y país 
(COUNTRY), y el término de error νit.  
Los resultados de estas regresiones se presentan de forma 
detallada en la sección de resultados del capítulo 3 (capítulo 3, sección 5). De 
forma general podemos decir que observamos una relación positiva y 
significativa entre la independencia del consejo y el pago de incentivos. Esta 
relación es observable tanto en la ecuación de selección (ecuación 2) como en 
la ecuación de resultados (ecuación 1), y en este último caso tanto si incluimos 
la intensidad de incentivos como variable dependiente como si incluimos el 
nivel de incentivos. El signo positivo del coeficiente    en la ecuación de 
selección indica que aquellas empresas con consejos más independientes son 
más proclives a utilizar remuneración incentivada. Por su parte, el signo 
positivo y significativo del coeficiente δ1 en la ecuación de resultados apoya la 
hipótesis de que, una vez decidida la concesión de incentivos, aquellas 
empresas que cuentan con una mayor proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos, 




magnitud del coeficiente δ1 en la ecuación de resultados indica que un 
aumento de un 1% en la proporción de consejeros no ejecutivos implica un 
aumento del 0.194% en la proporción de incentivos en la remuneración al 
consejero delegado, así como de un aumento del nivel absoluto de dichos 
incentivos. Toda esta evidencia sugiere que aquellas empresas que otorgan 
incentivos en forma de acciones y opciones sobre acciones usan este 
instrumento como forma de gobierno de forma complementaria a la 
composición (independencia) del consejo de administración. 
Además de las estimaciones planteadas de las ecuaciones 1 y 2 
hemos probado alternativamente a eliminar la variables que aproximan las 
necesidades de asesoría y control con objeto de comprobar si el impacto 
”bruto” de la independencia del consejo sobre los incentivos se mantiene en 
dicha especificación. Del mismo modo también se ha probado a eliminar la 
variable outsiders y analizar el impacto bruto de las variables que miden las 
necesidades de asesoría y control. Aunque por supuesto estas comprobaciones 
no sirven para comparar los diferentes coeficientes, sí nos permite concluir que 
la relación positiva entre las variables que aproximan las necesidades de 
supervisión y el valor de la empresa es robusta y consistente. Así, observamos 
que la probabilidad de que el consejero delegado reciba remuneración ligada a 
la evolución de las acciones está positivamente relacionada con el tamaño de la 
empresa (LNASSETS) y con la interconexión de los consejeros (INTERLOCKING). 
Por el contrario, la relación es negativa con la concentración de propiedad 
(OWNERSHIP), el índice de apalancamiento (LEVERAGE), y la dispersión del 
poder ejecutivo (MD).  
Como aproximación de las necesidades de asesoramiento 
incluimos, además de las variables binarias de industria, la variable Q que 




expectativas esta relación es positiva y significativa.  
En general nuestros resultados nos permiten afirmar que los 
consejeros delegados que trabajan en empresas con consejos más 
independientes tienen una mayor propensión a recibir incentivos en forma de 
acciones y opciones sobre acciones. Además, aquellos consejeros delegados 
que reciben éstos paquetes de retribución incentivada suelen recibir una 
proporción mayor de su paga en incentivos cuanto mayor sea la independencia 
del consejo. La relación de complementariedad entre ambos instrumentos de 
gobierno se sitúa en la línea de la propuesta de Bebchuk, Fried y Walker (2002), 
que sugieren que consejos de administración más independientes, debieran 
utilizar de forma intensiva el pago de incentivos a los consejeros delegados, 
para evitar la extracción de rentas privadas. Según estos autores la 
independencia (real) del consejo de administración es un elemento relevante 
para evitar el atrincheramiento del consejero delegado, puesto que aquellos 
consejeros delegados con suficiente poder para influir en el diseño de sus 
paquetes retributivos usarán dicha influencia para obtener mayores niveles de 
compensación y un menor volumen de remuneración incentivada. Al ser los 
consejeros delegados individuos adversos al riesgo, prefieren, ceteris paribus, 
compensación menos volátil y, por lo tanto, con una menor vinculación a los 
resultados empresariales. Evitando el atrincheramiento se minimiza la 
extracción de rentas privadas a través del paquete retributivo.  
Por el contrario, la hipótesis planteada por los modelos de agencia, 
que viene a sugerir que los propietarios pueden sustituir el control directo al 
consejero por un paquete retributivo con incentivos, no es avalada por los 
resultados empíricos, puesto que en ese caso, deberíamos encontrar una 
relación de sustitución entre ambos instrumentos, relación no refrendada por 




Por último, se han llevado a cabo nuevas estimaciones con objeto 
de comprobar la robustez de los resultados. El primero de los análisis de 
sensibilidad consistió en partir la muestra en diferentes sub-muestras con 
objeto de comprobar si los resultados difieren para empresas de diferentes 
características o que operan en marcos institucionales diversos. Repetimos 
pues el modelo propuesto en las ecuaciones (1) y (2) dividiendo la muestra de 
las siguientes maneras: (1) por países, analizando de forma separada el Reino 
Unido del resto de países, (2) por industrias, separando las empresas 
pertenecientes al sector de las nuevas tecnologías (tecnologías de la 
información, electrónica y software) del resto de industrias, (3) por tamaño, 
analizando de forma separada las empresas en función de su dimensión, y 
finalmente (4) por resultados, comprobando si las empresas con mejores 
resultados en términos de beneficios operativos (operating profit), 
rendimientos de acciones (return on equity) o rendimientos de los activos 
(return on assets), utilizan diferentes combinaciones de instrumentos de 
gobierno corporativo. En un segundo análisis de robustez comparamos los 
resultados del modelo de regresión de Heckman con aquellos obtenidos en un 
análisis de ecuaciones simultáneas que no incluye el sesgo de selección, 
corroborando la importancia de incluir la corrección de dicho sesgo.  
En el análisis por países, los resultados sugieren que la 
complementariedad de mecanismos no depende del marco legal e 
institucional, y que se da tanto en entornos donde el gobierno corporativo se 
centra en la protección de accionistas (como es el caso de Reino Unido) como 
en entornos donde el consejo debe velar por el resto de stakeholders o agentes 
económicos con influencia en la empresa (como es el caso de la Europa 
Continental).  




(2004), Davila y Peñalva (2006) y Coles, Lemmon y Wang, (2008), que 
encuentran una relación positiva usando datos de EE.UU.  
También comprobamos que la complementariedad se da tanto en 
empresas en sectores tradicionales como en las empresas pertenecientes a 
sectores tecnológicos, a pesar de que el pago de acciones y opciones sobre 
acciones está mucho más extendido en el primero de los grupos. Además 
también observamos que una vez que se decide conceder incentivos los 
consejeros delegados que trabajan en empresas tradicionales reciben una 
mayor proporción de su remuneración ligada al mercado. Por su parte, la 
relación positiva entre la intensidad de incentivos y la independencia del 
consejo es de mayor magnitud en empresas con propiedad más concentrada, 
con consejos de menor tamaño, y con mejores resultados empresariales.  
Por último, y para poner a prueba los modelos de captura de 
Bebchuk y Fried (2004), llevamos a cabo un análisis de ecuaciones simultáneas 
incluyendo como variables dependientes no sólo los incentivos sino también el 
nivel de compensación directa, de compensación total, y la proporción que 
representan los bonus en la compensación directa. Los resultados muestran 
que las empresas con consejos de administración más independientes pagan 
menos retribución a sus consejeros delegados (tanto retribución directa como 
retribución total), aunque los consejeros delegados reciben en proporción 
menos cantidad de bonus. Sin embargo, los consejeros delegados que reciben 
acciones y opciones sobre acciones obtienen una mayor proporción de su 
remuneración total de esta forma. 
De estos resultados de esta tesis podemos extraer la conclusión de 
que la independencia del consejo de administración por sí sola no tiene por qué 




duda existe situaciones en las que una determinada combinación de elementos 
de gobierno corporativo puede potenciar los efectos positivos de la 
independencia del consejo sobre el valor de la empresa. Así, hemos podido 
corroborar que la independencia del consejo, unida a la existencia de comités 
asesores dentro del mismo es capaz de influir positivamente en la creación de 
valor en la empresa. De la misma manera, en la segunda investigación empírica 
mostramos que las empresas que combinan de forma complementaria la 
independencia del consejo con el pago de incentivos en forma de acciones y 
opciones sobre acciones al consejero delegado, son empresas con mayor 
rentabilidad y mejores resultados.  
Los resultados de nuestra investigación además tienen una 
aplicación empírica relevante en el momento actual. Las carencias en los 
sistemas de gobierno corporativo de grandes empresas en EE.UU. y Europa, 
junto con deficiencias en los sistemas externos de control parecen haber 
precipitado y agudizado la actual crisis económica internacional. En este 
contexto, la utilización conjunta de diversos instrumentos de gobierno 
corporativo al alcance de las empresas puede mejorar la eficiencia así como 
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1. DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Although there is currently a consensus among the business 
community, politicians and the general public about the need for sound 
corporate governance, the definition of what constitutes good governance 
practices varies around the world and business communities. A generally 
accepted definition of Corporate Governance is that of the OECD (2004), which 
states “The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules 
and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also 
provides the structure through which the company's objectives are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.”  
This definition is very closely related to that from the UK Corporate 
Governance Code of 1994, elaborated by the Cadbury committee, which states 
that Corporate Governance is “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled”. Studies on Corporate Governance, thus, analyze how power and 
influence over decision making is distributed within the corporation (Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2010).  
The main difference between the existing corporate governance 
frameworks (which provide the set of regulations, recommendations, and 
business conditions where firms design their corporate governance systems), 
derives from the alternative distributions of ownership and control within 
corporations. Broadly speaking, existing corporate governance frameworks in 
the world can be classified into two differentiated groups, depending on who is 
considered the residual claimant of the company assets (Salas Fumas, 2002): 




The shareholder-based systems focus on shareholders as residual 
claimants of the company assets. In stakeholders-based systems, corporate 
governance frameworks extend their protection to other company 
stakeholders, like suppliers and employees, who make firm specific 
investments that are sunk costs, and should be therefore treated in the same 
way as shareholders. Two clear examples of firm specific investments are the 
investments in firm specific human capital- like learning a computer software 
specific to a company- made by company workers, and machinery investment 
to produce firm supplies made by contractual suppliers. Those are non-
marketable costs that cannot be recovered in the case of company failure. The 
differences between shareholder-based and stakeholder-based approaches to 
corporate governance are not only theoretical but have a clear impact on the 
practical implementation of corporate governance practices in different 
countries. As Andrés and Santamaría (2010) point out “the concept of 
corporate governance provides the framework for the solutions of corporate 
governance problems”. 
1.1 The shareholder-based approach 
In a shareholder based system, the focus of the firm corporate 
governance is to protect the rights of shareholders (considered the residual 
claimants of listed corporations) from expropriation from managers, who have 
the right to control the corporation. A shareholder focused corporate 
governance system is very well characterized by the definition of Corporate 
Governance by Schleifer and Vishny (1997) “Corporate Governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of 
getting a return on their investment”. These authors justify their shareholder 
approach to corporate governance as shareholders make sunken investments 
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in their company, and have to reap the returns from their investments by being 
residual claimants.  
From an economic point of view, the role of the firm corporate 
governance system in a shareholder-based approach is primarily to solve 
plausible agency problems that might arise from the separation of ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Different governance instruments are 
set to prevent rent extracting from managers at the expense of shareholders. 
These systems rely heavily on the characterization of a corporation as a quasi-
public organization in which a strong management team controls the 
organization and ownership is dispersed among small investors (Berle and 
Means, 1932). In this theoretical setting, ownership and control do not 
intersect (as for example, in cases when CEO and management teams do own a 
part of the corporation), and each investor is so small relatively to others that 
conflicts of interest between minority and majority shareholders are inexistent. 
Berle and Means, in their renowned book argued that (in US) a clear separation 
had developed between shareholders and managers, with shareholders no 
longer having any real voice in how the corporation is run and with 
management only theoretically accountable to the board of directors. This type 
of business environment has been characteristic of Anglo-Saxon economies 
during the 60s, 70, and 80s, until the wave of mergers and acquisitions of the 
late 80s in US, and the extension of executive compensation in the form of 
company stock (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001), changed the landscape of US 
corporate sector: the wave of mergers and acquisitions lead to more 
concentrated ownership and equity linked compensation burled the strict 
separation of ownership and control.  
The shareholder oriented approach has been widely accepted and 




Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) states that common law countries, 
where the shareholder-based approach is prevalent, provide better protection 
to minority shareholders. In their article, La Porta et al. (1998) divide countries 
into two groups- common law countries and civil law countries- according to 
their legal origin, and compare investor protection between both groups. They 
suggest that the common law system provides better investor protection than 
the civil law system and therefore it is better at promoting the development of 
capital markets and economic growth. In a subsequent article, La Porta et al. 
(2002) show that corporate valuations in the common law countries are 
significantly higher than corporate valuations in the civil law countries. 
 
TABLE 1. LEGAL ORIGINS. 
In this table we present the countries that cover our study, classified by their legal origins, 
according to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) 
English Origin French Origin Skandinavian 
Origin  

















As a result, this shareholder focused approach has been promoted 
around the world in the last decade, as international regulators have taken 
conscious steps to make capital markets more shareholder-oriented. This is the 
case, even when in other business environments, where ownership is 
concentrated and management ownership is significant, conflicts of interests 
Corporate Governance in Europe. An overview 
95 
 
might arise between minority and majority shareholders, between owners and 
employers or suppliers, or between different types of finance suppliers 
(debtors and shareholders). In those cases, a stake holder approach could be 
more efficient, due to its broader reach.  
1.2 The stakeholder-based approach 
The shareholder-based system of corporate governance, although 
prevalent in US and other Anglo-Saxon countries like UK, is not the common 
norm in the rest of the world (Germany, Japan, etc.), where stakeholder-focus 
systems are in place (Goergen, 2007). The stake holder based system is 
prevalent in countries like Germany and Japan. Germany, with its 
codetermination system is the paramount of the stakeholder based approach, 
while Japanese model reflects great commitment to employee welfare 
(Jackson, 2005; Jackson and Moerke, 2005). In a stakeholder-focused system 
the protection is extended to other stakeholders in the company, such as 
employees and suppliers, who also make firm specific investments and have to 
be protected from plausible rent extracting from managers who control the 
company. For example, employers invest in firm specific human capital that 
could be lost in the case of company default. 
Relevant authors have provided a definition of corporate 
governance from a stakeholder based approach. For example Gillan and Starks 
(1998) define corporate governance as “the system of laws, rules, and factors 
that control operations at a company”; Fernandez, Gomez, and Fernandez 
(1998) define the corporate governance system as “a complete set of relations 
and institutional agreements through which companies are directed and 
controlled”; Davis (2005) definition of Corporate Governance refers to “the 




allocate power and resource control among participants”; and Brecht, Bolton 
and Roell (2002) argue that “Corporate Governance is concerned with the 
resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the 
reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders”.  
This stake holder based approach rests firmly on Grossman and 
Hart (1986) representation of the firm as a set of incomplete contracts 
between different agents, such as owners, managers, suppliers of finance and 
inputs, workers and even the communities where the firm is allocated. The 
distribution of the bargaining power among stakeholders is what determines 
who the residual claimant in a corporation is. Corporate governance is set to 
prevent that groups with more bargaining power extract rents from groups 
with less bargaining power in the case of an incomplete contract. In that spirit, 
Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as “the set of constraints that 
shapes the ex-post bargaining over the quasi rents generated in the course of a 
relationship”, and Azofra (2005) refers to “the set of institutional and 
organizational mechanisms that allow to balance management 
“discretionarily” with stakeholder’s rights protection”.  
The stakeholder-based approach is prevalent in Continental Europe, 
in common law countries (See Table 1) and in countries with a two tier board 
structure, like Germany, Austria and Denmark. Unlike US and UK, characterized 
by relatively large and liquid capital markets, dispersion of ownership and a 
buoyant (hostile) takeover market, most Continental Europe companies –as 
well as most companies from the rest of the world- have large shareholders 
and go public much later than their Anglo-American counterparts (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2003). Large shareholders tend to be families, other companies, 
banks and the government (Correia da Silva, Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), 
who have an interest to closely monitor managers. This close monitoring 
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should be beneficial to other stakeholders, but this concentration of control 
comes at a cost. Under the stakeholder approach conflicts of interests do not 
just emerge between managers and shareholders, but also between minority 
and majority shareholders, between employees and shareholders, between 
debt holders and shareholders etc. Besides, in Continental Europe firms do not 
experience a separation of ownership and control after they are listed in the 
stock market. Initial shareholders usually keep a majority control after they go 
public, and it is common that CEOs and managers hold a large stake of 
company stocks. The stakeholder approach is thus, more suitable to adapt to 
the characteristics of the corporate governance sector in Continental Europe.  
 
TABLE 2. DEFINITIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
In this table we present a short description of the key definitions of corporate governance 
provided in section 1, classified by source of the definitions (institutional definitions, versus 
academic definitions) and these later by their conceptual approach (stakeholder versus 





The system by which companies are directed and controlled 
OECD Principles 
(1999)  
[…] a set of relations between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined 
OECD Principles 
(2004) 
[…] the corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate 
the exercise of shareholders’ rights. The corporate governance 
framework should recognize the rights of stakeholders established by 
law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and 
the sustainability of financial sound enterprises 
Green Paper: The 
EU Corporate 
A set or relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 













[…] corporate governing organs should be accountable to the 
shareholders, the more so since they are the residual bearers of risk of 
the company as owners of its equity [….] 
Academic definitions 
Shareholder based approach 
Schleifer and 
Vishny (1997) 
Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of 




Corporate Governance may be defined as the study of power and 




The concept of corporate governance provides the framework for the 
solutions of corporate governance problems 
Stakeholder based approach 
Gillan & Starks 
(1998) 
The system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at a 
company”, 
Tirole (2001) A good governance structure is then one that selects the most able 




A complete set of relations and institutional agreements through 
which companies are directed and controlled 
Davis ( 2005) The structures, processes, and institutions within and around 
organizations that allocate power and resource control among 
participants 
Brecht , Bolton 
and Roell (2002) 
Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective 
action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of 
conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholder 
Zingales ( 1998) The set of constraints that shapes the ex-post bargaining over the 
quasi rents generated in the course of a relationship 
Azofra (2005) The set of institutional and organizational mechanisms that allow 
balancing management “discretionarily” with stakeholder’s rights 
protection.  
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1.3 Towards a shareholder-based approach to Corporate Governance  
From an economic point of view, the type of shareholder structure 
is the key factor in determining which of the both approaches to corporate 
governance is beneficial. One could argue that in business environments 
characterized by liquid capital markets, dispersed ownership, and small 
collapse of ownership and control rights – typical of Anglo-Saxon countries- the 
shareholder focus can be beneficial, as it stresses the monitoring role of 
corporate governance structures over the controlling management team, while 
in the rest of the world (with concentrated ownership, less liquid markets, and 
management ownership), stakeholder-based systems are prevalent.  
On the other hand, Roe (2003) argues that it is not economic 
conditions, but rather politics the driving force behind the choice of corporate 
governance systems. Roe argues that left-wing governments favor employees 
over investors, and that the greater employee power tends to exacerbate 
certain types of manager-shareholder conflicts, such as the pursuit of growth in 
size versus firm profitability. Managers have an incentive to pursue firm growth 
over profitability, as this increases its status, power and income. By the same 
token employers prefer to work for bigger firms where higher wages and better 
working conditions are common. In these settings shareholders tend to 
accumulate larger stakes to reduce managerial discretion, and prevent excess 
growth. On the other hand, right-wing governments encourage ownership 
dispersion, by introducing legislation that reduces conflicts of interest between 
managers and owners. In an empirical test of his theory, he performs 
regressions on data on firms and governments from over 16 OECD countries, 
finding that politics has explanatory power over and above La Porta et al (1998) 




Over the last decade, we have witnessed a worldwide shift towards 
a market based approach to Corporate Governance, that puts the emphasis on 
the protection of shareholders rights at the stake of other stakeholders of the 
firm (Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001; Brecht et al., 2002). This is the case, as 
recent business failures have put in evidence the need to protect shareholder 
value. Advocates of a shareholder based approach argue that, under this type 
of governance system, firms have more access to funds, and that it provides 
better protection to minority shareholders and higher corporate valuations.  
As a result, there is nowadays an institutional awareness about the 
need to protect shareholder value. The shift towards a shareholder based 
approach can be observed very clearly from the definition and objectives 
provided from the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, in which most 
recent Corporate Governance developments worldwide (especially in Europe 
and US) are based. 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance from the year 1999 
stated that “Corporate Governance involves a set of relations between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives 
of the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and 
monitoring performance are determined”. However in the New 2004 Principles 
of Corporate Governance (issued in April 2004), the definition shifts clearly 
towards a shareholder based approach, and among its principles, it states “the 
corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights”16. With respect to other stakeholders, the same Principles 
state that “The corporate governance framework should recognize the rights of 
stakeholders established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage 
                                                     
16
 See OECD (2004), pp. 18  
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active co-operation between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financial sound enterprises.“17.  
In this later definition, shareholders are meant to be the residuals 
claimants in case of incomplete contracting within the corporation. Other 
stakeholders should have their rights protected through law, and the design of 
business contracts. In case of incomplete contracts, it will be the shareholders 
who are the residual claimants, and the firm corporate governance system is 
set to protect their residual right to control.  
The European Union follows exactly the OECD definition of 
corporate governance, as “the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled and as a set or relationships between a company’s management, its 
board, its shareholders and its other stakeholders”18. 
The European Association of Security Dealers (AADS) has clearly 
adopted a shareholder approach to Corporate Governance. The European 
Association of Security Dealers (EASD) states in its “Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations” (May 2000) 19 the following: “[…] governing 
organs of companies cannot be held accountable to all stakeholders in the 
company- shareholders, staff, clients, suppliers credit providers, as well as the 
communities and the environment in which they operate- lest accountability be 
fragmented, subjected to contradictory aims and thereby diluted. The 
Committee therefore espoused the view that corporate governing organs 
should be accountable to shareholders, the more so since they are the residual 
bearers for risk of the company as owners of its equity, [….]” 
                                                     
17
 See OECD (2004), pp. 21 
18
 See European Commission (2011) 
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Despite this prevalence of a shareholder based approach, it is an 
open research question whether this shareholder based approach outperforms 
stakeholder systems of corporate governance. Although there is academic 
evidence (La Porta et al., 1998) that common law countries (where the 
shareholder based approach is prevalent) provide better shareholder 
protection and their companies enjoy higher market valuation, there is 
currently an strand of the literature that clearly challenges this view (Goergen, 
2007; Hung, 2011). Some researchers claim that this prevalence is due to a lack 
of research on corporate governance on stakeholder based countries (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2003) and that previous results might not be extrapolated to 
institutional setting outside the Anglo-Saxon model. 
One of the key advantages of studying the European corporate 
governance system is that both types of governance structures coexist within 
the same economic union. This constitutes a unique field to analyze corporate 
governance and its impact on firm value. Besides, the European framework can 
provide stylized facts about corporate governance mechanism that overcome 
institutional constraints and have a global resemblance.  
 
2. INSTRUMENTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
How companies are governed and controlled depends on the 
combination of the different instruments that characterize firms´ corporate 
governance. Broadly speaking, these instruments can be classified into internal 
and external to the firm (Denis and McConnel, 2003). The internal control 
mechanisms are the board of directors, managerial compensation, and 
ownership structure. The external control mechanisms are the legal and 
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regulatory environment, the takeover market for control, and the product 
market competition. Firms can, to a large extent, design their own internal 
governance systems, while the external instruments of corporate governance 
are not at reach of firms´ owners, but serve as discipline devices and configure 
the structure of the formal control within the organizations.  
There is an extended literature on the use of each of those 
instruments and its impact on firm value. In what follows I present a brief 
description of each of the instruments and its relations with the other 
instruments within the system.  
 
2.1 Board of directors 
The board of directors is arguably the most important internal 
corporate governance instrument. It holds the formal authority to adopt or put 
a veto on every decision of the management team, and it has the ultimate 
responsibility to monitor the management team to prevent rent extracting.  
Holding formal control rights – as it does- is not alone enough for 
the board to accomplish its duty efficiently. Board members also need to have 
the correct incentives and the necessary information to perform efficiently 
their supervisory and advisory functions. The composition of the board (the 
number of board members, the characteristics of each of them and the internal 
distribution of tasks in committees) determines to a large extent the exchange 
of information and the distribution of power between insiders and outsiders.  
Due to its importance for firm value, the question on what 
constitutes a good board of directors has attracted the interest of academic 
and practitioners since Smith (1776) and Berle & Means (1932)20. Seminal 
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 See Levrau and Van den Berghe (2004), Perry and Shivdasani (2005), Andres and Vallelado (2008) and 




studies on board composition focused on the monitoring role of boards21. They 
suggested increasing the degree of board independence to solve plausible 
conflicts between managers and owners, and reducing board size to avoid 
inefficiencies due to free riding and lack of control. These suggestions have 
been widely implemented, even when there is no consensus in the literature 
about the benefits of smaller and more independent boards (Wintoki, Linck and 
Netter, 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  
This apparently lack of empirical relation between board 
composition and firm value has been explained by the trade-off in information 
transmission (Adams and Ferreira, 2007); by the fact that board composition is 
endogenously determined (Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008); by the high 
costs for outsiders to obtain the necessary information to monitor and advise 
efficiently (Boone et al, 2007; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Link, Netter and 
Yang, 2008); by the role of the CEO to control de information available to board 
members (Song and Takor, 2006) and even by the econometric techniques 
used in previous empirical studies (Wintoki et al, 2012)22.  
As a result a second generation of studies on board of directors 
incorporates the advisory function to its models, and analyzes in which 
circumstances each function is prevalent (Coles et al 2008; Lasfer, 2006; Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007; Boone et al, 2007; Drymiotes, 2007; Markarian and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Cheng, 2008; Link et al, 2008, Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Andres and Rodríguez, 2011). The internal functioning of the board is as 
important as the aggregate independence level to understand how the board 
                                                     
21
 See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993), John and Senbet (1998) 
22
 Wintoki et al (2012) present an extended literature review on the papers that analyze the impact of board 
independence on firm value, noting the lack of consensus in the literature, and providing a plausible 
explanation for this lack of consensus, based on the econometric techniques used in the analysis. They argue 
that the apparently contradictory results might be driven by not taking into account the dynamic aspect of the 
board/performance relation. They argue that once past performance, simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity are controlled for, there is no causal relation between board structure and firm performance, 
which is in sharp contrast to the findings of some earlier studies 
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performs its functions. Current research -like ours in chapter two - deals with 
the internal functioning of the board in committees. Faleye, Hoitash and 
Hoitash (2011b) find that the participation of outsiders in advising committees 
allows them a better understanding of the firm, while the quality of monitoring 
improves with the independence of monitoring committees (Faleye et al., 
2011a; Conyon and He, 2004). Evidence suggests that the work in committees 
facilitates the delegation of authority (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010) and helps to 
mitigate coordination and free riding problems which can arise in the case of 
larger and more independent boards. 
The personal characteristics and incentives of individual directors 
are also relevant. Hiring directors who hold board positions in many companies 
might improve firm performance, as they bring expertise, know-how and 
relations. Besides, numerous board positions signal director’s quality (Fich, 
2005; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Gilson 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; Vafeas, 
1999; Coles and Hoi, 2003) that can yield reputational gains to the firms. By 
contrast, busy directors might be detrimental to firm performance (Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006; Core el at 2006; Prinz 2006), as they might lack the time and 
incentives to commit to each individual board position, and they might be more 
prone to entrenchment (Loderer and Peyer, 2002; Non and Franses, 2007).  
Current research on board composition and performance stresses 
the importance of features such as information transmission, trust and 
cooperation among board members, delegation or authority, consensus in the 
decision making and internal distribution of power (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010; Harris and Raviv, 2008; Baranchuk, 
2009). The recent empirical and theoretical developments suggest that the 
diversity of board types, sizes and compositions observed in corporations 




board designs to their specific monitoring and advising requirements, and to 
various institutional constraints. 
 
 2.2 Managerial compensation  
Owners can also use the remuneration packages to managing 
directors and the executive team to align the interest of shareholders (who 
own the company) and managers (who control the company). The level of 
compensation has to suffice to attract and retain talented managers, while the 
composition of compensation is meant to prevent rent extracting. There is a 
vast literature on how the structure of CEO pay affects CEO action choices and, 
ultimately, firm value: many authors argue that equity linked compensation is 
the optimal way to align the incentives of managers and shareholders 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Homstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Wuang, 2004), 
whereas several studies analyse the plausible pervasive effects of this type of 
management compensation. Excessive equity linked compensation (stocks, 
restricted stock and stock options) can lead to earnings management 
(Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Zheng and Cullinan, 2010), risk reallocation 
(Coles et al, 2006; DeFusco et al, 1990; Guay, 1999; Jin, 2002), choice of short-
term strategies over the long term (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Bebchuck, Cohen 
and Spamann, 2010; Bolton and Scheinkman, 2006; Volker, 2012), option 
backdating (Bebchuk et al, 2010), etc.  
The rapid increase and high levels of managerial compensation has 
also attracted a large amount of attention from academia, politicians, and from 
the regular press. Several economic theories have been proposed to explain 
the observed levels of CEO compensation (See Edmans and Gabaix, 2009 for a 
survey). Among those we can cite changes in the demand for CEOs (Murphy 
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and Zabojnik, 2007; Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004), increase in firm size (Gabaix 
and Landier, 2008) changes in the diligence of boards of directors (Hermalin, 
2005), empire building (Jensen, 2003), ratcheting (Nagel, 2005) and 
competition for scarce CEO talent (Acharya, Pagano and Volpin, 2012). All those 
different theories stand as opposing that of Bebchuk and Fried (2004), who 
argue that the recent increase in executive compensation is originated by 
entrenched managers due to poor firm governance (See Bebchuck, 2005 for an 
overview).  
The interaction of compensation incentives with other governance 
mechanisms in place (albeit part of this thesis) has been less noticed in the 
literature. Ownership and capital structure are related to the grant of equity 
linked compensation (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999; Mehran, 1995). For 
example, in settings where ownership is widely dispersed, equity linked 
compensation can be seen as an efficient instrument to align the interest of 
shareholders and the management, while in settings where ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of few major shareholders, the grant of equity linked 
compensation can facilitate entrentchment of the management team, and rent 
extraction from minority shareholders, to the hands of majority shareholders 
and management team. On the other hand, equity linked compensation is 
arguably an efficient governance instrument in firms with limited cash flow, 
high growth opportunities or in need to restructure (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2001).  
Because the use of equity linked compensation blurs the separation 
between ownership and control, it clearly influences the composition of the 
board, and its supervisory role on the management team (Ferranini, Moloney 
and Ungureanu, 2009; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Chung, 2008; Wuang, 




compensation structure to the CEOs (Feinberg, 2011), and whether caps to 
(arguably) excessive CEO pay are adequate.  
 
2.3 Ownership structure 
How corporations are governed and how control is distributed 
within these organizations depends crucially on the organization’s ownership 
structure.  
Although most theoretical literature on corporate governace is 
based on Berle and Means (1932) notion of corporation with many dispersed 
owners, each of them so small that is unable to influence firm governance 
alone, this type of ownership structure is not represantive of listed 
corporations worldwide (LaPorta and Lopez de Silanes, 1999). It is a common 
classification that firms in anglo saxon (common law) countries are 
characterized by dispersed ownership of the type described by Berle and 
Means, while ownership in Continental Europe (civil law countries) is 
concentrated around few controlling shareholders. 
In a setting where ownership is dispersed among several owners, all 
of them small enough, the key agency problem arises between the 
management who controls the firms and the shareholders that are small to 
monitor efficiently, whereas in settings where ownership is concentrated in 
few hands, the agency problems can arise between minority and majority 
shareholders, as majority shareholders have an incentive to self-deal or to 
extract rents from minority shareholders. Among the authors modeling these 
types of rent extractions we can cite Johnson et al. (2000), Lombardo and 
Pagano (2002), LaPorta et al (2002), Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Doidge et 
al (2007), Durnev and Kim (2005), Stulz (2005).  
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In shaping control powers over the firm, it is not just the 
proporportion of ownership that is relevant, but also other factors like the type 
of owner, or the existance of complex ownership structures. Typical controlling 
shareholders are large institutional investors, such as banks, financial 
instituions and non financial institutions, pension funds, companies, the state, 
families or wealthy individuals. Large shareholders can form alliances and act as 
a block to influence corporate decisions. Those block holders are significant in 
countries with concentrated ownership such as South Korea, Russia, Germany, 
Italy or Spain. The effect of this disproportional ownership on firm value is 
ambiguous. The existance of controlling shareholders can be beneficial, as they 
have incentives to monitor the management, pursue long term growth, and 
even reduce the exposure of firm shares to market price volatility. However, 
when disproportionate control creates too many opportunities for rent 
extraction, private investors might be reluctant to provide capital, leading to 
underinvestment, which ultimately prevents economic growth (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2008). 
Complex ownership structures allow to obtaing control of the 
corporation, in excess of cash flow rights. Complex corporate structures are 
pyramids (widely present in Continental Europe), firm networks and cross 
holdings (present in countries like Korea and Japan). The pyramid is the 
structure widely used by international groups who own the companies 
incorporated in a number of countries. It is also frequently used by family 
owners, to hold control over corporation in excess of their cash flow rights.  
Dual class shares are also used to distort the proportionality 
principle. Dual class firms allow to separate cash flow and voting rights, usually 
allowing management (or the original owner of the company) to control the 




voting and without voting rights trade at different prices, giving the resulting 
premium a measure of the value of corporate control and private benefits 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2008; Doidge, 2004; Neumann, 2003, Nicodano, 1998). 
Howe and Tamm (2011) show that dual class firms are less likely to have 
independent boards and have lower levels of institutional ownership. On the 
other hand, they are more likely to have separate individuals as CEO and 
Chairman of the board, and less likely to have staggered boards, which are 
considered to be good governance characteristics. Gompels, Ishii and Metrick 
(2010) find strong evidence that firm value is increasing in insider’s cash-flow 
rights and decreasing in insider’s voting rights.  
 
2.4 Legal, political and regulatory system  
The laws and regulations of a country that provide the institutional 
and legal framework for business contracts have a clear impact on the way 
corporations are governed. According to LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000), differences in investor protection are very important 
determinants of differences in ownership structure, financial development, 
dividend policy, mergers and acquisitions. Their importance is such that these 
authors argue that countries legal approach (in terms of investor protection) is 
a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than 
the conventional distinction between bank centered and market-centered 
financial systems. In a series of papers they show that countries with poorer 
investor protection have smaller and narrower capital markets (La Porta et al., 
1997), more concentrated ownership (La Porta et al., 1998), and ultimately 
lower firm valuation (La Porta el al., 2002). This later conclusion is the one that 
has attracted most interest, shaping the institutional approach to corporate 
governance of the last decade, towards a shareholder based approach, 
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common in Anglo-Saxon countries, which are- according to these authors- the 
countries where investors are more protected by the legal and institutional 
framework.  
Besides, recent empirical papers show that firms seem to choose 
very similar governance standards within countries (Bergman, 2007; Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz, 2007), even when there is evidence of positive returns to 
governance standards above the minimum requirements (Gompers et al., 
2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Gomes, 2000). One plausible explanation for this 
puzzle is that firms do not internalize the benefits that their improved 
corporate governance has on their competitor. When corporate governance 
generates positive externalities, market based mechanisms that force firms to 
internalize this externality and increased regulatory standards are desirable 
(Acharya and Volpin, 2010).  
 
2.5 Business forces: product market competition and the market for 
corporate control  
Product market competition acts as a disciplinary device to avoid 
rent extracting (Jensen, 2003), as it is in settings where competition is high 
among players, that only the most efficient firms are able to survive. In a high 
competitive setting the chances to obtain excess surplus are reduced by 
competition, and thus, the chances to extract rents for those who control the 
corporation eliminated or severely constrained. In settings where firms 
compete for funding in the capital markets, sound corporate governance can 
be decisive to attract capital, and raise funds on better terms. Gompers et al. 
(2003) find that firms with better corporate governance have –other things 




acts as a strong disciplinary device is the risk of a take-over (Holmstrom and 
Kaplan, 2001; Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). If a firm is ill-governed, it risks to be 
taken over by outside investors, who can replace the management team and 
add value by improving the governance system. This acts as a disciplinary 
device for managers with career concerns, who would lose reputation and 
future income if replaced. However, managers and majority shareholders can 
protect themselves from hostile takeovers, implementing measures such as 
staggered boards (where only one third of the board can be replaced each 
year, so that the original board members still hold control of the company), 
shareholders right plans (such as poison pills), supermajority clauses or dual-
class shares.  
 
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE: THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The Corporate Governance framework for listed companies in the 
European Union is a combination of legislation and ”soft law”, including 
recommendations and corporate governance codes. While corporate 
governance codes are adopted at a national level, Directive 2006/46/EC 
promotes their application by requering that listed companies refer in their 
corporate governance statement to a code and that they report on their 
application of that code on a ”comply or explain” basis23.  
The European corporate goverannce framework has experienced its 
largest development within the last decade (1999-2009), which correspond to 
the years of our study. During these years we witnessed an unprecedented 
                                                     
23
 See Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance Framework (2011) 
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interest from academics, regulators, and public opinion, on how firms design 
their internal Corporate Governace Systems.  
The issue of internal corporate governance of listed firms became 
central to the public interest after the collapse of the Enron Corporation in US 
in October 2001, due to a failure of internal control mechanisms, and after the 
Parmalat scandal in Europe, in the year 2003, where the lack of independence 
of the audit committee members from controlling shareholders was key to the 
fraud (Mellis, 2006). These scandals originated a growing interest in corporate 
governance improvement, not just from academics and regulators, but also 
from the small investors and the general public. This public awareness put 
corporate governance improvements at the top of the political agenda, and 
originated a wave of new norms and regulations in both sides of the Atlantic, to 
address issues such as the optimal design of the board of directors, increase in 
transparency and disclosure rules, accountability of directors and members of 
the management team for excessive risk taking, rent extraction and business 
failures, etc.  
In the central years of the decade- approximately between 2002 
and 2007- the attention of the public opinion was centered on the levels of 
executive compensation, especially in US, and the controversy about certain 
types of compensation schemes, like stock options, which were blamed to 
induce rent extraction, excessive risk taking, and ultimately, business failures 
(Chesney, Stromberg and Wagner, 2011).  
Nowadays, failures in the internal corporate governance systems of 
several financial firms and CEO greedy behavior due to poorly designed 
compensation schemes have been blamed for the ongoing financial crisis. 




(partly due to their compensation systems), and overlooked long term 
sustainability of their companies (Bhagat and Bolton, 2011), while uninformed 
auditors and entrenched board of directors were unable to stop the failure and 
address the wrong doing (Bebchuck, Cohen and Spamann, 2010).  
As a result of the corporate scandals on both sides of the Atlantic, 
there have been profound changes in corporate governance regulations, both 
in US and in Europe. Regulations have aimed at harmonized and stricter 
accountancy standards, more independent boards of directors, increased 
amount of control-enhancing mechanisms, increased disclosure in executive 
and director compensation and increased disclosure of the company position 
and prospects to shareholders. We have also witnessed an unprecedented 
wave of corporate governance harmonization worldwide. The differences 
between corporate governance systems have diminished over the last decade, 
and we observe a growing consensus over corporate governance standards, 
towards a market based approach to corporate governance, where companies 
retain flexibility so as to design their internal corporate governance systems, 
while ensuring accountability to their shareholders. 
 
3.1 The period 1999-2003. The harmonization and consolidation of national 
codes  
The years that cover our study (1999-2009) have an additional 
interest for Europe from a corporate governance point view. Together with the 
common interest to improve corporate governance standards, there was an 
intense activity in Europe to harmonize the corporate governance systems of 
the Member States, in a clear effort to advance towards Corporate Governance 
harmonization within the framework of a single European Market. From the 
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beginning, the EU was involved in the development of numerous Directives 
(see Table 3), relating to company law and corporate governance, with the 
objective to harmonize corporate laws and codes within the European Union. 
This harmonization was especially intense during the period 1999-2003, when 
many countries issued or amended their Corporate Governance Codes. In one 
of its latest Green Papers (Green Paper 2010/164 on the EU Corporate 
Governance Framework), the European Commission reiterated its commitment 
to a successful single market, being corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility key elements to building people’s trust in the single market.  
 
TABLE 3. MAJOR EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES 
 
In this table we present major EU initiatives in the field of the fostering and development 
of a Corporate Governance Framework, as key element in the creation of the Single 
European Market. This table is not exhaustive; we rather focus on EU acts that are 
relevant to the corporate governance elements of this study (compensation policies, 
board size and independence, committee work, etc.).  
Year Corporate Governance Initiatives 
1968-1989 Various EU Directives, Recommendations and Communications involving 
company law and corporate governance 
2001 The Council Regulation on the Statute for a European Company (Societas 
Europaea) 
2003  The Modernization Directive (2003/51/EC) 
The Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) 
2004 Market in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC) 
The Takeover Bids Directive May 2004 (2004/25/EC) 
The Transparency Obligations of Listed Companies Directive (December 
2004) 2004/109/EC 
Recommendation on the Remuneration for Directors of Listed Companies 
(December 2004) 
2005 Recommendation on the role of non-executive/supervisory directors and 
Supervisory Board Committees (February 2005) 





The Statutory Audit of Annual and Consolidated Accounts Directive 
(2006/46/EC) 
2007 Directive on the Exercise of Shareholders’ Rights (2007/36/EC) 
2008 The Small Business Act 
2008 Mediation Directive (2008/52/EC) 
2009 The Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies 
2010 The Green Paper on the EU Corporate Governance Framework. 
COM2010/164 
2011 Report of the Reflection Group on the Future of EU company law 
 
Besides, all countries in our study have introduced new Corporate 
Governance Codes (see Table 4), and Corporate Governance Laws and 
Regulations (see Table 5) during the last decade, with the result of a clear 
tendency towards harmonization of Governance standards within EU. As a 
result of this intense regulatory decade, all Member States (in our study) had 
their own distinctive code of “best practice”, by the end of 2010.  
These national codes present notions of “best practices”, on comply 
or explain basis, compliance varying considerably from country to country. 
Compliance of the codes is followed in all countries in our study via surveys 
performed by various private and public entities. Due to public and investors 
awareness of the importance of sound corporate governance, there is a 
tendency among firms to comply with the code recommendations, rather than 
to explain areas of non-compliance. Thus, one can argue that these codes have 
a clear impact so as how European companies design their internal control 
mechanism.  
One of the distinctive features of the Corporate Governance 
systems in the EU is that, despite convergences of internal controls, there is not 
a unified Corporate Governance Code that holds for the whole EU, but each 
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Member State has developed its own corporate governance codes (See Table 
4).  
 
TABLE 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
CODES 
 
In this table we present the latest- as of year 2010- Corporate Governance Code issued 
(the country, the name of the document, the issuing institution and the year of 
publication) in each of the countries that are covered by this study. 
Country Code of Corporate Governance  Issuing Institution Year 




Austrian Working Group 
for Corporate Governance 
2007 
Belgium The revised Belgian Code on 
Corporate Governance 
The Lippens Committee 2009 
Denmark The revised report on Corporate 
Governance in Denmark 
An Independent corporate 
governance committee of 
the Copenhagen Stock 
Exchange 
2008 
Finland Revised Corporate Governance 
Recommendations for Listed 
Companies 
A working group 
comprising HEX Plc, the 
Central Chamber of 
Commerce of Finland and 
the Confederation of 
Finnish Industries and 
Employers 
2008 
France Revised Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance 
Hellebuyck Commission 2008 
Germany The Revised German Corporate 
Governance Code (The Cromme 
Code) Deutscher Corporate 
Governance Kodex (DCGK) 
A government commission 
appointed by the German 
Justice Minister 
2008 
Greece The Principles of Corporate 
Governance  
The Federation of Greek 
Industries 
2001 






Italy Revisions to the Corporate 
Governance Code (Codice di 
Autodisciplina) 
The Italian Stock Exchange 2006 
Luxembourg  The Ten Principles of Corporate 
Governance of the Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange 
The Societé de la Bourse 










Portugal The Corporate Governance Code The Securities Market 
Commission 
2007 
Spain The Unified Code of 
Recommendations for Good 
Governance  
A Government Special 
Working Group 
2006 
Sweden  The revised Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance  
The Code Group 2008 
UK The Combined Code  The Financial Reporting 
Council 
2008  
Source: Pierce (2010) 
 
Already in 2002, a research report “A comparative Study of 
Corporate Governance Codes Relevant to the European Union and Its Member 
States” on behalf of the European Commission (January 2002), analyzed 
Corporate Governance Codes Convergence within the EU Member States. The 
report recommended that the EU should not attempt to develop a pan 
European code. It also concluded, that despite legal differences among EU 
Member States, the trends towards convergence in corporate governance 
practice in EU Member States appeared to be both more numerous and more 
powerful than the trends towards differentiation. The report states that in this 
regard, the codes—together with market pressures—appear to serve as a 
converging force.  
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According to the report, the two key differences in corporate 
governance practice among EU Member States relate to employee 
representation, and, more importantly to our study, to board structure (to the 
use of one-tier, versus a two-tier board structure). In the two-tier board 
structure, a supervisory body, formally separated from the management body, 
is set up to supervise the management team. In the one-tier board structure, 
there is only one body (the board), composed by both members of the 
supervisory and management team. In all cases, shareholders elect all board 
members, although in countries with employee representation (Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden), in firms of a certain size, 
employees have the right to choose some members of the supervisory board. 
Each type of board has clearly advantages over the other. The one-tier system 
might result in a closer relation and better information sharing between 
managers and supervisors, while the two-tier system might allow clearer 
formal separation of supervision and control. However, notwithstanding 
structural differences between one-tier and two-tier board systems, the 
similarities in actual board practices are significant. This is the case, as both 
types of board structure recognize similar board functions (the supervisory 
function and managerial function, being distinctions between those functions 
more formalized in the two-tier board structure). Besides in many Member 
States, codes give firms freedom to choose their preferred board structure 
(Portugal, Italy, France, Finland), and different board structures coexist within 
the same institutional framework. Finally, other aspects of board work (like the 
separation of the roles of Chairman of the Board and CEO in one tier board 
structures, and the internal board work in committees), allow convergence in 




The key conclusion of this report was that the trends toward 
convergence in corporate governance practice in EU member states were 
identified as being both more numerous and more powerful than the trends 
towards differentiation. The most important differences in corporate 
governance practice within the EU resulted from differences in company law 
and securities regulation rather than differences in corporate governance code 
recommendations. The research found a considerable degree of company law 
standardization, although significant differences, deeply grounded in national 
attitudes, still remained.  
 
3.2 The period 2003-2007. The modernization of Corporate Governance 
towards increased board independence, transparency and harmonization 
Simultaneously to the comparative study of national corporate 
governance codes, the European Commission launched an initiative, in 2002, to 
make recommendations on a modern regulatory framework for company law 
within the EU. A high level group of experts elaborated a report “The Winter 
Report”, focused on the efficiency and competitiveness of European Business. 
As a result of the Winter Report, an action plan to modernize company law in 
the EU was implemented by the European Commission: the Modernization 
Directive (June 2003) 2003/51/EC. The recommendation included –among 
other aspects- the enhancement of corporate governance disclosure 
requirements, and the strengthening of the role independent non-executive 
and supervisory directors. 
This recommendation towards increased board independence and 
the preference for outsider dominated board, was reinforced with the 
Recommendation on the Role of Non-executive/ Supervisory Directors and 
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Supervisory Board Committees of February 2005. This recommendation clearly 
reinforced board independence, as it included among its principles the 
recommendation of a balance between non-executive and executive directors, 
with a sufficient number of independent directors; it also recommended to 
separate the roles of Chairman and CEO in unitary boards, and to set up 
(independent) nomination, remuneration and audit committees. The board 
could delegate decision-making to committees although it retained the 
responsibility for their decisions.  
In July 2007, the EC published a report on member states´ 
application of this recommendation favoring board independence. The report 
concluded that “There was a clear trend towards improving corporate 
governance standards in the EU”, and identified that firms in member states 
had complied “almost fully or to a large extent”. The main areas of non-
compliance were identified as being the failure by some firms to have a 
sufficient number of independent board members on the remuneration and 
audit committees.  
In April 2004, The European Union adopted the Takeover Directive 
(Directive 25/2004/EC2004] OJ L12/142 to increase investor protector and 
facilitate takeovers across the EU, providing a level-playing ground for cross 
border mergers and acquisitions in the European Union. The most relevant 
provisions contained in the directive are (1) the principle of equal treatment, 
which states that minority shareholders are given the opportunity to exit their 
firm in the wake of a takeover bid on the same terms as the large shareholders. 
(2) the one-share-one-vote principle, which prohibits any restrictions on voting 
rights (3) the break-through rule that enables a bidder to circumvent voting 
restrictions contained in a company’s articles of association. This last provision 




protection. It faced opposition from Germany and Sweden and was only 
adopted in a watered-down form. Opponents of this provision argue that the 
break through rule violates the principle of shareholder decision-making. It 
might also make inefficient bids possible that would otherwise have failed or 
increase the use of pyramids of ownerships. The impact of this Directive on 
shareholder protection and harmonization across Europe is still to be 
measured, and depends on how the directive is applied in each Member State.  
Additionally, during the second part of the decade, the European 
Commission worked on other aspects of corporate governance, like mediation 
(Mediation Directive, April 2008), Small Business (Small Business Act, June 
2008), audit and accounting (The Statutory Audit of Annual and Consolidated 
Accounts Directive , June 2006/43/COM, The Fourth and Seventh Accounting 
Directives Amendments, June 2006/46/EC), and even a proposal to create a 
new type of private company, that could be formed quickly and cheaply under 
the same principles across the EU, The European Private Company (Societas 
Privata Europaea Proposal, June 2008)24.  
 
3.3 The period 2007-2012. Fighting the crisis through improved corporate 
governance.  
Nowadays, there is a clear understanding at European level of the 
importance of sound Corporate Governance to achieve further economic 
integration and growth. Current issues on the agenda are to deepen the 
harmonization process within the EU to achieve a de facto single economic 
market; and to improve corporate governance standards to avoid business 
failures like those that led to the financial crisis that we are currently suffering.  
                                                     
24
 See Table 3 
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The Commission has adopted a bundle of recommendations and 
regulations promoting financial stability within the EU. For example, we have 
witnessed the creation in year 2009 of three different European Supervisory 
Authorities (ESAs)- one each to supervise banking, securities and insurance 
across Europe. The Commission has also adopted a package of legislation to 
significantly strengthen the supervision of the financial sector in Europe. It set 
up a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), composed of National 
Supervisors, and the three new Supervisory European Authorities for the 
banking, securities and insurance and occupational pensions sectors. These 
measures reflect the clear awareness among regulators about the need to 
identify risks in the system at an early stage, and to be able to act together in 
emergency situations and in resolving disagreements among supervisors25.  
To cut excess remunerations, a non-binding recommendation on 
“The Regime for the Remuneration of Directors of Listed Companies (April 
2009)”, requires a balance between fixed and variable remuneration, and links 
performance remuneration to predetermined and measurable performance 
criteria. It proposes limits to the fixed component of the severance payments, a 
balance between fixed and variable remuneration, and a balance between 
short term and long term performance criteria. It also allows companies to 
reclaim variable remuneration based on misstated corporate performance data 
(claw-back provisions); it enhances remuneration disclosure and fosters the 
role of remuneration committees. This recommendation extends the disclosure 
requirements in the 2004 Recommendation to improve shareholder oversight. 
It proposes that non-executive should not receive share options to avoid 
conflict of interest and strengthens the role and operation of the remuneration 
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committees through new principles on composition of the remuneration 
committees.  
 
TABLE 5. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
LAWS AND REGULATION  
 
In this table we enumerate the key actions in the field of corporate governance, which 
have been implemented in each of the EU countries that are subject of this study. 
Country  Law/Regulation Year 
Austria  The Decree by the Financial Authority on Compliance of Issuers 
(Emitente-Compliance-Verordnung) 
2007 
Belgium The Corporate Governance Act 2002 
Denmark The Social Responsibility for Large Business Law 2008 
Finland The Companies Act 2006 
France Travail, Emploi, Pouvoir d’achat (TEPA) 2007 
Germany The Implementation of the Shareholders Rights Directive Act 2009 
Greece Law 3604 2007 
Ireland The Companies Act 2009 
Italy The Consolidated Financial Act 2008 
Luxembourg The Law on Transparency 2008 
Netherlands One Tier Board Bill 2009 
Portugal CMVM Regulation No 1/2007: Corporate Governance  2007 
Spain Circular 5/2007 of the CNMV 2007 
Sweden  The Companies Act (Aktiebolagslagen) 1975 
UK The Companies Act 2006 
Source: Pierce (2010) 
 
The EU gives a high priority to the harmonization of codes and 
company law, and two recent reports, “The Green paper 2011 COM2011/164 
on the EU Corporate Governance Framework” and “The Report on the 
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Reflection Group on the Future of EU company law” both published in the year 
2011, address this importance.  
In the first report, on the EU Corporate Governance Framework, the 
green paper stresses the importance of board of directors (and the figure of 
Chairman of the Board) for the business strategies and future of European 
companies. The European Commission reiterates its commitment to a strong 
and successful single market, being Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility key elements to building people´s trust in the single 
market.  
The Report of the Reflection group on the Future of EU company 
law addresses current problems in the EU company law, provides analysis and 
suggests initiatives to serve as inspiration for the on-going debate on EU 
company law. It shares the view that EU harmonization should respect the 
national corporate governance systems of the Member States, which have 
been developed throughout the years, and are aware of national 
characteristics of the Members business environment and institutional 
framework. Harmonization should strive to further the trend towards increased 
flexibility and freedom of choice in respect to company forms and the internal 
distribution of powers. This Report also recommends that harmonization 
should be focused and aimed at particular problems, and it should not rely on 









4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FEATURES OF EUROPEAN LISTED FIRMS  
 
4.1 An overview of the European corporate sector 
The European corporate sector is characterized (as opposed to the 
US sector) by concentrated ownership, smaller and less liquid stock markets, 
and lower takeover activity (See Table 6). These market conditions clearly 
influence the way European corporations are governed and controlled, and are 
closely related to the institutional settings where European listed firms 
operate.  
TABLE 6. OWNERSHIP, SHAREHOLDERPROTECTION AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN 8 
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
In this table we present measures of ownership concentration and investors protection 
from 8 European countries. 











UK 0.19 63.08 5.0 8.80 5 
France 0.34 14.00 3.5 7.66 2 
Germany 0.48 10.37 3.5 8.95 2 
Italy  0.58 12.98 2.0 7.10 5 
Sweden 0.28 39.18 3.5 8.78 3 
Denmark 0.45 - 4.0 9.08 4 
Norway 0.36 36.77 3.5 8.86 3 
Finland 0.37 28.68 3.5 9.16 3 
Average 0.38 29.30 3.56 8.55 3.37 
Source: Damiani and Pompei (2008) 
 
Historically, Continental IPO market (the market place where firms 
go public) has been much smaller than its US counterpart26. Until fairly 
recently, most European Stock Exchanges have had listing requirements that 
focused on financial requirements, such as having three years of positive 
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earnings before going public (Ritter, 2003). Besides, firms going public in 
Europe- especially in Continental Europe- tend to be older than those going 
public in the US27, and are more likely to include secondary shares (shares 
being sold by existing shareholders) in the offering than it is true for US IPOs 
(Source Ritter, 2003).  
TABLE 7. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS BY TARGET COUNTRY IN 8 EUROPEAN 
COUNTRES, 2002-2005 
Country Number of M& A  % of M& A 
UK 475 59.23 
France 106 13.22 
Germany 57 7.11 
Sweden 43 5.36 
Norway 40 4.99 
Italy 45 5.61 
Finland 11 1.37 
Denmark 25 3.12 
Total 802 1000 
Source Damiani and Pompei (2008) 
 
Ownership is more concentrated in continental Europe that in UK 
and US. For example, only 2% of listed UK and 1.7% US firms have a majority 
shareholder, compared to 68% of Austrian firms, 64% of German firms, and 
56% of Italian firms (Goergen, 2007). Those large shareholders have incentives 
to commit over the long term with the firm, a feature related (in our view) to 
the liquidity differences between Europe and US. On the other hand, large 
holdings of company stock provide chances to extract rents from minority 
shareholders, which could be related with the degree of ownership 
concentration prevalent in Europe.  
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Ownership concentration differs not only in numbers, but also in 
the nature of large shareholders. Large shareholders in Europe tend to be 
family, other companies, banks (who are also present as key debt holders) and 
the Government (Goergen, 2007). Germany is characterized by inter-corporate 
equity relations and family control whereas institutional shareholders hold 
most of the voting rights in UK (Damiani and Pompei, 2008).  
In 2007, the Institutional Investors Service conducted a survey on 
behalf of the European Commission about deviation of one share-one vote 
principle in 16 European Countries. The survey showed that at least 44% of the 
sample (464 firms) had at least one CEM (control enhancing mechanism), being 
the most frequent mechanisms pyramids (27% of the corporations), and dual-
class shares (24%)28. The report showed great divergences between countries. 
While pyramids are common in Belgium (34% of the firms) and Sweden (48%), 
there are few of them in the UK (3%) and Denmark (0%). The report also 
showed that multiple voting shares are common in Sweden (59%), France 
(58%) and the Netherlands (41%), but virtually nonexistent in some countries 
such as Belgium and Italy. Pajuste (2005) provides evidence of a marked trend 
away from dual-class shares in Europe, showing that firm value increases after 
unification of dual class shares.  
The take-over market is less active in Europe than is US. Patterns of 
ownership and control provide a plausible explanation for this feature. In 
countries where ownership is very concentrated (like those mentioned above) 
takeovers might be less common, since large shareholders have enough 
incentives and power to exert control over managers, and they are in a 
stronger position to impose defensive strategies to prevent hostile takeovers 
(although they benefit from friendly takeovers). UK is the European Country 
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with the largest M& A activity (See Table 7), more than tripling that of France, 
Germany and Sweden. By economic sectors, the Telecommunication sector is 
that bearing the largest number of M&A transactions (Ritter, 2003).  
 
4.2 The evolution of last decade: from the technological bubble burst to the 
current financial crisis29 
Despite the intense regulatory development of the European 
Corporate Governance framework from the beginning of the 2000s, we 
observe that actual changes in firms´ corporate governance systems have been 
more subtle. In our study, we observe that the most remarkable changes in 
board structure are a (1) trend towards smaller and more independent boards, 
(2) a stable structure of board organization within committees, and (3) a 
volatile path of CEO compensation and incentive pay.  
 
TABLE 8. THE STATE OF CORPORATE GOVERNACE IN EUROPEAN LISTED FIRMS  
In this table we present key figures on the estate of corporate governance in a representative sample of 
listed European Firms provided by the data provider BoardEx. The sample covers the firms, countries and 
years that are subject to this study. We present data on firm value (Q), board size and independence 
(Outsiders), number of committees, number of monitoring and advising committees, proportion of 
monitoring committees, the (firm) average committee size, the (firm) average committee independence 
(committee outsiders), the (firm average) independence of monitoring (monit. com. outsiders) and advising 
(adv. Com. outsiders) committees, the proportion of firms where the CEO is also Chairman (chair duality) and 
the proportion of equity linked compensation in CEO pay.  
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Q 2.83 2.593 1.87 1.55 1.76 1.88 2.0 2.26 2.06 1.47 1.622 
Outsiders  0.59 0.591 0.605 0.615 0.62 0.62 0.617 0.618 0.618 0.629 0.631 
Board size  10.3 10.03 10.06 10.03 9.81 9.41 9.06 8.8 8. 6 8.768 8.74 
Nr. Of 
committees  
2.82 2.80 2.82 2.79 2.88 2.88 2.82 2.78 2.81 2.83 2.88 
Nr. committees 
(Monitoring)  
2.4 2.40 2.39 2.36 2.43 2.45 2.42 2.79 2.41 2.39 2.44 
Nr. committees 
(Advising)  
0.39 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.4 0.43 0.44 
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monitoring com.  
0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Committee size  3.66 3.53 3.53 3.52 3.5 3.41 3.25 3.26 3.26 3.3 3.33 
Committee 
outsiders  
0.62 0.60 0.60 0.604 0.61 0.609 0.602 0.599 0.60 0.597 0.593 
Monitoring com. 
outsiders 
0.58 0.557 0.54 0.546 0.55 0.549 0.52 0.51 0.505 0.48 0.494 
Adv. com.outs.  0.11 0.125 0.14 0.129 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.144 0.142 0.158 0.149 
Chair duality 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 
Proportion of 
variable pay in 
CEO 
compensation  
0.24 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.246 0.256 0.257 0.21 0.235 
Nr. of obs. 301 456 621 739 879 1031 1248 1467 1627 1636 1512 
 
Board size has decreased in Europe from an average 10.34 board 
members in 1999 to 8.74 board members in 2009, while the average ratio of 
outsiders to board size (which is a commonly established measure of board 
independence), increased from 59% in 1999 to 63% in year 2009. The decrease 
in board size was more pronounced after year 2003: if the average board size in 
Western European firms decreased from 10.34 to 9.81 ( which means a 5.1% 
decrease in size) in the period between 1999 to 2003, the shrinkage in the 
subsequent four years (the period from 2003 to 2007) doubled to 11.72% (from 
9.81 to 8.66 members).  
The increase in board independence was less pronounced, and 
occurred mainly during the years previous to the Modernization Directive 
(2003) that recommended the strengthen of independence requirements for 
boards of directors. The average proportion of outsiders on a sample of 
representative Western European Boards increased from 58.6% at the 
beginning of the period (1999) to 63.1% at the end of the period (year 2009), 
which amounts to a 7.6% increase in independence. In the four-year-period 
previous to the publication of the Modernization Directive the proportion of 
outsiders on European boards rose on average 5.8% (the ratio of outsiders to 
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executive directors was 58.6% in year 1999, and 62 % in year 2003). In the six 
following years the increase was of just 1.7% (from 62% in year 2003 to 63.1% 
in year 2009). This figures support a common view that Corporate Governance 
Framework in Europe aims at setting minimum standards, that usually respond 
to business needs that might have been already anticipated and implemented 
within firms, so that they comply with the requirements when the new 
recommendations are in place.  
Even when we observe changes in the overall composition (size and 
independence) of European boards, the internal functioning of the boards in 
committees has remained, on average, very stable throughout the years of our 
study in Europe. The median listed firm in Europe has 3 committees in its 
board, being the most common the Audit committee (in approximately 90% of 
the firms), Nomination committee (in 45% of the firms), Remuneration 
committee (in 77% of the firms and Remuneration and Appointments 
committee (12% of the firms). Those three are the committees recommended 
in the Modernization Directive (2003). Less than 25% of the European Firms in 
our sample have set up committees that are purely advisor in nature (like the 
strategy committee, organization committee, or risk management 
committees). 
We observe a decrease in average committee size from 3.66 
members to 3.33 members in the years of our study, and a 4.3% decrease in 
the average proportion of outsiders within committees (from 0. 62 in the year 
1999 to 0. 593 in the year 2009). By nature, the monitoring committees are on 
average more independent that the advisory committees, where only 14% of 




Another trend towards increase independence is reflected by the 
fact that CEO duality (the situation where the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Board), has become rarer in Europe. 
The CEO of an average European listed firm received 1 470 000 US 
dollars in the year 2007. CEOs received equity linked compensation in 42.52% 
of the observations, while in the rest (57.48%) CEO pay contained no equity 
linked compensation. For the CEOs receiving equity linked compensation, this 
type of pay made up to 45.9% of their total pay.  
Figure 1 shows that the evolution of equity linked compensation 
(for the firms used in the analysis of chapeter three) followed the evolution of 
direct and total compensation, being in year 2007 when CEO pay reached its 
highest levels, and in year 2002 when it was at its lowest.  
As we see from Figure 1, the evolution of equity linked 
compensation went parallel to the state of the public debate on executive 
compensation during the years 1999-2009. The amount of equity linked 
compensation dropped sharply in year 2000, after the technological bubble of 
the late 1990s exploded. The enormous increase in stock option compensation 
of the late 1990s was seen as a key determinant of the speculative era that led 
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FIGURE 1. EVOLUTION OF CEO COMPENSATION 1999-2007 
 
 
We also observe a sharp decline in equity linked compensation after 
the Enron scandal was disclosed in October 2001. Due to the Enron scandal, 
option plans where associated with the distortion of management incentives 
and earning manipulation. Several policy makers and academics started 
questioning the effectiveness of this type of remuneration. Still, equity linked 
compensation increased during the expansion period 2002-2007, despite the 
lively public debate on executive compensation, questioning the current levels 
and the structure of executive compensation.  
Despite the increase in the total amount of equity linked 
compensation granted after year 2002, we observe in Figure 2 that the 
proportion of firms that grant equity linked compensation declined after the 
year 2002, as shown by the declining striped line named “Equity dummy”. 
However, those firms that do grant equity linked compensation pay a higher 





















CEO COMPENSATION 1999-2007 




CEO compensation, “Equity proportion”, has increased constantly since the 
year 2002.  
 
FIGURE 2. CEO COMPENSATION AND BOARD STRUCTURE  
 
 
4.3 Country differences and convergences: the tendency towards a flexible 
and harmonized corporate sector in Europe 
The great dispersion of the remuneration to European CEOs 
outstands in a country-based analysis. We observe big differences between 
firms and between countries. On average, Finnish, Italian and French CEOs 
receive the highest pay, while Greek, Portuguese and Danish CEOs receive the 
lowest total compensation in our sample (See Figure 3). However, median and 
average values differ considerably, both within countries and between 
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CEO COMPENSATION AND BOARD STRUCTURE  
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values, while Sweden, Spain and Greece are the countries with lowest median 
CEO Pay (Figure 4). 
 
FIGURE 3. CEO COMPENSATION- COUNTRY AVERAGE 
 
 
The fact that UK is not one of the countries where the average pay 
highest might be explained by the way the sample is constructed. UK firms 
amount to 62.7% of the firms followed by the data provider BoardEx (from 
which the data is obtained), which means that bigger and smaller firms are 
included. The rest of the countries have fewer observations, and one can 
expect that only the biggest firms of each country are part of our sample. Thus, 
the inclusion of smaller firms in the UK case, might draw the pay figures 
downwards. Also we have to note that the figures from smaller countries might 
be clearly influenced by some relevant firms in those countries (like Nokia in 








CEO COMPENSATION- COUNTRY AVERAGE 




FIGURE 4. CEO COMPENSATION- MEDIAN VALUES  
 
 
Board size also varies considerably between countries, as reflected 
in Figure 5 “Board Composition by Country”. Country based differences in 
board size and composition might be driven by the regulations in different 
countries. For example, Germany and Austria have a two-tier system of 
corporate governance, with a supervisory board on top of the management 
board, which might influence the number of directors. The supervisory board is 
formed by representative of the employees and shareholders, while the 
executive board is formed exclusively by members of the executive team. This 
duality might explain partly why Austria and Germany have the largest boards, 
while UK Ireland and Finland (where firms have more freedom to design their 
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FIGURE 5. BOARD COMPOSITION BY COUNTRY  
 
 
Finally, in Figure 6, we present the join use of CEO incentive pay and 
the proportion of outsiders on the board. We observe that countries in the 
Scandinavian legal tradition are the ones with most independent boards, and 
lower CEO incentive pay. On the opposite place we find the countries from the 
anglosaxon legal tradition (UK, Ireland), with high levels of equity linked 
compensation paired with less independent boards. On average, and not taking 
into account the non random selection into equity linked compensation, those 
countries are the ones where the complementary use of both instruments is 
less accentuated. Besides, UK and Ireland are the countries in our sample, 
where the use of equity linked compensation is more extended. In 55% and 44 
% of the observations in our sample, firms do grant some equity linked 
compensation to their CEOs. The average complementarity is more 
accentuated in countries with French origin legal tradition, like Spain, France 
and Portugal. In those countries firms grant equity linked compensation in 3%, 
29% and 9% of the observations in our sample. However, this figure only 
presents country averages, and does not take into account the non random 




BOARD COMPOSITION BY COUNTRY 




FIGURE 6. BOARD COMPOSITION AND INCENTIVE PAY 
 
 
These representative data show that, despite efforts towards the 
creation of a single market and the harmonization of corporate codes of 
conduct and corporate law, disparities between countries still remain. These 
disparities have their origin in different economic realities, different cultural 
and economic tradition and different law origins, and cannot be dismissed 
when approaching the issue of corporate governance harmonization. 
Convergence is subject to path dependence (Hopt and Leyens, 2005), and the 
EU has opted for increasing flexibility within institutional settings (the recent 
changes in France and Italy allowing firms to choose between three different 
board structures and in Finland where firms can choose between a one tier or 
two tier board structures, are clear examples). This flexibility rests on soft law 
and the exercise of self regulation (the internal controls), as key elements to 
create a European Corporate Governance Framework, where firms with 
different governance requirements coexist and compete in an efficient Single 














































CHAPTER TWO.  
COMMITTEES AS DRIVERS OF THE BOARD 














One of the key characteristics of recent studies on corporate boards 
is that they depart their attention from a unique function of the board- the 
monitoring of the executive team- adding the advisory role to their functions, 
and analyzing in which circumstances each function is prevalent (Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2006; Lasfer, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Boone, Field, 
Karpoff and Raheja, 2007; Drymiotes, 2007; Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Cheng, 2008; Link ,Netter and Yang, 2008). 
The board of directors holds the authority to adopt or- as decision 
maker of last resort- put a veto on any decision adopted by the executive team 
of the firm. In this context, the board of directors has to review and approve 
strategies, and it also has to analyze the functioning and financing of the firm. 
This role – being decision maker of last resort- is relevant to prevent that the 
strategies adopted by the executive team are guided by the incentive to extract 
private rents, at the expense of the interest of the firm owners (shareholders).  
Holding decision making rights (which shareholders delegate to the 
board automatically) is not alone enough for board members to accomplish 
their duties properly. Board members also need to have the correct incentives 
and the necessary information to perform efficiently their supervisory and 
advisory functions. In some cases- depending on how information is 
transmitted among board members- a certain kind of confrontation between 
both board functions can occur. Although it is generally true that boards with a 
majority of independent directors monitor better, members of the executive 
team face a trade-off when sharing information with the rest of board 
members (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). The board is able to provide better 




but, at the same time the revelation of this information helps the board to 
determine the number of available options and it increases the risk that the 
board interferes in the decision making process. Due to this trade-off, the 
shareholders might have to choose between a board with a larger number of 
independent board members, that would supervise more efficiently, and a 
more friendly board (with greater insider representation) that would 
encourage the advisory activity of board members.  
In both cases, in order to monitor and advise efficiently, board 
members, especially outsiders, need to have information about the firm and 
the business environment. This information is - to a great extent – generated 
and transmitted within the committees in which board work is organized.  
In the corporate governance literature, delegation of activities from 
the board to committees has been proposed as an organizational solution to 
excessively large (oversized) board problems. This way, firms have recently 
constituted committees like the audit, remuneration and appointments or 
strategy (some of them compulsory in many countries), for which there is 
evidence of an improvement of the monitoring function of the board (Klein, 
1998; Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). For example, Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) 
argue that this type of organization in committees allows solving 
communication, coordination and free riding problems, especially in boards 
with a large number of board members, and a larger participation of outsiders. 
They also point out plausible disadvantages associated to the use of 
committees, like the possibility of asymmetric information between board 
members, and the risk for individual board members to focus their effort on 
specific committee work at the expense of the general objectives of the board. 
Because of this type of disadvantages, the use of committees might not be 
appropriate in some cases, especially in firms with smaller boards and boards 
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with a greater proportion of outsiders.  
Recent studies by Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011a and b) show 
how the efficiency of the board improves considerably through the use of 
committees, both in the monitoring task (2011a) and in the advisory task 
(2011b). However, these authors also stress the trade-off of this increased 
efficiency, as the increase in monitoring intensity (measured by a greater input 
of independent directors in monitoring tasks) reduces the efficiency of advising, 
and, more importantly, the global efficiency of the board. They do not find, 
however, any support of a reverse effect, as an increase in the advising activity 
of board members does not harm the supervisory intensity. 
More importantly, the relevance of each type of function depends 
on certain characteristics of the firm and the business environment where it 
operates (See Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008; 
Coles et al, 2008; Link et al, 2008; Faleye et al, 2011a and b). This way, the 
scope or complexity of the firm operations, the chance for the manager to 
extract private rents, the asymmetric information about net present value of 
the projects proposed by the management team, the power, managerial ability 
and characteristics of the CEO, or the existence of incentives that align the 
interest of owners and insiders, are some of the factors that allow to estimate 
the firm specific monitoring and advising needs. As a consequence, these 
factors allow a detailed study of the different governance structures and their 
impact on firm value.  
In this context, we propose and test the hypothesis that aggregate 
board composition, per se, is not the key factor to improve performance. It is 
rather the information transmission within committees– both monitoring and 




functions efficiently.  
Our research analyzes how the participation of outsiders and 
insiders in committees allows better monitoring and advising to the 
management team, and, therefore, better governance. The relative importance 
of this monitoring and advising depends –as existing literature suggests- on 
firm and business characteristics, and on the relative strength of other 
corporate governance mechanism in place. Our contribution with respect to 
the existing literature is that we suggest that these monitoring and advising will 
be more efficient if information transmission is delegated to committees, as it 
will be within the committees where the outsiders will be more prone to 
acquire information and share their experience with the rest of the 
organization, contributing more efficiently to a better governance of the firm.  
To analyze whether information transmission within committees 
improves the general efficiency of the board, we try to find empirical evidence 
of our two key hypothesis: (H1) The use of committees leads to value creation 
(especially in the case of over dimensioned or very independent boards) and 
(H2) the improvement in governance is not homogeneous along the firm 
spectrum: the use (and independence) of advisory committees is more 
beneficial in the case of complex firms and firms with growth opportunities, 
while firms facing greater agency concerns (like bigger firms, or firms with 
controlling CEOs) benefit from the use of monitoring committees.  
For a test of the first implication, we analyze the relation between 
board independence and firm value, adding the internal functioning of 
corporate boards as key element of the analysis. We argue that the efficiency 
of independent boards hinges crucially on the smooth information transmission 
between members of the executive team and outside board members; and this 
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information transmission takes place in committees. Thus, the benefits of 
independent boards (if any) will be prevalent (significant) when the work 
structure of the board in committees, and the committee composition is 
adequate to allow this information transmission. To test this hypothesis we 
compare regression results from a benchmark value equation –where 
information on committees is excluded from the analysis- to the results from 
an augmented equation, where information on committees (their number and 
independence) is included. We expect the inclusion of this information in a 
value regression, where firm value is regressed on firm and governance 
characteristics, to have a direct and indirect impact on firm value. The direct 
impact can be measured by the sign and significance of the committee 
variables alone. The indirect impact has to do with the plausible bias in the 
benchmark equation due to missing information on committees. We check 
whether including information on committees changes the measured relation 
between board independence and firm value. If our hypothesis is correct, 
adding this information improves the impact and significance of the variable 
measuring board independence on firm value.  
For a test of our second hypothesis (whether firms that adapt their 
internal structure in committees to their monitoring and advising requirements 
generate more value), we investigate whether monitoring and advising 
necessities -which are performed at a committee level- have a different impact 
on firm value, depending on the firms requirements for supervision and advice. 
To do so, we estimate a two-step maximum likelihood Heckman regression 
model, where we include in the first step factors that arguable contribute to 
the creation and design of monitoring and advising committees, and test 




second step, we analyze whether the monitoring and advising committees have 
a direct impact on firm value.  
We include the number and independence of monitoring and 
advising committees separately. Also in our sensitivity analysis we study 
separately firms for which monitoring and advising intensity differ. To do so, 
we split the sample by industry and firm size. In the first sensitivity analysis, we 
compare results for firms in new technology industries (which are arguably 
more complex and have larger growth opportunities) versus traditional 
industries. In our second sensitivity analysis we split the sample by firm size, as 
bigger firms face arguably greater agency concerns.  
A two step maximum likelihood Heckman regression has been 
selected as the key econometric technique in the analysis. It has the clear 
advantage of controlling for the nonrandom design of committee structure, 
allowing estimating simultaneously the determinants of committee design and 
the joint impact of committees and board design on firm value. In our final 
sensitivity analysis, we depart from the Heckman regression model that has 
been used throughout the analysis, to account for dynamic heterogeneity and 
unobserved endogeneity with the use of a dynamic two step panel GMM 
system estimator.  
We find that, when we account for the fact that firms adapt their 
board and committee structure to their monitoring and advising requirements, 
those firms with more numerous and independent committees have on 
average higher market Q, which is our measure of firm value. The use and 
independence of monitoring committees do not have a significant relation to 
firm value, but both the use and the independence of advising committees 
within firms have a positive impact on firm value. We do find that firms in the 
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new technology sectors- where we expect advising requirements to be 
stronger- benefit more from the use of advisory committees, than firms in the 
more traditional industrial sectors, and we do also find that firms with in the 
new technology sectors benefit from the intensive use of committees in 
general, which reinforces our initial hypothesis. Finally, we find that lager firms 
benefit more from having numerous monitoring committees (but the 
independence of these committees does not have a significant relation to firm 
value). 
By contrast, our results show no significant relation between board 
(and committee) structure and firm value, in a dynamic two step panel GMM 
system, where we control for past performance, simultaneity and unobservable 
heterogeneity. This result is in line with recent econometric research (Wintoki, 
Linck and Netter, 2012), which analyses the lack of empirical evidence of a 
positive relation between board independence and firm value. However, due to 
the lack of suitable instruments, and the econometric problems that arise when 
estimating dynamic panel models in corporate finance (Flannery and Hankins, 
2013) we interpret the results from this later sensitivity analysis with caution.  
Our study contributes the literature on the impact of board 
composition on firm performance in different ways. First, it contributes to a 
new generation of studies that analyzes the impact of board composition on 
firm value, where the work in committees, rather than the overall composition 
of the board is analyzed. Our contribution with respect to this extent of the 
literature is that we analyze the joint impact of committees and board 
independence on firm value, rather than focusing on one or the other alone. 
Looking at the joint impact of board and committee design we take into 
account that board composition and committee structure and intrinsically 




depending on the design of their internal organization. By the same token, 
boards with apparently similar committees might differ in their authority to 
implement committee’s advice and resolutions, if their degree of aggregate 
independence varies.  
The second contribution is that we take into account differences in 
firm characteristics and business environments, and allow for heterogeneity in 
governance design. We test how information transmission within committees 
adds value to board independence in firms with different growth opportunities, 
agency problems, etc. We depart from the “one board fits all” type of analysis. 
This departure improves the explanatory power of our results and eliminates 
biases resulting from unobserved heterogeneity in business environments or 
board design. More importantly we use a two-step maximum likelihood 
Heckman regression model to appropriately estimate the relation between 
governance and performance. When analyzing how firms adapt their 
committee structures to their monitoring and advising requirements, the 
Heckman selection model accounts for the fact that the decision to set up 
committees is not random, but rather a self-preferred choice by the board. 
Incurring a correction for self-selection eliminates the plausible bias due to 
non-random board design.  
The third contribution refers to the use of European Data. Previous 
studies on the impact of committees on board size (Faleye et al 2011b) analyze 
US data. Other studies with European Data (like Faleye et al. 2011a), use the 
information on committees within the data to characterize the board or the 
directors, but do not explicitly model the impact of committees on board 
composition or firm value.  
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The rest of the chapter is organized like follows. In section 2 we 
discuss the related literature and develop our hypotheses. In section 3 we 
describe the dataset for our empirical analysis. In section 4 we present the 
research strategy and results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The seminal studies on the impact of board composition on firm 
value focused on the monitoring role of boards (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). These studies analyzed how different 
board characteristics, or different board actions impact firm results, being 
these actions the solely results of the monitoring function. The underlying 
theory relies on the board to discipline managers and solve the plausible 
conflicts between owners and managers (John and Senbet, 1998). One of the 
most relevant proposals of this extant of the literature, is to increase the 
degree of board independence as a way to improve its efficiency in certain 
supervisory tasks, and, therefore, in business performance. They also proposed 
boards with a reduced number of board members, to avoid inefficiencies due 
to free riding and lack of coordination and control. These suggestions have 
been so widely implemented, that it is nowadays very difficult to find a Code of 
Good Governance which does not include among its guidelines, the 
recommendation to reduce the number of board members or increase the 
presence of independent directors on the board, even when there is no 
consensus in the academic literature about the benefits of smaller and more 





This lack of consensus on the benefits of board independence for 
firm value has generated a second generation of academic papers trying to 
explain the apparent lack of relation between board independence and firm 
value. This lack of empirical relation has been explained by the trade-off in 
information transmission (Adams and Ferreira, 2007); the fact that board 
composition is endogenously determined (Raheja, 2005 and Harris and Raviv, 
2008); the high costs for outsiders to obtain the necessary information to 
monitor and advise efficiently (Boone et al, 2007; Coles et al, 2008 and Link et 
al, 2008); the role of the CEO to control de information available to board 
members (Song and Takor, 2006) and even the econometric techniques used in 
previous empirical studies (Wintoki et al, 2012) 30. 
Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that independence could be 
harmful if insiders lack the incentives to reveal information to independent 
board members. This lack of incentive might arise, as informed independent 
board members could have the chance to interfere in management decisions. 
Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2008) present structural models where 
board composition (size and independence) is determined endogenously and 
depends on specific characteristics of the board, of the firm and of the business 
environment where it operates. They stress the monitoring role of board 
members, not modeling the advisory role so explicitly. Both Raheja (2005) and 
Harris and Raviv (2008) characterize the interactions between outsiders and 
insiders as key determinants of board composition. To maximize shareholders 
wealth, outsiders have to search for relevant information about the firm, at a 
                                                     
30
 Wintoki et al (2012) present an extended literature review on the papers that analyze the impact of board 
independence on firm value, noting the lack of consensus in the literature, and providing a plausible 
explanation for this lack of consensus, based on the econometric techniques used in the analysis. They argue 
that the apparently contradictory results might be driven by not taking into account the dynamic aspect of the 
board/performance relation. They argue that once past performance, simultaneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity are controlled for, there is no causal relation between board structure and firm performance, 
which is in sharp contrast to the findings of some earlier studies 
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cost. While insiders are the source of information to outsiders, they can extract 
private rents from communicating or not this information to outsiders. Harris 
and Raviv (2008) model the equilibrium of power between outsiders and 
insiders, which in turn determines the ultimate control of the board, delegation 
of authority, information transmission, decision making, and ultimately the 
optimal board structure. Raheja (2005) incorporates to the monitoring function 
the evaluation of insiders as potential successors of the CEO, inferring different 
optimal board structures for different types of firms.  
Almost simultaneously, three different empirical papers (Boone et 
al, 2007; Coles et al, 2008; and Link et al, 2008) share the idea that the 
supervisory and advisory function are key board functions, and that the costs 
and benefits of monitoring and advising, and ultimately, the optimal board 
design, depend on certain characteristics of the firm and of the business 
environment where it operates.  
All three works coincide in suggesting that the need of advice from 
the board to the CEO increases with the degree of complexity, which is related 
to factors like the firm diversification, firm size, leverage or age. They propose 
more independent boards, concomitant to increased complexity to improve 
efficiency and increase firm value.  
On the other hand, all three works also notice that the cost for the 
independent directors to obtain information to perform their functions 
increases with complexity, leading to a reduction in board size and 
independence. Boone et al. (2007) specifically link this cost to the monitoring 
activity, while Coles et al. (2008) and Link et al. (2008) extend their reasoning to 
the advising activity.  




boards to prevent rent extraction by the CEO: the benefits derived of an 
increase in the monitoring intensity are higher when the management chances 
to extract private rents are high. Song and Takor (2006) coincide in the idea 
that the CEO controls the information available to board members. Taking into 
account the career concerns of the CEO and board members, they conclude 
that independent boards do not always constitute the optimal board structure.  
All these theoretical and empirical papers point out that both the 
monitoring and advising functions of the board are closely related to the 
availability of information to outsiders, as well as to the specific characteristics 
of the board, the firm and the business environment where it operates. In what 
follows we address specifically, how committees allow the information 
transmission between insiders and outsiders (section 2.1), and whether 
differences in information transmission between the monitoring and advising 
functions of board members exist, and whether they are sensible to specific 
board and firm characteristics (section 2.2)  
 
2.1 The use of committees, board composition and firm value  
If we have agreed that information transmission is relevant for the 
board members (specially for outsiders) to perform their monitoring and 
advising functions effectively, in what follows, we analyze the specific role of 
the committees in transmitting this information, and therefore, in enhancing 
the contribution of outsiders to firm value.  
Some research papers show how the activity of the board is 
determined by board size and independence. Coles et al. (2008) and Linck et al. 
(2008) coincide in that board size and independence are key factors to improve 
efficiency. However, an excessive number of independent directors can be 
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detrimental to board cohesiveness and to the board capacity to adopt strategic 
decisions. It can also generate coordination, communication and asymmetric 
information problems.  
According to Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) the use of committees 
facilitates delegation of authority and helps to mitigate coordination and free 
riding problems which can arise in larger and more independent boards. The 
costs of committees stem from information asymmetries, especially in smaller 
boards or in boards with greater insider representation. In fact, these authors 
find a positive influence of the use of committees, both monitoring and 
advising committees, only in the case of larger boards and boards with a 
greater proportion of independent members.  
With respect to the participation of outsiders in committees, Faleye 
et al. (2011a) find that the quality of monitoring improves when independent 
directors serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees. 
In a subsequent paper, Faleye et al. (2011b) find that the 
participation of outsiders in advising committees allows them a better 
understanding of the firm, increasing their capacity to make informed 
decisions. They argue that effective advising benefits from a certain degree of 
specialization, with a critical mass of independent directors dedicated to the 
firm supervision. This would allow the CEO to develop a closer relation, based 
on trust, with a complementary group of independent directors, facilitating the 
information transmission and provision of advice. Their empirical results show 
that the use of monitoring and advising committees leads to an improvement 
in board monitoring and advising; however, they also find that intensive 
monitoring by the board erodes the trust of the CEO to transmit information, 




These arguments lead us to our first hypothesis: The use of 
committees in general and supervisory and advising committees in particular, 
improves the general efficiency of the board and leads to value creation.  
  
2.2 Monitoring and advising committees, board composition and firm value 
In a second step (and once the adequacy of the use of committees 
has been analyzed), we investigate an hypotheses that has been suggested in 
various previous theoretical and empirical papers, based on the existence of a 
plausible trade-off between the two key board functions, monitoring the 
management team, and providing advice on key strategic decisions. The 
hypothesis that we investigate is whether the monitoring and advising 
intensities - which are performed at a committee level- have a different impact 
on firm value, depending on the firm requirements for supervision and advice. 
The theoretical model proposed by Adams and Ferreira (2007) 
states that there is a trade-off between both board functions, which arises 
because of the information transmission between outsiders and insiders. When 
inside board members reveal sensible information to the board, the board can 
provide better advice, although this information allows the board to interfere 
in the decision making process of the management team. This is why the CEO 
can be reticent to reveal information, when the board of directors is too 
independent from the management team. Due to this trade-off, to emphasize 
board independence alone can be detrimental to firm value. Other factors, like 
the CEO benefits of control, the alignment of interest between managers and 
the board, firm complexity, and business environments can be relevant in a 
model where the importance of the monitoring and advising roles are decisive 
in the design of board structure. 
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Adams (2009) herself obtains empirical evidence of this trade-off 
using a survey of Swedish CEOs and board members. In her research shows 
that board members who perceive that they monitor more intensively, might 
not acquire the necessary compromise to provide effective advice, and that the 
personal links between CEOs and board members enhance trust, exchange of 
information and value creation.  
A recent extant of the literature has been dedicated to analyze 
what constitutes an efficient board, in base of this trade-off between the 
monitoring and advising functions, and to describe in which circumstances is 
one function prevalent over the other (Coles et al, 2006; Lasfer, 2006; Boone et 
al, 2007; Drymiotes, 2007; Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Cheng, 2008; Link 
et al, 2008).  
We translate the current debate on the trade-off between board 
functions to the committee level, and analyze whether the use of committees 
might help to alleviate this trade-off. As Adams (2009) suggests, a certain 
degree of specialization is required for outsiders to perform their monitoring 
and advising duties efficiently. We argue that the use of committees facilitates 
this specialization, as the use of committees facilitates the division of director 
activities (monitoring and advising), both among directors, and for each 
individual director among his committee tasks. This way, boards that adapt 
their internal design in committees to the firm monitoring and advising 
requirements will be more effective and generate more value.  
Faleye et al (2011a and 2011b) suggest variables like firm 
complexity or the power and influence of the CEO to measure advising 
intensity, and free cash flow, institutional ownership, and analyst coverage, to 




complexity and the number of board meetings as key variables to measure the 
existence of coordination and communication problems. In short, all these 
variables are proxy for some of the relevant characteristics of firm, of the CEO 
and the management team, or of the business environment where the firm 
operates, that ultimately determine the firm monitoring and advising 
requirements.  
Thus, boards that adapt their internal structure in committees to 
their monitoring and advising requirements will generate more value. This 
second hypothesis can be summarized in two testable implications:  
In complex business environments, where the advising requirements 
are significant, the intensive use of advising committees improves firm value.  
In business environments, where the monitoring requirements 
increase, the intensive use of supervisory committees leads to value creation. 
 
3. THE DATA  
 
For this study, we have constructed a dataset that contains 
information on the main western European economies for the years 1999-
2009. To construct this dataset, we merge three different datasets. We use two 
datasets on corporate governance supplied by BoardEx (one of them containing 
information on firm governance and CEO compensation, and the other one 
containing information on committees), and merge the resulting panel with 
information on firm characteristics and market conditions from the data 
supplier Thomson.  
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3.1 Information on committees 
For every firm in our sample, the first BoardEx dataset provides the 
name and composition of all the board committees reported by the board of 
directors. Along with firm and committee name, the data contains additional 
information on committee composition, such as the number of directors 
working on this committee, the committee gender ratio, the committee 
nationality mix, and whether CEO is committee member. It also informs on the 
average time in role of committee members and the average number of 
additional board positions of committee members.  
When available, the dataset also provides information on the 
number of executive directors and the number of independent directors in 
each committee. Also with attrition, the original dataset provides information 
on average compensation of committee members. The original dataset 
contains 61 714 observations. Each observation corresponds to a committee-
firm-year register. The dataset contains information on 22 184 firms. For every 
firm, we have information on an average of 2.78 committees per year. For the 
last years of the sample (from 2005 onwards) our sample contains a larger 
number of observations and more firms are registered. In Table 1 we present 










TABLE 1. YEARLY DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION ON COMMITTEES 
Yearly distribution of the original dataset on committees, where each committee within a firm is a separate 
observational unit. For every year in our sample, we present the number of observations (Obs.), their 
frequency (Frequency) and the cumulative distribution of the sample (Cum.). The frequency refers to the 
ratio of the number of observations by year to the sample size, and the cumulative distribution refers to the 
proportion of observations up to (and containing) each particular year. We also include in this table the 
number of firms for which we have information on committees (Firms), their frequency by year (Freq. 
Firms), and their yearly cumulative distribution (Cum. Firms). 
Year Obs. Frequency Cum Firms Freq.Firms Cum. Firms 
1 999 1 686 2.73 2.73 612 2.76 2.76 
2 000 2 504 4.06 6.79 912 4.11 6.87 
2 001 3 308 5.36 12.15 1 209 5.45 12.32 
2 002 3 979 6.45 18.6 1 443 6.5 18.82 
2 003 4 939 8 26.6 1 746 7.87 26.69 
2 004 5 818 9.43 36.03 2 071 9.34 36.03 
2 005 6 900 11.18 47.21 2 493 11.24 47.27 
2 006 7 653 12.4 59.61 2 804 12.64 59.91 
2 007 8 441 13.68 73.29 3 060 13.79 73.7 
2 008 8 498 13.77 87.06 3 040 13.7 87.41 
2 009 7 988 12.94 100 2 794 12.59 100 
Total 61 714 100  22 184 100   
 
The name of each committee allows us to classify committees into 
three different categories: monitoring committees, advising committees and 
mixed committees. Our original dataset contains 697 different committee 
names. Most committees have common names that are directly related to their 
functions (like Audit, Nomination, Remuneration, etc.). The group of 
observations with the 23 most common committee names contains more than 
86% of the total number of observations.  
On the other hand, some of the committees have a name that 
appears only once in the whole data set: we find, for example, only one 
observation where the committee name is “Technology and Production”, and 
only one observation where the committee name is “Transport Decisions”. 
Although there are numerous unique committee names, they only correspond 
to a small fraction of the total number of observations (the 14% remaining 
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observations have unique or relatively scarce committee name).  
In Table 2 we present the frequency of the 23 most common 
committee names. For every committee name, we present the total number of 
observations where this committee name appears (irrespective of the year). 
The last raw of the table presents the aggregation of the remaining 672 
committee names. In the second column of the table our final classification of 
committees into Monitoring/ Advising and Mixed groups is presented. A 
detailed description of how we have classified the committees into those 
subgroups is presented in Table 3 below.  
 
TABLE 2. COMMITTEE NAMES – TYPES OF COMMITTEES 
In table 2 we present the total distribution of the committees in the original committee dataset. Committee 
Name is the original committee name that appears in the company annual reports. Committee Classification 
refers to our classification into monitoring/advising/mixed groups. For each original committee name we 
also present the number of observations in the committee database (Number of Observations) and the 
proportion of each committee name into the total sample (Percentage). 





Audit Monitoring 19 223 31.15 
Remuneration Monitoring 14 763 23.92 
Nomination Monitoring 9 016 14.61 
Compensation Monitoring 1 744 2.83 









Strategy Advising 668 1.08 
Risk Advising 448 0.73 





Investments Advising 383 0.62 










Mediation Advising 331 0.54 
Internal Control Monitoring 297 0.48 





Audit and Risk Monitoring 238 0.39 
Chairman's Advising 230 0.37 





Others   8 204 13.29 
Total   61 714 100 
As we observe from Table 2, as much as 69.68% of the observations 
correspond to the Audit, Remuneration and Nomination committees alone, 
suggesting (as we will show later in detail) that monitoring committees are the 
most numerous in our sample. Only 2.43% of the observations correspond to 
the most common advising committees (Strategy, Risks and Investments). 
Being advising committees clearly underrepresented in our sample (and in the 
corporate sector in general), they become the differential feature among firms 
in our study. Because the information required for efficient advice is subjective 
by nature and very difficult to quantify, firms with a strong need for advice by 
the board require a more efficient information transmission. We argue that 
those firms will benefit more from the use of committees in general (and the 
use of advising committees in particular).  
To analyze the data, we have classified committees into different 
subgroups, according to committee name. We aim to classify the committees 
into three key groups- advising, monitoring and mixed- depending on the 
committee function. However, in lack of a key committee function, our 
classification is based solely on the committee name, which is the only 
information available in our dataset. Still, as mentioned before, most 
committees have common names, usually related to their function (like audit, 
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remuneration or nomination), which allow us to classify the committees into 
monitoring, advising and mixed committees31. 
Our committee classification is presented in Table 3. For each 
classification, we present the number of observations (number of committee-
year observations within that group), their percentage of the total sample, the 
average number of committee members, the average number of executive 
directors, the average number of independent directors and the percentage of 
committees within each group where the CEO is a committee member.  
 
TABLE 3. COMMITTEE CLASSIFICATION 
   In this table we present our classification of committees, according to their name and function. In Table 3A, we 
present a broad classification into nine different groups. In Table 3B, we cluster our original classification into 
seven different groups, merging the groups containing “Nomination”, “Remuneration” and “Nomination and 
Remuneration” committees into a single group called “Remuneration and Nomination”. Finally, in Table 3C, 
we present the more stylized classification into Monitoring, Advising and Mixed Committees. In the regression 
analysis, the Advising and Mixed committees are merged into a single “Advising” group. The number of 
observations (Obs.) refers to the number of times that each committee name appears in the data. Frequency 
distribution refers to the proportion of that number to the sample size, while the cumulative distribution 
refers to the sum of all frequencies up to (and including) that particular name. The average number of 
committee members (members), the average number of executive directors within the committee (eds), the 
average number of independent directs (ids) and the percentage of the committees, where the CEO is 















Table 3.A. Broad Committee Classification  
Audit 22 110 35.83 3.32 1.2 2.2 3.56 
Nomination 10 354 16.78 3.9 1.2 2.1 30.78 
Executive 2 182 3.54 4.58 2.85 2.55 54.77 
HR 924 1.5 3.54 1.46 2.2 8.87 
Organisation 2 689 4.36 3.9 1.8 2.16 27.15 
Remuneration 16 901 27.39 3.15 1.24 2 6.17 
Remuneration 
& Nomination 2 881 4.67 3.4 1.17 2.1 8.78 
Strategy 3 673 5.95 4.39 1.9 2.36 39.99 
Table 3.B. Committee Classification  
                                                     
31




Audit 22 110 35.83 3.32 1.2 2.2 35.64 
Executive 2 182 3.54 4.58 2.85 2.55 54.77 
HR 924 1.5 3.54 1.46 2.2 8.87 
Organisation 2 689 4.36 3.9 1.82 2.16 27.14 
Remuneration 
& Nomination 30 136 48.83 3.4 1.23 2.06 14.87 
Strategy 3 673 5.95 4.39 1.92 2.36 39.99 
Table 3. C. Monitoring, Advising and Executive Committees  
Advising 6 362 10.31 4.1 1.88 2.28 34.56 
Mixed 3 106 5.03 4.2 2.73 2.44 41.11 
Monitoring 52 246 84.66 3.38 1.24 2.12 10 
 
Table 3 is divided into three different panels (3.A, 3.B, 3.C), each 
one corresponding to a different committee classification. To present our key 
results we have simplified our classification into monitoring and non-
monitoring (mixed and advising) committees.  
In Table 3.A. we present an extensive committee classification, 
which contains 8 committee types. We have grouped all committees into this 
broad classification according to their name. This way, for example, the “Audit” 
group in the 3.A classification includes committee names like “Audit”, “Audit 
and Control”, “Audit and Compliance”, “Internal Control”, etc. The classification 
presented in Table 3.B is more restricted (we have aggregated three groups 
into one, once again, based on closeness of committee names or similarities of 
committees functions). Finally, the classification presented in Table 3.C only 
contains information on whether the committee has a monitoring, advising or 
mixed nature. In the first extensive classification- see table 3.A- committees are 
grouped into the following groups: (1) audit gathers all committees whose 
name is related to audit, accountancy and control (2) nomination contains all 
committees that have a name related to nomination of executives and 
directors, succession plans, CEO replacements etc. (3) executive: in this group 
we have included all committees that have a name related to executive, 
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corporate governance design, executive management etc., (4) Human 
resources contains committees that are related to personnel policies, 
personnel remuneration etc., (5) Organization contains all names that would be 
related to firm operational management, like general purposes, safety, 
corporate social responsibility etc., (6) Remuneration contains all observations 
where the committee name is related to CEO and executive remuneration (7) 
Remuneration and nomination contains all observations where the committee 
name is related simultaneously to executive and CEO remuneration and 
director and executive appointments, nomination, succession plans etc. (8) 
Strategy contains all committees that have a name related to firm strategy, like 
mergers, strategic plans, expansion, development and marketing strategy etc.  
In this broad classification, we have created a sufficient number of 
groups, in order to keep track of the original committee names and functions. 
For example, we have three different, but much related subgroups: 
“Nomination”, ”Remuneration” and “Nomination and Remuneration”. For our 
current research, we pool these three subgroups in a join group named 
“Nomination and Remuneration” in table 3B. We consider that those groups 
are monitoring in nature, as their role (we argue) is to control that the CEO 
does not extract excessive rents. Remuneration and Nomination committees 
monitor the CEO by fixing CEO remuneration (linking pay to performance), and 
by appointing and replacing CEO, executives and directors (as risk of 
replacement can be perceived as a strong disciplinary device).  
In Table 3.B we present the same broad classification as in 3.A, but 
with the functions of “Nomination” “Remuneration” and “Remuneration and 
Nomination” gathered into a single group “Remuneration and Nomination”.  




of committees (from the original eight). These committee types are (1) audit (2) 
executive (3) human resources (4) remuneration and nomination (5) 
organization and (6) strategy  
The Organization and Strategy groups are also very close to each 
other. Both relate to the board advising function. We have tried to include into 
the strategy group all committees whose name suggests firm long term policies 
or clear strategic planning, while we have tried to include into the organization 
group the committees that have a name related to daily management, firm 
organization, etc. The committees in the Organization and Strategy groups are 
pooled in the final classification (Table 3.C) into the general group “Advising 
committees”. 
Table 3.C presents the most stylized committee classification. 
Because the key functions of the board of directors are to monitor the 
management and provide key strategic advice, we have created a classification, 
where committees can be (1) monitoring (2) advising or (3) mixed, depending 
on their key function. We have included in the monitoring group all committees 
related to Audit, Remuneration and Nomination. The advising group contains 
strategy and organization committees, and the third group, the executive, 
contains all committees in the human resources and executive groups. This 
third group is a “mixed group”, which contains committees that share both the 
monitoring and advising functions. It contains 5% of the observations of our 
sample. The committees included in this group are those whose name is 
related to corporate governance design, management, and human resources. 
Some of the committee names included in this group are “Executive”, 
“Personnel”, “Human Resources“, “Corporate Governance” and 
“Management”. Up to 50.52% of the observations within the committee type 
mixed are those where the committee name is “Executive”. Except for the 
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“Executive” (1569 Observations) and the “Personnel” (377 Observations), the 
rest of the committees names in this group are underrepresented in our 
sample. Following previous research, we use in our regressions a binary 
committee classification (monitoring- non monitoring committees). The non-
monitoring group contains all the mixed and advising committees from table 
3C.  
In this original dataset, the committee-year is the unit of analysis. 
This way, for example, a firm with a board organized into three committees in a 
certain year, appears three times in the original dataset. We aggregate this 
information at firm level, in order to obtain only one observation per firm year. 
For every firm in our sample, we obtain this way the following information: the 
number of committees that each firm has in its board (Nr. Of Com.), the 
average outsider ratio, which we calculate as committee size minus number of 
executive directors divided by committee size (COMOUTSIDER), the average 
size of the committees that conforms firm’s board (COMSIZE), and the 
proportion of committees where the CEO is committee member 
(CEOMEMBER). We use the two first variables (Nr of Com. and COMOUTSIDER) 
as our key explanatory variables, while the latter ones (COMSIZE and 
CEOMEMBER) are used to check the robustness of our results.  
We also calculate for each firm the number of monitoring 
committees (Nr. Of Monit. Com.), the number of advising committees (Nr. Of 
Adv. Com.), and the number of mixed (Nr. Of mixed) as well as the (firm) 
average proportion of outsiders in the monitoring, and non-monitoring 
committees (Monint. Indep., Adv. Indep. And Mixed Indep.). The original 
dataset also provides information on whether the CEO participates in each 
committee. We calculate for every firm the average number of committees 




monitoring/advising/mixed committees where the CEO is committee member 
(CEOMON, CEOADV, CEOMIXED). In our regression analysis we simplify this 
classification further, using the number, proportion, size and CEO participation 
of the monitoring and advising committees, containing the advising group the 
sum of the advising plus the few observations from the mixed group.  
 
3.2 Information on firm governance  
The second data set provided by BoardEx, contains firm level 
information. For every firm in the dataset, BoardEx provides data on board 
composition and CEO compensation, and average number of board positions of 
board members. BoardEx provides the number of board members 
(BOARDSIZE), and the number of executive directors. We use this late variable 
to construct our measure of board independence, as board size minus number 
of executive directors divided by board size (OUTSIDER). 
To further analyze board composition, we have created the 
dummies ODB, outsider dominated board, which takes the value 1 if the 
proportion of outsiders in the board is strictly larger than 0.5, and 
SUPERMAJORITY, which takes the value one if the proportion of outsiders is 
equal or larger than 0.7  
BoardEx also includes information on CEO pay, which we use to 
proxy to CEOs incentive, using Wealth Delta, which is the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to a dollar change in stock price. Using information on the Job Title of 
the CEO, we create a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also 
Chairman of the Board (CHAIRMAN).  
Finally, we construct the variable INTERLOCKING, as the average 
number of additional board positions in quoted firms of all the members of the 
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Board. BoardEx also provides a sectorial classification which we use in our 
definition of New Technology firms. 
 
3.3 Information of firm characteristics  
Finally, from the data provider Thomson, we obtain firm and market 
values, which we use to characterize the firm specific, market and business 
environment conditions. From the data provider Thomson we obtain the 
following variables: market capitalization (in mill. of dollars), total debt (in mill. 
dollars), total assets (in mill. dollars), common equity (in mill dollars), number 
of shares outstanding, ownership concentration (proportion of shares in hands 
of insiders, where insiders includes officers, pension and benefit plans, 
individuals who hold 5% or more of the outstanding shares and shares held in 
trust), and SIC industry classification (4 digit sic codes).  
With this information we construct our measure of firm value (Q), 
which is defined as the ratio of the sum of the firm total assets plus market 
capitalization minus common equity, divided by the total assets of the firm.  
As explanatory variables in our analysis we use LEVERAGE, defined 
as total debt divided by the sum of market capitalization plus total assets minus 
common equity; OWNERSHIP which is the ratio of the number of closely held 
shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding; ASSETS (we use 
the log of total assets) and eight industry dummies, based on the two digit sic- 
codes- industry classification. 
 
3.4 The dataset 




different sources contains information on a representative sample of European 
firms (2 029 firms), and it contains as much as 11 517 observations. From 
those, 20% of the observations (2 310 observations) correspond to 210 firms 
that appear all years in the sample. Even when France and UK are the countries 
with the largest number of observations (together they represent 71.22% of 
our sample), all countries included in the analysis have a significant number of 
observations. Every country in the data has observations in all years in our 
sample. The countries included in the analysis, the frequency and the number 
of firms in each country are presented in Table 4.  
 
TABLE 4: OBSERVATIONS BY COUNTRY  
Table 4 presents the distribution of the data by country in the panel data constructed for the regression 
analysis, where a firm-year is the basic observational unit. The first column (Frequency) presents the total 
number of observations for each country. Percentage refers to the proportion of each country number of 
observations to the total sample. The fourth column, number of firms, presents the total number of firms by 
country in the sample. The last column, firm-percentage, refers to the ratio of firms by country to the total 
number of firms.  
Country  Frequency  Percentage  Nr. of firms Firm-Percentage 
Austria 88 0.76 33 1.63 
Belgium 255 2.22 38 1.88 
Denmark 59 0.51 17 0.84 
Finland 49 0.43 11 0.54 
France 1 110 9.65 197 9.72 
Germany 534 4.64 113 5.58 
Greece 97 0.84 19 0.94 
Ireland  346 3.01 56 2.76 
Italy 456 3.96 79 3.9 
Netherlands 432 3.76 78 3.85 
Portugal 93 0.81 21 1.04 
Spain 394 3.42 70 3.46 
Sweden 508 4.42 97 4.79 
United Kingdom 7 083 61.57 1 197 59.08 
Total 11 504 100.00 2 026 100.00 




Descriptive statistics of the key variables in our analysis is presented 
in Table 5. As we see from Table 5, an average firm in our sample has a board 
of 9.1 members, and the average number of committees per board is 2.8. Only 
20% of the boards in Europe are dominated by insiders, being outside directors 
common norm in European firms.  
 
TABLE 5. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis. For each variable we present the number of 
observations (column 2), mean (column 3) and standard deviation (column 4), and the minimum (column 5) 
and maximum (column 6) values. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Q 10 606 1.896581 2.733712 0.038 128.82 
Leverage  10 599 0.1684 0.16882 0 0.972 
Interlocking 11 517 3.886 2.102 1 18.33 
Ownership 8 511 0.28186 0.2377 0 0.9389 
Total Assets 10 847 23 123.59 143 721.7 0.0074 3 586 851 
Wealth Delta 9 450 165.848 748.8053 0 18 418 
Chairman  11 517 0.2344 0.4236 0 1 
Outsiders 11 517 0.6191 0.1799 0 0.9615 
ODB 11 517 0.7989 0.400 0 1 
Supermajority  11 517 0.3303 0.4703 0 1 
Board size  11 517 9.1684 4.346 2 36 
Number of committees 11 517 2.8342 1.019 1 11 
Number of monitoring com.  11 517 2.416 0.745 0 8 
Number of advisory com.  11 517 0.277 0.6199 0 8 
Number of mixed com.  11 517 0.1404 0.376 0 3 
Proportion of monitoring com. 11 517 0.8843 0.206 0 1 
Proportion of advising com.  11 517 0.07266 0.155 0 1 
Proportion of mixed com.  11 517 0.0430 0.1263 0 1 
Average com. size  11 517 3.3699 1.154 1 15 
Average monitoring com. size 11 517 3.292 1.1768 0 15 
Average advising com. size  11 517 0.86915 1.88 0 15 
Average mixed com. size  11 517 0.5604 1.632 0 15 
Average com. outsider rate 5 286 0.6019 0.2255 0 0.9333 
Average monitoring outs. rate 5 286 0.5224 0.3176 0 0.9230 
Average advising outs. Rate 5 286 0.1413 0.2744 0 0.933 
Average mixed outs. rate 5 286 0.0598 0.189361 0 0.91666 
Average CEO com. membership  11 517 0.1344 0.2643 0 1 
Av. CEO memb.in monit.com. 11 517 0.1143 0.3182 0 1 




In Europe, monitoring committees are more numerous in general 
than advising or mixed committees. The average firm has 2.4 monitoring 
committees, while only 0.27 advising committees. Besides, the monitoring 
committees are usually larger in size (3.32 members compared to an average of 
3.28 members of the advising committees)32, and more independent (69% of 
outsiders in an average monitoring committee, while the average advising 
committee has a proportion of outsiders of 61.81%). This strong presence of 
monitoring committees in European firms, along with a board independence 
rate of 61.91% suggests that preventing rent extracting is the key function of 
European boards.  
Our sample corroborates the tendency recommended by an extant 
of the academic literature towards smaller and more independent boards. 
From table 6, we observe that board size has dropped from 10.34 to 8.74 in our 
sample, and the average outsider rate has increased from 58.6% to 63.1%. 
These changes reflect tendency within firms, but also the fact that new firms 
are added to the sample every year. To control for the larger coverage of the 
latest years in our sample, we calculate the average board size and 
independence for the 210 firms that appear all years in our sample. For those 
firms, the average board size was 10.13 members in 1999, board size in 2007 
was on average 9.99 members, and the average size in 2009 was 9.6 members. 
Those firms (probably because they are larger firms) also had a greater 
tendency towards independence: from 58% of outsiders on their boards in 
1999 to 65% in 2007 and 67% in 2009.  
On the other hand, we observe that the number of committees and 
the average size of the committees have remained fairly stable along the years 
                                                     
32
 These are the average values of the variables Average monitoring com. size and Average advising com. size 
when we exclude those observations with value zero  
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of our sample. The average number of committees was 2.82 in 1999 and 2.44 in 
2009, while the average committee size ranges from 3.66 members in 1999 to 
3.33 in 2009. Independence of the committees has decreased slightly from 62% 
(averaged over firm average) in 1999 to 59.3% in 2009, while CEO participation 
has decreased from 16% to 12.5%. Other corporate governance instruments 
available to firms (like ownership concentration and leverage have remained 
also very stable along the years, in line with the casual evidence that 
differences in governance are mainly cross sectional, and that within firm 
changes in corporate governance design are not common norm.  
 
TABLE 6. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE BY YEAR 
 
In Table 6 we present yearly descriptive statistics of key variables in our analysis. Each row shows the yearly 
average of the key variables in the analysis. The number of observations per year is included in the last row 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Q 2.83 2.593 1.87 1.55 1.76 1.88 2.0 2.26 2.06 1.47 1.622 
Leverage 0.155 0.159 0.175 0.192 0.178 0.151 0.14 0.13 0.152 0.211 0.195 
Ownership 0.187 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.233 0.28 0.303 0.326 0.34 
Chairman 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 
Board size  10.34 10.03 10.06 10.03 9.81 9.41 9.06 8.8 8.6 8.768 8.74 
Outsiders  0.586 0.591 0.605 0.615 0.62 0.62 0.617 0.618 0.618 0.629 0.631 
Nr. of com.  2.82 2.80 2.82 2.79 2.88 2.88 2.82 2.78 2.81 2.83 2.88 
Nr. of Mon. com.  2.4 2.40 2.39 2.36 2.43 2.45 2.42 2.79 2.41 2.39 2.44 
Nr. of Adv. com.  0.255 0.241 0.27 0.27 0.139 0.27 0.26 0.144 0.27 0.29 0.304 
Nr. of Mx. com 0.166 0.153 0.156 0.15 0.068 0.141 0.13 0.059 0.13 0.14 0.133 
Com. Size  3.66 3.53 3.53 3.52 3.5 3.41 3.25 3.26 3.26 3.3 3.33 
Mon. com. size 3.84 3.34 3.38 3.4 3.43 3.35 3.27 3.2 3.20 3.2 3.28 
Adv. com. size 0.255 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.58 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.93 
Mixed com. size 0.166 0.57 0.63 0.631 0.634 0.85 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.508 
CEO in Com. 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.125 
CEO in Monit. 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
CEO in Adv. 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 




Mon. outs. rate 0.579 0.557 0.54 0.546 0.55 0.549 0.52 0.51 0.505 0.48 0.494 
Adv. outs. rate 0.11 0.125 0.14 0.129 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.144 0.142 0.158 0.149 
Mx outs. rate 0.066 0.052 0.06 0.06 0.068 0.06 0.062 0.06 0.054 0.06 0.052 
Number of obs. 301 456 621 739 879 1031 1248 1467 1627 1636 1512 
 
In Table 7 we compare whether descriptive statistics differ when 
firms’ board structures differ. In Table 7, Panel A, we compare firms with 
insider dominated boards, to firms with a majority of outsiders on their boards. 
In Table 7, Panel B, we compare key descriptive statistics for firms with a simple 
majority of outsiders (those where the proportion of outsiders on the boards 
ranges from 50% to 70%), to those with a supermajority of outsiders (with a 
proportion of outsiders on the board larger than 70%).  
 
TABLE7. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY TYPE OF BOARD  
 
In this table, we present descriptive statistics of key variables for different subsamples when we split the 
sample by the degree of board independence. In Panel 7A, we present means and standard deviations for 
key variables when we split the sample in two groups: column one presents data on firms with boards 
where more than half of their members are insiders (ODB=0), and column two presents data on firms with 
outsider dominated boards (ODB=1). In panel 7.B. we present only information on firms with boards where 
the proportion of outsiders is larger than 0.5 (ODB=1). In column one we present information for firms with 
a simple majority of outsiders (where the outsider rate ranges between 0.5 and 0.7), while in the second 
column we present information on firms with a supermajority of outsiders in their boards (outsider rate is 
larger than 0.7 for those firms) 






 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  
Q 2.25  (4.48) 1.8  (2.05) 
Leverage 0.12  (0.15) 0.18  (0.17) 
Ownership 0.29  (0.23) 0.28  (0.24) 
Board size  7  (2.41) 9.7  (4.54) 
Outsider rate 0.37  (0.078) 0.68  (0.13) 
Nr. of com  2.57  (0.78) 2.9  (1.06) 
Nr. of Mon. com.  2.42  (0.63) 2.4  (0.77) 
Nr. of Adv. com.  0.094  (0.36) 0.32  (0.66) 
Nr. of Mx. com 0.051  (0.23) 0.16  (0.4) 
Com. Size  2.75  (0.962) 3.5  (1.14) 
Mon. com. size 2.72  (0.96) 3.4  (1.18) 
Adv. com. size 0.27  (1.05) 1.01  (2.01) 
Mixed com. size 0.22  (1.04) 0.65  (1.73) 
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Com outs. rate 0.55  (0.22) 0.62  (0.22) 
Mon. outs. Rate 0.55  (0.23) 0.51 (0.34) 
Adv. outs. rate 0.038  (0.14) 0.17  (0.30) 
Mx outs. rate 0.007  (0.058) 0.08  (0.21) 
Panel 7B. Majority/ 





Q 1.9  (2.4) 1.66  (1.4) 
Leverage 0.16  (0.17) 0.21  (0.17) 
Ownership 0.25  (0.22) 0.32  (0.25) 
Board size  8.2  (3.73) 11.83  (4.75) 
Outsider rate 0.58  (0.06) 0.82  (0.075) 
Nr. of com  2.9  (0.99) 2.9  (1.15) 
Nr. of Mon. com.  2.55  (0.70) 2.2  (0.82) 
Nr. of Adv. com.  0.23  (0.58) 0.46  (0.74) 
Nr. of Mx. com 0.11  (0.34) 0.23  (0.47) 
Com. Size  3.38  (1.03) 3.72  (1.26) 
Mon. com. size 3.35  (1.06) 3.55  (1.31) 
Adv. com. size 0.64  (1.59) 1.55  (2.39) 
Mixed com. size 0.42  (1.36) 0.96  (2.12) 
Com outs. rate 0.59  (0.24) 0.67  (0.19) 
Mon. outs. rate 0.58  (0.30) 0.40  (0.37) 
Adv. outs. rate 0.10  (0.22) 0.29  (0.36) 
Mx outs. rate 0.026  (0.11) 0.16  (0.30) 
 
Firms with boards dominated by outsiders have on average less 
market Q, and they are more leveraged firms. We also observe that firms with 
boards dominated by outsiders, do not have more committees in their boards, 
but those are larger in size and more independent.  
When we compare firms with a simple majority of outsiders in their 
boards with firms with a qualified majority, we find that firms with a simple 
majority of outsiders are less leveraged, and more valuable (in terms of Tobin’s 
Q). As before, we do not find a significant difference in the number of 
committees, although those are larger and more independent in the case of 
firms with a qualified majority of outsiders on their boards.  
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 




the general efficiency of the board and increases firm value), we compare the 
results of a benchmark firm value equation, with those of an augmented 
equation, where the joint impact of committee design and board composition 
is included in the analysis.  
More specifically, we compare the magnitude and significance of 
the impact of board independence on firm value in a benchmark value function 
(where firm value depends on board composition along with firm and market 
characteristics), with the magnitude and significance of the variable board 
composition in an augmented value function, where we include, along with 
board composition different measures of the use of committees (like number 
of committees and firm-average committee independence) as key explanatory 
variables.  
To test our second hypothesis (whether firms that adapt their 
internal structure in committees to their monitoring and advising requirements 
generate more value), we investigate whether monitoring and advising 
necessities –which are performed at a committee level- have a different impact 
on firm value, depending on the firm requirements for supervision and advice. 
To do so, we include in the analysis factors that arguably contribute to the 
creation and design of monitoring and advising committees, and test whether 
monitoring and advising committees have per se any impact on firm value. Also 
in our sensitivity analysis we study separately firms for which monitoring and 
advising intensity differ. To do so, we split the sample by industry and firm size. 
In the first sensitivity analysis, we compare results for firms in new technology 
industries (which are arguably more complex and have larger growth 
opportunities) versus traditional industries. In our second sensitivity analysis 
we split the sample by firm size, as bigger firms face arguably greater agency 
concerns.  
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Overall in the analysis we control for the fact that firms’ choice to 
use committees is not random. This nonrandom selection occurs because the 
number and composition of committees are owner’s preferred choices, and 
they depend on the firm characteristics and business environment. To correct 
for this self-selection, we use a Heckman regression model, where the 
dependent variable in the outcome equation is firm performance, and in the 
selection equation, we include dummy variables for monitoring and advising 
intensities as dependent variables, and determinants of monitoring and 
advising necessities as key explanatory variables. This way, rather than 
concentrating solely on the impact of board and committees on firm 
performance we include in the analysis the economic determinants of the 
existence of committees in the firm, especially in the case of advising 
committees, which are not common norm in our sample.  
The choice of a Heckman regression model (Heckman, 1979), over a 
dynamic GMM type of analysis, has the clear advantage of controlling for the 
nonrandom creation of committees (which GMM does not allow to do). The 
downside of the Heckman Maximum Likelihood regression model is that it does 
not allow to control for plausible dynamic endogeneity (as it uses current level 
instruments) and unobserved heterogeneity (as it does not exploit the panel 
structure of the data). As dynamic endogeneity is less of a concern in 
regressions relating governance on firm characteristics (Wintoki et al., 2012), 
the results of the Heckman regression models, will be especially useful to 
explore the determinants of monitoring and advising intensities, and their 
relations to other governance mechanism like board independence, chair 
duality, interlocking etc. Besides, the use of panel data might not improve over 
cross sectional studies when dealing with unobserved heterogeneity, if there is 




is common in corporate governance studies, where board, ownership and 
institutional parameters change little throughout the years (a feature present 
in our dataset, as we show in the previous section). We account for the 
plausible bias due to unobserved heterogeneity and (current and dynamic) 
endogeneity in our third sensitivity analysis, where we contrast the results 
(specially the magnitude and significance of the coefficients, as well as the 
general explanatory power of our regressions) from a Heckman regression 
model, with those of a GMM type of analysis that provides control for those 
types of bias.  
This section is divided into five differentiated parts: in the first part, 
we analyze the relation between board structure and firm value, taking into 
account how firms adapt their board independence and number of committees 
to their monitoring and advising requirements. In the second part we include 
the independence of committees in the analysis (instead of the number of 
committees). In the third part we test whether firms with more advising 
requirements benefit more from the intensive use of the advising committees, 
contrasting results for a Heckman regression model in the new technology 
sectors (which are knowledge intensive and growing sectors) with those of the 
rest of the economy (what we call traditional sectors). In the fourth subsection 
we test whether in business environments, where the monitoring requirements 
increase, the intensive use of supervisory committees leads to value creation. 
To do so, we split the sample by firm size, comparing results for firms with size 
below the sample median, to those of the subsample of firms that are larger 
than the sample median. Finally, in our fifth subsection, we depart from the 
Heckman type of regression and present the benchmark and augmented value 
functions using a GMM type of regression, where endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity are taken into account.  
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4.1 Number of committees, board independence and firm value 
In this section, we analyze the statistical relation between firm 
value and the joint determination of committee and board composition, and 
provide an insight on how firms adapt their internal board structure in 
committees to their monitoring and advising requirements.  
To do so, we perform a simultaneous regression system, where firm 
value is characterized in the first regression (outcome equation), while in the 
second regression (selection equation); we map the determinants of having a 
large number of committees within the firm.  




30YEARit+σρ1λit(Xit)+εit     (1) 
Pr(COMMITTEEit=1)=γ0+γ1OUTSIDERSit+γ2LNBOARDSIZEit+γ3OWNERS
HIPit+γ4CHAIRMANit+γ5INTERLOCKINGit+γ6LNASSETSit+γ7-17INDUSTRYit+γ18-
29YEARit+μit      (2)  
 
In the outcome equation (equation 1) firm value , measured by Q, is 
regressed on OUTSIDERS, the number of committees (Nr.ofCom.), 
LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP and WEALTHDELTA as proxies for the firm 
corporate governance structure; LEVERAGE and LNASSETS as proxies for the 
firm characteristics, and year and industry dummies to account for the business 
environment where the firm operates. We also include the inverse Mills ratio, 




but rather the result of the firm’s optimization of their governance structure.  
In the selection equation (equation 2), the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more than the sample median 
number of committees (COMMITTEE). In our sample, the median firm has set 
up 3 committees. This median value of the sample number of committees is in 
line with our expectations, as the EU commission recommends the setup of 
Nomination, Remuneration and Audit committees33 in European listed 
companies. Those firms that have created more than the three recommended 
committees can be seen as using committees intensively. With the dummy 
variable COMMITTEE=1, we split the whole sample into two clearly 
differentiated groups of firms: one group of firms that uses committees 
intensively, setting up more committees than the three recommended by the 
commission, and a second group- the baseline group- of firms with three or less 
committees on their boards. The dummy variable COMMITTEE takes the value 
one in the case of the first group (with numerous committees), and the value 
zero in the baseline group. 
To explain why firms self-select into the group of firms with 
numerous committees, we include (in the selection equation, equation 2) other 
governance mechanisms in use, together with firms and industry characteristics 
that proxy for monitoring and advising necessities. We do this, as we argue in 
our theoretical approach that firms that adapt their internal board structure to 
their monitoring and advising requirements generate more value. Thus, the 
dummy for numerous committees is regressed on OUTSIDERS, LNBOARDSIZE; 
CHAIRMAN, OWNERSHIP, INTERLOCKING to account for alternative governance 
mechanisms in place and on LNASSETS, INDUSTRY and YEAR dummies to 
                                                     
33
 Recommendation on the Role of Non-executive /Supervisory directors and Supervisory Board Committees 
(February 2005) 
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account for firm characteristics and characteristics of the business environment 
where the firm operates.  
If the intensive use of committees in general leads to value 
creation, we should observe a positive and significant coefficient of the variable 
Nr.of Com. in the outcome regression. Besides, if the efficiency of independent 
boards hinges on the use of committees to transmit sensible information, we 
should observe that the introduction of the variable Nr.of Com. leads to an 
increase in the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of the variable 
measuring the impact of board independence (OUTSIDERS) on firm value.  
Regression results for the joint estimation of equations (1) and (2) 
are presented in Table 8. In the first column, we present results for a 
benchmark equation, where information on committees (the variable Nr.of 
Com in equation 1) is excluded from the analysis. The purpose of including this 
benchmark equation is twofold. On one hand, it allows to compare the results 
of a benchmark equation (where information on committees is not included), 
with those of an augmented version, where we include information on 
committees, to check whether including information on committees improves 
explanatory power of the value function. On the other hand it allows to 
compare the results of the Heckman regression model, with that of the GMM 
type of analysis presented in Table 14, and it provides an insight on how 
parameters differ between both model specifications, which is related to how 
serious our problems with unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity 
in the Heckman case, and self selection in the GMM case are. In column (2) we 
present regression results for equations (1) and (2). 
In columns (3) and (4) we study the impact of monitoring and 




number of committees with the number of monitoring committees in the 
outcome equation. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes the value one if the firm has at least two monitoring 
committees. In column (4) we substitute the total number of committees from 
the outcome equation with the total number of advisory committees, and we 
use as dependent variable in the selection equation a dummy that takes the 
value one if the firm has at least one advisory committee.  
Regression results for the outcome equation are presented in Panel 
8.A. and regression results for the selection equation are presented in Panel 
8.B. 
 
TABLE 8. REGRESSION RESULTS 1. NUMBER OF COMMITTEES, BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE 
 
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, controlling for 
the total number of committees. In Panel 8A we present results for the outcome equation, in Panel 8B we 
present results for the selection equation. The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the Tobin’s Q 
(Q) in all cases. Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), number of 
committees (Nr. Com.), number of monitoring committees (Nr.of Monit.), number of advising committees 
(Nr. Adv.), board size (LN BOARDSIZE), sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (CEO WEALTH), 
debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LN ASSETS), industry and 
year dummies, the inverse Mill’s ratio and a constant term. In the selection equation (Panel 8B) the 
dependent variable is a dummy that reflects intensive use of committees by firms (COMMITTE). In columns 
1 and 2 the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more than three 
committees. In column 3 the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more 
than two strictly monitoring committees, and in column 4, the dependent variable takes the value one if the 
firm has at least one advising committee. The dependent variables in the selection equation are OUTSIDERS, 
LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP, a dummy for chair duality (CHAIRMAN), INTERLOCKING, LNASSETS, industry 
dummies and a constant term. P|z| of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001. The estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation 
between the error terms of the outcome and selection equation, (RHO), and the variance of the outcome 







Nr. Adv.  
(4) 
Panel 8.A. Outcome Equation.  









Nr.of Com.   0.122***   




Nr. Of Monit.    0.059 
(0.514) 
 
Nr. Of Adv.    0.112** 
(0.009) 
















































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 8.B. Selection Equation  

























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 8220 8220 8203 7812 
Censored observations 6858 6858 4080 5944 
Uncensored observations 1362 1362 4123 1868 
Wald Chi2 169.27 176.59 625.92 289.69 






Rho 0.235 0.2429 0.16274 -0.0675 
Sigma 1.44 1.441 1.79 1.394 
 
From the benchmark outcome equation (Table 8, column 1) we 
observe that firm value is positively related to board size, and negatively 
related to market leverage and firm assets. The coefficient of board size, β3, is 




coefficient of board independence, β1, is positive, 0.516, but not significant. 
This result is in line with previous studies by Wintoki et al (2012) and Palia 
(2001). Other additional internal governance instruments (like CEO wealth 
delta and ownership concentration), have a non-significant impact on firm 
value in our benchmark outcome equation. This lack of significance does not 
necessarily mean that board independence -or other internal governance 
mechanisms- does not have an impact on performance. It might also be the 
result of a downward bias originated by the exclusion of information on 
committees or other governance mechanisms in place from the analysis.  
The selection equation provides an insight into the key 
determinants of the creation of committees. We observe that the propensity to 
use committees intensively increases with board and firm size, and decreases 
with board independence, ownership concentration, chair duality and directors 
additional board positions. We explain the positive relation between board size 
and the intensive use of committees; as bigger boards have more capacity to 
set up additional committees, and they benefit more from the use of 
committees as organizational tool to transmit information within the board. 
We explain the positive relation between firm size and the intensive use of 
committees, as bigger firms, might have more complex operational 
environments, which would benefit from the work of committees.  
The observation that the alternative governance mechanisms in 
place have a highly significant impact on the firms selecting to have a large 
number of committees is in line with the view that firms design their corporate 
governance structures as a system, taking into account the interrelations 
between alternative corporate governance instruments. This way, firms with 
more concentrated ownership, more independent boards and more connected 
board members use committees less intensively. Besides, we find that firms 
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with powerful CEOs (firms where the CEO is also chairman) are less prone to 
have numerous committees. This might be the case as in firms with powerful 
CEOs decision making relies less on the board, and more on the managerial 
team. In this case, information transmission within committees (and thus the 
use of committees) becomes less relevant. It can also reflect entrenchment, as 
powerful CEOs prefer to avoid close monitoring by committees.  
To analyze whether the use of committees leads to increase firm 
value, we extend the benchmark regression model presented in Table 8, 
column 1, to include the firm total number of committees in the outcome 
regression. Results are presented in Table 8, column 2. We observe that, once 
we have accounted for the non-random creation of committees, an increase in 
the total number of board committees is positively related to an increase in 
firm value. The coefficient of number of committees in the outcome regression, 
β2, is positive (0.122) and it is statistically significant. We also note that 
including the number of committees in the firm value, does not change the sign 
or significance of the impact of board independence on firm value (which is 
very close to that obtained in the benchmark equation), indicating that both 
independent and less independent boards benefit equally from the set-up of 
committees, and that adding information on committees does not improve the 
explanatory power of the relation between board independence and firm 
value. The positive and significant impact of the number of committees on firm 
value is in line with our first hypothesis, which states that the use of 
committees in general improves the efficiency of the board and leads to value 
creation.  
In Table 8, column 3 we present results of the augmented model, 
including the number of monitoring committees in the analysis, instead of the 




dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more 
than two monitoring committees (which is the sample median), and in the 
outcome regression, the key explanatory variable is the total number of 
monitoring committees. In Table 8, column 4, we substitute the total number 
of committees with the number of advisory committees in the outcome 
regression, and we use a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm has at least 
one advising committee, as dependent variable in the selection equation.  
From the outcomes equations in Table 8 we observe that, both an 
increase in the total number of committees, and an increase in the number of 
firms advisory committees imply an increase in firm value, while the number of 
monitoring committees is not statistically related to firm value (Table 8 
columns 2 to 4). This result might indicate that is the setup of advising 
committees, rather than the monitoring committees, the one that drives the 
positive relation between the use of committees and firm value as the informal 
information transmission within committees is especially relevant for boards to 
implement their advisory role efficiently.  
We also find from the selection equation (Table 8, columns 3 and 4) 
that the proportion of outsiders in the board is positively related to the 
creation of advisory committees, while it is negatively related to the intensive 
use of monitoring committees. This result, together with the positive and 
significant coefficient of the variable OUTSIDER in the outcome equation from 
Table 8, column 4, is in line with second our hypothesis that firms with 
independent boards benefit more from the creation of advising committees, 
where information between outsiders (who provide advise) and insiders (who 
provide the necessary information for efficient decision making), is transmitted 
more efficiently. 
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4.2 Committee independence, board independence and firm value 
The analysis in this subsection is similar to that in section 4.1, but 
we substitute information on the total number of (monitoring/advising) 
committees, with the proportion of outsiders in the (monitoring/advising) 
committees.  
We run the following regressions:  
Qit=α+β1OUTSIDERSit+β2Com.Indep.it+β3LNBOARDSIZEit+β4WEALTHD
ELTAit+ β5OWNERSHIPit +β6LEVERAGEit+β7LNASSETSit+β8-18INDUSTRYit+β19-
30YEARit+σρ1λit(Xit)+εit     (3) 
Pr(COMMITTEEit=1)=γ0+γ1OUTSIDERSit+γ2LNBOARDSIZEit+γ3OWNERS
HIPit+γ4CHAIRMANit+γ5INTERLOCKINGit+γ6LNASSETSit+ γ 7-17INDUSTRYit+ γ 18-
29YEARit+μit      (4) 
In the outcome regression (equation 3) firm value (Q) is regressed 
on OUTSIDERS, average proportion of outsiders in the committees (Com 
Indep.), LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP and WEALTHDELTA as proxies for the firm 
corporate governance structure; LEVERAGE and LNASSETS as proxies for the 
firm characteristics, year and industry dummies to account for the business 
environment where the firm operates, and the inverse Mills ratio, σρ1λit(Xit), to 
control the non-random selection into committees.  
The selection equation is similar to that in the previous section, 
where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm 
uses committees intensively and 0 otherwise. As explanatory variables we 
include proportion of outsiders on the board (OUTSIDERS), board size in 
logarithm (LNBOARDSIZE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), a dummy 
that takes the value one if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board (CHAIRMAN), 




(INTERLOCKING), firm assets (LNASSETS), industry and year dummies and a 
constant term.  
Results for this model specification are presented in Table 9, 
columns 1 to 4. As in the previous section, we include in column (1) a baseline 
model for comparison purpose, where the variable measuring the 
independence o of committees (Com.Indep.) is excluded from the outcome 
equation. In the second column, we include as explanatory variable in the 
outcome equation the average proportion of outsiders in the firm committees 
(Com. Indep.), as in equation (3). In the third column we analyze how the 
independence of the monitoring committees is related to firm value. We do so, 
by including in the outcome equation the average outsiders in firm monitoring 
committees as explanatory variable, and in the selection equation, a dummy 
that takes the value one if the firm has more than two monitoring committees 
as dependent variable. Finally, in column 4, we analyze the relation between 
the outsiders in the advising committees and firm value, by including, as 
explanatory variable in the outcome regression, the average proportion of 
outsiders in the firms advising committees, and as dependent variable in the 
selection equation, a dummy for the existence of advising committees in the 
board.  
 
TABLE 9. REGRESSION RESULTS 2. COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCE, BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE.  
  
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, controlling for 
the independence of committees. In Panel 9A, we present results for the outcome equation, in Table 9B we 
present results for the selection equation. The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the Tobin’s Q 
(Q) in all cases. Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), average 
proportion of outsiders in committees (Com. Indep.), the average proportion of outsiders in monitoring 
committees (Monit. Indep.), the average proportion of outsiders in advising Committees (Adv. Indep.), 
Board size (LNBOARDSIZE), sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (CEO WEALTH), debt to assets 
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ratio (LEVERAGE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LNASSETS), industry and year dummies, 
the inverse Mill´s ratio and a constant term. In the selection equation (Panel 9B) the dependent variable is a 
dummy that reflects intensive use of committees by firms (COMMITTE). In columns 1 and 2 the dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more than three committees. In column 3 the 
dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has more than two strictly monitoring 
committees, and in column 4, the dependent variable takes the value one if the firm has at least one 
advising committee. The dependent variables in the selection equation are OUTSIDERS, LNBOARD SIZE, 
OWNERSHIP, a dummy for chair duality (CHAIRMAN), INTERLOCKING, LNASSETS, industry dummies and a 
constant term. P|z| of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
***p<0.001. The estimated coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation between the error 
terms of the outcome and selection equation, (RHO), and the variance of the outcome regression (SIGMA), 
are also provided. 
 Benchmark 
(1) 






Panel 9.A. Outcome Equation.  









Com. Indep.  0.564** 
(0.006) 
  
Monit. Indep.   0.047 
(0.544) 
 
Adv. Indep.     0.055 
(0.601) 


















































Industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 9.B. Selection Equation  




























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 8220 7940 8203 7812 
Censored observations 6858 6858 4080 5944 
Uncensored observations 1362 1082 4123 1868 
Wald Chi2 169.27 119.51 625.93 282.07 








Rho 0.235 -0.0547 0.28062 -0.008 
Sigma 1.44 1.514 1.79 1.396 
 
From Table 9, column 2 we observe a positive and statistically 
significant relation between the average independence of firm committee and 
firm value. This positive relation holds, even when the total proportion of 
outsiders in the board is not significantly related to firm value. We also observe 
that the average independence of advisory committees is positively related to 
firm value, while we do not find a consistently statistically significant relation 
between the independence of monitoring committees and firm value. Including 
the information on the average firm committee independence in the 
regressions, does not change the significance of the relation between board 
independence and firm value, which is still not significant. Thus, one can argue, 
in view of these results, that it is the composition of the committees within the 
board, rather than the aggregate board structure what is relevant for the 
creation of value and that firms that adapt their committee structure to their 
monitoring and advising requirements both in terms of the number of 
committees (selection equation) and in terms of the average committee 
independence (outcome equation) are those with higher Q values in our 
sample. This result is in line with our statement in proposition H1, where we 
argue that the composition of the committees is relevant for firm value, as it is 
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within committees where information is transmitted. 
On aggregate, the results in the outcome equations in Tables 8 and 
9 are in line with our proposition (H1) that states that the use of committees in 
general improves the general efficiency of the board and leads to firm value, as 
we find, on aggregate, a positive and significant joint impact of board 
independence and committee independence on firm value. Disaggregating by 
committee type, we find that the positive and significant joint impact holds 
when we analyze the independence of the advisory committees alone, while 
the joint impact of board and monitoring committee independence is not 
significant.  
We cannot conclude that including information of committees in 
the regression improves the explanatory power of the relation between the 
aggregate board independence and firm value, as only in the case of the 
inclusion of the number and independence of advisory committees (Tables 8 
and 9, column 4) board composition has a positive and significant impact on 
firm value. However, we find support to our statement that the use of advisory 
committees leads to value creation, and even that including information on 
advisory committees in the model improves the explanatory power of board 
independence on firm value (Tables 8 and 9, column 4). One could also argue 
that the results in Table 9, column 4 are in line with our proposition that 
information transmission within advisory committees is very relevant for the 
board to perform its advisory duties efficiently. It also provides partial support 
to proposition (H2), as it shows that in business environments where the 
advising requirements are significant, the intensive use of advising committees 
improves firm value.  




regression model does not correct or dynamic endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity, which can be done with the use of other econometric 
techniques, like the generalized methods of moments (GMM) estimation. 
While the Heckman regression does not correct for dynamic endogeneity, the 
GMM analysis might be suffering from selection bias which we correct for in a 
Heckman type of analysis. To include the Heckman correction for selection in 
our model is especially relevant in the case of advisory committees as they are 
not common norm in our analysis. The term Mills Lambda provides the 
estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio. When Lambda is statistically 
different from zero (as it is the case with the use of monitoring committees) 
selection bias has to be accounted for. Besides, if the estimated rho is 
significantly different from zero, as it is the case in most model specifications, 
we may reject the hypothesis of no correlation between the two error terms 
from the outcome and selection equations. This later should indicate the 
adequacy of a simultaneous equation model where selection is relevant. In 
section 4.5, we present results for an analysis using GMM and compare both 
sets of results.  
 
4.3 Business complexity, committee and board composition and firm value  
In this section, we test our second hypothesis, which states that in 
complex business environments where the advising requirements are 
significant, the intensive use of committees in general, and advising 
committees in particular, improves firm value.  
For a test of the impact of committees on firm value in complex 
business environments, we split our sample by industry, and we analyze 
whether parameters of our model differ depending on the subsample analyzed, 
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and thus, the type of business environment. To split the sample, we create a 
new dummy variable, NEWTECH, that takes the value one if the firm is in a 
technological sector, and zero if the firm is any of the remaining sectors. Firms 
that belong to the new technology sectors are those that belong to the 
following groups in the BoardEx sector classification: “Aerospace and Defense”, 
“Information Technology Hardware” and “Software and Computer Services”. In 
all, there are 1 303 observations in the New Technology group in our sample, 
and they amount up to 11.31 % of the total number of observations. 
We check whether the number and independence of committees 
have a different impact on firm value, in the two subsamples. In Table 10 we 
analyze the relation between the total number of committees (and the total 
number of advising committees) for firms in the new technology sectors 
(versus firms in the traditional sectors). To do this we run equations (1) and (2) 
separately for both groups of firms, and we compare the sign and significance 
of regression coefficients.  
 
TABLE 10. REGRESSSION RESULTS 3. BUSINESS COMPLEXITY, NUMBER OF 
COMMITTEES, BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE. 
 
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, when we split 
the sample by industry (New Technology Firms, High Tech=1, and traditional industries, High Tech=0). In 
Panel 10A we present results for the outcome equation. The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q). 
Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), the number of committees 
(Nr. Com.), number of Advising Committees (Nr. Adv.), Board Size (LNBOARDSIZE), sensitivity of CEO wealth 
to changes in stock price (WEALTHDELTA), debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), ownership concentration 
(OWNERSHIP), firm size (LNASSETS), industry and year dummies, the inverse Mill’s ratio and a constant 
term. In the selection equation, Panel 10B, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value one if 
the firm has more than three committees (Columns 1 and 2), and a dummy that takes the value one if the 
firm has at least one advising committee (Columns 3 and 4). The dependent variables in the selection 
equation are OUTSIDERS, LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP, a dummy for chair duality (CHAIRMAN), 
INTERLOCKING, LNASSETS, industry dummies and year and a constant term. P|z| of estimated coefficients 
are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. The estimated coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection equation (RHO) 




Panel 10.A. Outcome Equation.  
Dependent Variable: Q 
High Tech=1 
(1) 







































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 10.B. Selection Equation 

























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 888 7292 842 6872 
Censored observations 822 6036 711 5233 
Uncensored observations 66 1256 131 1639 
Wald Chi2 376.64 144.49 238.75 202.56 








Rho -0.0506 0.06 -0.157 0.296 
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Our results suggest that both the number of committees and the 
number of advisory committees have a positive and significant impact on firm 
value in the case of new technology firms, while we do not find this relation in 
the subsample that contains the rest of economic sectors. As we see in Table 
10A, columns 1 and 3, the coefficient that measures the relation between the 
number of committees and firm value is positive, 0.395, and significant, while 
the relation between the number of advisory committees and firm value is also 
positive, 0.265, albeit is very marginally significant. In this case, the value zero 
lies within the 95% confidence interval, although the z value, 1.94, is very close 
to the significance threshold. This coefficients and significance levels contrast 
sharply with those of the non-technological sector (with z values of 0.62 for the 
coefficient measuring impact of the number of committees on firm value, and -
1.6 for the coefficient of the number of advisory committees) , which are 
clearly not significant. In all, these results do not contradict our hypothesis that 
the use of committees in general, and the use of advisory committees in 
particular are beneficial in settings with strong advisory requirements. They 
support the idea that the use of committees in general can be beneficial in 
complex business environments, as it the case of the new technology sectors.  
Support for our hypothesis is not so strong when we analyze the 
impact of committee independence on firm value. Results are presented in 
Table 11. We find a positive and significant relation between the committee 
independence and firm value in the case of firms in the traditional sector. This 
relation is not significant for new technology firms. Besides the joint impact of 
board independence and committee independence is not statistically 
significant in the case of new technology firms, while it is positive and 
significant for the group of firms in the traditional sector. This result is at odds 




independent advisory committees. According to our results, firms in the 
traditional sectors benefit more from the independence of advisory 
committees. One plausible explanation for this puzzling result could be that our 
industry classification does not reflect properly business complexity. 
Robustness tests (not reported here, but available upon request) rule out this 
plausible explanation, as they show the persistence of this result, even when 
we use other sectorial classifications. We also test alternative proxies for 
business complexity, not based in industry classification, but on measures like 
research and development expenses and capital intensity, defined as the ratio 
of total capital to total assets, and results are inconclusive34.  
 
TABLE 11. REGRESSSION RESULTS 4. BUSINESS COMPLEXITY, COMMITTEE 
AND BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE. 
 
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, when we split 
the sample by industry (New Technology Firms, High Tech=1, and traditional industries, High Tech=0). In 
Panel 10A we present results for the outcome equation. The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q). 
Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), the average independence 
of committees (Com. Indep.), the average independence of Advising Committees (Adv. Indep.), Board Size 
(LNBOARDSIZE), sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (WEALTHDELTA), debt to assets ratio 
(LEVERAGE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LNASSETS), industry and year dummies, the 
inverse Mill’s ratio and a constant term. In the selection equation, Panel 10B, the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes the value one if the board has more than three committees (Columns1 and 2) and a 
dummy that takes the value one if the firm has at least one advising committee (Columns 3 and 4). The 
dependent variables in the selection equation are OUTSIDERS, LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP, a dummy for 
chair duality (CHAIRMAN), INTERLOCKING, LNASSETS, industry dummies and year and a constant term. P|z| 
of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. The estimated 
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and 
selection equation (RHO) and the variance of the outcome regression (SIGMA), are also provided. 
Panel 11.A. Outcome Equation.  
Dependent Variable: Q 
High Tech=1 
(1) 























                                                     
34
 Results not reported here, but available upon request 
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Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 11.B. Selection Equation 

























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 853 7059 842 6872 
Censored observations 822 6036 711 5233 
Uncensored observations 31 1023 131 1639 
Wald Chi2 
 
45.39 125.58 277.33 201.39 








Rho -1.0 -0.307 0.310 0.3188 
Sigma 1.76 1.57 2.779 1.460 
 
 
In all, we observe a positive relation between the use of 
committees within firms and firm value, in the sector of new technologies: both 
the number of committees and the number of advisory committees are 
positively related to firm value for this group of firms. Including information on 




findings, as we do not find a positive and significant relation between the 
independence of committees in general, and the independence of advisory 
committees and firm value in the new technology sectors.  
 
4.4 Firm size, committees and board composition and firm value 
In this section we analyze the impact of the number and 
independence of monitoring committees on firm value when we split the 
sample by firm size. We do this to test whether firms with stronger monitoring 
requirements (as it is the case of larger firms) benefit more from the set up and 
independence of monitoring committees. The results for these tests are 
presented in Tables 12 and 13. 
 
TABLE 12. REGRESSSION RESULTS 5. FIRM SIZE, NUMBER OF COMMITTEES, 
BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE  
 
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, when we split 
the sample by firm size (Firms with size above the sample median, Big Firm=1, and firms with size below the 
sample median, Big firms=0). In Panel 12.A, we present results for the outcome equation, in Table 12.B we 
present results for the selection equation. The dependent variable in the selection equation is the Tobin’s Q 
(Q) in all cases. Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), number of 
committees (Nr. Com.), number of monitoring committees (Nr. Monit.), Board Size (LNBOARD SIZE), 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (CEO WEALTH), debt to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), 
ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LN ASSETS), industry and year dummies, the inverse Mill’s 
ratio and a constant term. In the selection equation (Panel 16.B) the dependent variable is a dummy that 
takes the value one if the firm has more than two monitoring committees. The dependent variables in the 
selection equation are OUTSIDERS, LNBOARDSIZE, OWNERSHIP, a dummy for chair duality (CHAIRMAN), 
INTERLOCKING, LNASSETS, industry dummies and year and a constant term. P|z| of estimated coefficients 
are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. The estimated coefficient of the inverse 
Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and selection equation, (RHO), 
and the variance of the outcome regression (SIGMA), are also provided. 
Panel 12.A. Outcome Equation.  
Dependent Variable: Q 
Big Firm=1 
(1) 
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Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 12.B. Selection Equation  

























































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 4313 3890 4313 3890 
Censored observations 2075 2005 2075 2005 
Uncensored observations 2238 1885 2238 1885 
Wald Chi2 
 
993.05 317.38 977.23 317.96 








Rho -0.014 0.396 -0.1319 0.397 
Sigma 0.666 2.5191 0.668 2.519 
 
In Table 12, we run equations (3) and (4) separately for firms with 
total assets above the sample median (what we call big firms) and for firms 
with total assets below the sample median, which is 562.856 in our case. In this 
case we include the total number of committees as key explanatory variable in 
the outcome equation in columns 1 and 2, and the total number of monitoring 




equation, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm 
has more than two monitoring committees in all cases.  
From Table 12, we observe that in big firms, both the total number 
of committees and the number of monitoring committees have a positive and 
significant relation to firm value, which supports our testable implication that 
states that firms with greater monitoring requirements benefit more from the 
set-up of monitoring committees. Besides, when we include information on 
committees in the outcome regression, we observe that the relation between 
board independence and firm value turns out to be positive and significant, 
which also supports our statement that including information about 
committees in the analysis improves the explanatory power of board 
composition in firm value.  
On the other hand, we observe in Table 13, that the independence 
of the committees in general and the independence of monitoring committees 
in particular is not significantly related to an increase in firm value, neither in 
firms of above median size, nor in the subsample of the smaller firms. This 
result reinforces our findings in Section 5.2, where we do not find a significant 
relation between the independence of monitoring committees and firm value. 
This result is relevant for normative purposes, as most corporate governance 
recommendations in Europe and worldwide advocate for setting independent 
monitoring committees (the independence of audit, remuneration and 
appointment committees is usually recommended to be above average). In our 
study we find no evidence that independence of monitoring committees is per 
se a value increasing strategy. As in the case of board independence, we do not 
find evidence that increasing committee independence alone leads 
automatically to increased firm value.  
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TABLE 13. REGRESSSION RESULTS 6. FIRM SIZE, COMMITTEE AND BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE AND FIRM VALUE  
 
Heckman two step consistent estimate of the impact of board independence on firm value, when we split 
the sample by firm size (Firms with size above the sample median, Big Firm=1, and firms with size below the 
sample median, Big firms=0). In Panel 13.A, we present results for the outcome equation, in Table 13.B we 
present results for the selection equation. The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q) in all cases. 
Explanatory variables are the proportion of outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS), average proportion of 
outsiders in firms committees (Com. Indep.), proportion of outsiders in monitoring committees (Monit. 
Indep.), Board Size (LNBOARDSIZE), sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (CEO WEALTH), debt 
to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LNASSETS), industry and year 
dummies, the inverse Mill’s ratio and a constant term. In the selection equation (Panel 17.B) the dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has at least two monitoring committee. The 
dependent variables in the selection equation are OUTSIDERS, LNBOARD SIZE, OWNERSHIP, a dummy for 
chair duality (CHAIRMAN), INTERLOCKING, LN ASSETS, industry dummies and year and a constant term. P|z| 
of estimated coefficients are in parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. The estimated 
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio (LAMDA), the correlation between the error terms of the outcome and 
selection equation, (RHO), and the variance of the outcome regression (SIGMA), are also provided. 
Panel 13.A. Outcome Equation.  
Dependent Variable: Q 
Big Firm=1 
(1) 







































































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 13.B. Selection Equation      






















































Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr of observations 3507 3062 4313 3890 
Censored observations 2075 2005 2075 2005 
Uncensored observations 1432 1057 2238 1885 
Wald Chi2 594.70 205.74 972.85 319.00 








Rho -0.011 0.357 -0.1357 0.379 
Sigma 0.681 3.04 0.668 2.508 
 
 
4.5 Robustness test: The use of a GMM System Estimation 
To check the robustness of our results, we analyze the relation 
between board independence and firm value using an alternative econometric 
technique. We use a dynamic panel GMM estimator, as it is done is previous 
studies on the relation between board independence and firm value (See 
Wintoki et al, 2012 for a review), and compare these results, with those of the 
previous sections, where a two-step maximum likelihood Heckman regression 
model is preferred.  
Using dynamic GMM we control for the plausible bias that results 
from unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity and dynamic endogeneity. 
Unobserved heterogeneity might cause bias in the estimated coefficients as 
some underlying factors affect simultaneously firm performance and 
governance, and endogeneity appears because firm performance (or the 
expected value of performance) might have an impact on the selection of the 
firm governance design. Dynamic endogeneity appears as current firm 
performance affects future firm performance through the choice of current 
governance mechanism, eliminating the assumption of time independent 
observations. The use of a two-step panel data GMM estimator should solve 
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these problems. However, the accuracy of the dynamic two-step panel data 
GMM estimator depends crucially on the selection of adequate instruments to 
account for endogeneity, as well as on the inclusion of an adequate number of 
lags to correct dynamic endogeneity.  
We measure the relation between firm value and board 
composition with the following benchmark equation:  
 
Qit= α+ β0LagQit+ β1OUTSIDERSit+ β2LNBOARDSIZEit+ 
β3INTERLOCKINGit+ β4WEALTHDELTAit+ β5LEVERAGEit+ β6OWNERSHIPit+ 
β7CHAIRMANit +β8LNASSETSit + β9-17INDUSTRYit + β18-28YEARDUMMYit +υi + ε it 
(5) 
In our benchmark equation, firm value is related to specific firm 
characteristics, to firm governance structure and to characteristics of the 
industry where the firm operates. This way, firm value, measured by Q, is 
regressed on OUTSIDERS, LNBOARDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, WEALTHDELTA, 
LEVERAGE, OWNERSHIP and CHAIRMAN, as proxies for the firms’ corporate 
governance structure, LNASSETS, as proxy for firm size, and 8 industry dummies 
(INDUSTRY) and 11 year dummies (YEAR) that proxy for the firm business 
environment. We also include lag performance (LAG Q) to control for dynamic 
endogeneity. The term υi is the individual fixed effects and εit is the normally 
distributed error term. The results from this benchmark equation are 







TABLE 14. REGRESSION RESULTS 7. THE USE OF A GMM SYSTEM ESTIMATION 
 
Two-step GMM estimation of the impact of board independence on firm value, controlling for information 
on committees. The dependent variable is the Tobin’s Q (Q) in all cases. Explanatory variables are: last year 
Tobin Q (LAG Q), proportion of non executive directors (OUTSIDERS), number of board members 
(LNBOARDSIZE), average number of additional board positions of board members (INTERLOCKING), 
executive Chairman (CHAIRMAN), sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (WEALTHDELTA), debt 
to assets ratio (LEVERAGE), ownership concentration (OWNERSHIP), firm size (LNASSETS), constant term, 
year and industry dummies. In the first column we present results for our benchmark equation, where Q is 
regressed on the mentioned firm and governance characteristics. In column (2) we include a multiplicative 
term, NrCom., which is the product of OUTSIDERS and a dummy that takes the value one if the firm has 
above the sample median number of committees. In column (3) we include a multiplicative term, 
Indep.Com, which is the product of OUTSIDERS and a dummy that takes the value one if the independence 
of firm committees is above the sample median. In column (4) the multiplicative term is the product of 
OUTSIDERS and a dummy that takes value one if participation of CEO in committees is above the sample 
median. ∑ assesses the joint significance of the estimator for the reference group (OUTSIDERS) plus the 
multiplicative variable. Arellano-Bond Test of serial correlations, AR(1) and AR(2), and test for over 
identifying restrictions, Sargan and Hansen χ
2
 Tests, are also included. P>|z| of estimated coefficients are in 
parentheses. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 






















































































Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Number of Observations  6 005 6 005 6 005 6 005 
 
From the results of the benchmark equation, we observe a non-
significant relation between the proportion of outsiders on the board and firm 
value in our sample (See Table 14, column 1). The coefficient of board 
independence, β1, is positive, 0.479, but not significant. This result is in line 
with previous studies by Wintoki et al (2012) and Palia (2001), and with our 
previous analysis, where we use a Heckman regression model as an alternative 
econometric technique. The coefficient β1 and its significance are very sensitive 
to the model specification. Omitting certain explanatory variables (like 
CHAIRMAN or LAG Q) results in a positive and significant coefficient β1, as in 
Coles et al (2008) and Yermack (1996). Following Wintoki et al (2012) we argue 
that the inclusion of lag firm performance is necessary to address the problem 
of dynamic heterogeneity, and to control for the impact of past firm 
performance on current performance and current governance.  
The results corresponding to the rest of the covariates are in line 
with those of previous studies. We find a positive –albeit only marginally 
significant- relation between firm value and board size (Coles et al, 2008), and a 
non-significant relation between ownership concentration and market value. 
We also find that larger and more leveraged firms also exhibit lower 
performance (measured as Tobin’s Q). We find no significant relation between 
other governance characteristics (like the CEO being chairman, the average 
number of additional board positions hold by directors, or the CEO firm 
ownership) on performance. As with board independence, this lack of 




are not relevant to firm performance. It might also suggest that value 
maximizing governance depends on firms’ characteristics, the operational and 
contractual opportunity set and the firms’ past performance, and all those 
features are already taken into account in the information set included in our 
analysis.  
To test whether the intensive use of committees leads to value 
creation we extend our benchmark model to include in the equation (1) the use 
of committees, (2) the independence of committees and (3) CEO involvement 
in committees, and (4) committee size35, alternatively. Results for these 
augmented models are included in Table 14, columns (2) to (4) 
In Table 14, column (2), we analyze the impact of board 
independence on firm value, especially for those firms that have on their board 
a larger number of committees that the sample median. For this test, we 
include in the benchmark equation a multiplicative term: β1BOUTSIDERSCOM. 
The multiplicative term is the product of the board outsider rate and a dummy 
variable that takes the value one if the number of firm committees is larger 
than the sample median (the median number of committees in our sample is 
3). With this multiplicative term we measure the incremental impact of board 
independence on firm value, for those firms with larger than the median 
number of committees (which means, those firms that use committees 
intensively). The regression equation yields:  
Qit= α+ β0LagQit+ β1AOUTSIDERSit + β1BOUTSIDERSCOMit+ 
β2LNBOARDSIZEit+ β3INTERLOCKINGit+ β4WEALTHDELTAit+ β5LEVERAGEit+ 
β6OWNERSHIPit+ β7CHAIRMANit +β8LNASSETSit + β9-17INDUSTRYit + β18-
28YEARDUMMYit +υi + ε it    (6) 
                                                     
35
 The test where we include committee size yields similar results as the previous ones, and for ease of 
explanation this test is not reported here. It is available to the reader upon request 
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We observe from Table 14, column (2) that the impact of board 
independence on firm value is relatively similar for firms with a larger (or 
smaller) number of committees. The impact of board independence on firm 
value is 0.236 (coefficient β1A) for firms that do not use committees intensively, 
while the incremental impact is 0.272 (coefficient β1B) for firms with more than 
three committees in their board. In both cases coefficients are not significant. 
The impact of board independence on firm value in this model specification 
(the sum of both coefficients β1A and β1B, which is 0.508) is close to the 
aggregate impact of the benchmark equation (0.479), which is also non-
significant. Besides, the relation between board size and firm performance 
turns not significant when we include information on the total number of 
committees in the analysis. This result is in line with previous studies that find 
no statistical significance between governance variables and firm value 
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; and Bhagat and Black, 2002), with the 
argument that firms optimize governance structures (both board composition 
and committees) according to their characteristics and business opportunity 
set.  
We also observe that including information on the total number of 
committees, and on the number of monitoring and advising committees, does 
not influence the coefficients of the variables representing firm characteristics 
and other governance mechanisms in use. If we compare the coefficients of the 
remaining variables (Interlocking, Chairman, Leverage and Ownership) from 
Table 14 column 1, with those of Table 14, columns 2, 3, and 4 we can 
appreciate that the sign, magnitude and significance of coefficients remain 
fairly stable. Only in the case of board size, adding information on the total 
number of committees in the analysis reduces the significance of the 




and it turns no significant when we include information on the total number of 
committees.  
In Table 14, column (3) we analyze the impact of board 
independence on firm value, especially for those firms with committees that 
are more independent than the sample median. As in the previous analysis, we 
include in our benchmark equation a multiplicative term, β1BOUTSIDERSINDEP, 
that is the product of OUTSIDERS times a dummy that takes the value one if the 
average outsider ratio of the firms committees exceeds the sample median. 
The regression equation yields:  
Qit= α+ β0LagQit+ β1AOUTSIDERSit + β1BOUTSIDERSINDEPit+ 
β2LNBOARDSIZEit+ β3INTERLOCKINGit+ β4WEALTHDELTAit+ β5LEVERAGEit+ 
β6OWNERSHIPit+ β7CHAIRMANit +β8LNASSETSit + β9-17INDUSTRYit + β18-
28YEARDUMMYit +υi + ε it    (7) 
From Table 14, column 3, we observe that the impact of board 
independence on firm value is not significant when we include information on 
committee independence. We also find that board independence is in general 
more efficient in firms where the independence of committees is lower than 
the sample median: the value of the coefficient β1A is 0.244, while the value of 
the coefficient β1B is -0.313. The first one represents the impact of board 
independence on firm performance for firms with average committee 
independence lower than the sample median, while the later reflects the 
incremental impact of board independence on firm performance for firms with 
average committee independence larger than the sample median. For those 
firms (with more independent committees), the impact of board independence 
on firm performance is -0.069 (∑ asseses the joint significance of the estimator 
for the reference group plus the multiplicative variable), which is close to zero 
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and not significant. The change of the sign in the impact of board 
independence on firm value (positive in the case of firms with more 
independent committees, and negative in the case of less independent 
committees) might provide indication that both types of governance structures 
might behave differently, although the lack of statistical significance does not 
allow to make inferences about the magnitude or economic impact of those 
differences. We find that neither the independent coefficients β1A and β1B -nor 
their joint impact ∑- are significant.  
To analyze the impact of board independence on firm value, 
including information on whether or not the CEO is member of the firms 
committees, we include in our benchmark equation a multiplicative term, 
β1BOUTSIDERSCEO. It is the results of multiplying our variable of interest, 
OUTSIDERS, times a dummy variable that takes the value one if the proportion 
of committees where the CEO is a member exceeds the sample median. The 
regression equation yields:  
Qit= α+ β0LagQit+ β1AOUTSIDERSit + β1BOUTSIDERSCEOit+ 
β2LNBOARDSIZEit+ β3INTERLOCKINGit+ β4WEALTHDELTAit+ β5LEVERAGEit+ 
β6OWNERSHIPit+ β7CHAIRMANit +β8LNASSETSit + β9-17INDUSTRYit + β18-
28YEARDUMMYit +υi + ε it    (8) 
The regression results for this augmented equation are presented in 
Table 14, column (4). As previously, adding information on CEO involvement in 
committee work does not improve the explanatory power to the impact of 
board independence on performance.  
The same results (lack of significance) as in the previous section 
appear when we include committee size (instead of committee independence) 




they are available upon request). In none of the cases we observe changes in 
the sign or significance of key explanatory variables when we introduce 
information about committee sizes in the analysis. Including this information 
does not change either the estimated relation between governance 
characteristics (like board size, independence, ownership concentration, dual 
chair, or CEO incentive alignment), and firm performance.  
To test hypothesis (H2) -whether the use of monitoring (advising) 
committees adds more value in settings with different monitoring (advising) 
requirements- we run all previous regressions including as explanatory 
variables the use, the independence, CEO involvement and size of monitoring 
and advising committees separately. Results for these model specifications, 
where monitoring and advising requirements are tested separately are not 
presented here, but are available to the reader upon request. As in the case of 
the total number of committees, we find that adding information on the 
number of monitoring and advising committees does not change the sign or 
significance of the impact of board composition on firm value, nor does it 
change the impact of other governance characteristics on firm value.  
Overall in the regressions presented in Table 14, and in the 
additional tests performed, the variables measuring firm characteristics and 
business environment (lagged market Q, leverage, assets and industry and year 
dummies), are the ones that add most explanatory power to our regression on 
firm performance, being the coefficients of the variables that contain 
information on firm governance (board independence, interlocking, chairman, 
remuneration, and ownership concentration) not significant in all model 
specifications. From the governance instruments included in the regressions, 
only leverage is statistically related to firm value in a robust way, although we 
cannot conclude that this relation is due to governance considerations alone. 
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The negative relation between leverage and firm value might also reflect the 
difficulties that stressed firms undergo as a result of excessive debt. The market 
conditions of the last part of the decade might exacerbate this relation. Overall 
in the regressions we find that lagged values of market Q have a positive and 
significant impact on current firm performance, indicating the need to account 
for dynamic endogeneity in the analysis. We also find that industry and year 
dummies are in general significant, as firm characteristics and the business 
environment where it operates have a non-negligible impact on firm value.  
From all the variables measuring different aspects of corporate 
governance, only the natural logarithm of board size appears to have a positive 
(and marginally significant) impact on firm value, in a model where 
simultaneity, unobserved heterogeneity and dynamic endogeneity are taken 
into account. Adding information on committees, both in a multiplicative way 
and directly as explanatory variables (these later results omitted here, but 
available to the reader), does not improve the explanatory power of our 
governance measures, nor does it have a statistically significant impact on firm 
value.  
This lack of significance does not necessarily mean that board 
independence, or other governance mechanisms, have a negligible impact on 
firm value. It can have an economic significance: the lack of significance can be 
due to the fact that firms adapt constantly their governance systems to 
business and market conditions. However, the fact that Q varies considerably 
within firms from year to year, while governance characteristics (like board and 
committee composition) are fairly stable along the years, is at odds with this 
plausible explanation. If firms where constantly in equilibrium, both types of 
variables should change simultaneously to adapt in the short term to the new 




of an additional plausible explanation for this lack of significance, which is 
based on the econometric techniques used in the analysis. 
The use of panel data econometric technique might be partially 
responsible for the little significance of our key coefficients. The use of a 
dynamic two step system GMM estimate has two main shortcomings: the first 
one refers to the use of first differencing right hand side variables with little 
variation, which might lead to imprecise estimates; the second one refers to 
the use of adequate instruments for the endogenous variables.  
Panel data techniques take firm averages throughout the years in 
the sample. However, when explanatory variables have little variation along 
time, mean differencing might lead to imprecise estimates, and other 
econometric techniques might be more appropriate. The lack of statistical 
significance of the governance variables in the value regression, and the 
significant impact of firm characteristics (like past firm performance, leverage, 
assets and industry and year dummies), are in line with this latter explanation.  
With respect to the lack of adequate estimates, there are no single 
criteria for evaluating the joint strength of the instrument set in a dynamic 
panel system GMM estimator (Wintoki et al, 2012). We use in our analysis 
results from Hansen and Sargan Test. Based on our test results, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that our instruments are endogenous (the p-values for 
Sargan and Hansen Test are close to zero, meaning that we reject the null 
hypothesis of exogenous instruments). This lack of exogenous instruments is 
pervasive in all model specifications. In our data, that past values of firm 
governance and differences might not be exogenous instruments when 
measuring the impact of governance on firm performance, when performance 
is measured as Tobin’s Q. Including other measures of performance as 
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explanatory variables (like Earnings per Share or Return on Assets) reduces 
partially the endogeneity problem, albeit it does not change the non-significant 
relation of board independence, committee variables and firm value relation. It 
is worth noting that Sargan and Hansen Tests, measure the exogeneity of a 
subset of instruments, but they do not allow us to make inferences about the 
suitability of each instrument alone. To address these econometric 
shortcomings, we choose to analyze our theoretical hypothesis with a 




Boards of directors are arguably the most important governance 
instrument available to corporations. It is their duty to prevent rent extracting 
from managers, to analyze the functioning and financing of the firm, to review 
and approve business strategies, and to provide the managers resources and 
know how to improve the overall business performance.  
To perform its duties efficiently -especially its advisory role- the 
board needs to obtain information about the firm and business environment 
from the management team. Because members of the management team are 
the depositaries of this information, board composition (its degree of 
independence and its internal functioning in committees) has to balance the 
adequate proportion of outside board members, who provide supervision and 
know how, with inside board members, who provide information about the 
firm and business environment. The use of committees within board has been 
proposed in the corporate governance literature to improve monitoring and 




In this chapter, we look at the joint impact of overall board 
composition and the composition of the committees in which board work is 
constituted on firm performance. Using a unique dataset that contains 
information on corporate governance, board and committees of a 
representative sample of the key western European economies, we test 
whether the introduction of information on committees in our model improves 
the explanatory power of board independence on firm value, and leads to 
value creation.  
Accounting for the nonrandom use of committees, we find a 
positive and significant relation between the total number of committees and 
firm value, and a positive and significant relation between the firm average 
committee independence and firm value.  
We also find that the average number of advisory committees is 
positively related to firm value, while we do not find a statistically significant 
relation between the independence of the board of directors (and the average 
independence of monitoring or advising committees) and firm value.  
Thus, one can argue, in view of these results, that it is the 
composition of the committees within the board, rather than the aggregate 
board structure what is relevant for the creation of value and that firms that 
adapt their committee structure to their monitoring and advising requirements 
both in terms of the number of committees and in terms of the average 
committee independence are able to create value (as they are those firms with 
higher Q values in our sample).  
These results are relevant, as they are at odds with the 
recommendations to set up strict independence in both the board of directors, 
and in the monitoring committees within the board (specially the nomination, 
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audit and remuneration committees). These recommendations are common 
norm in Corporate Governance Codes in Western European economies, even 
when a recent strand of the literature, and our work here, do not find empirical 
evidence of a positive impact of board independence on firm value. In line with 
recent research (Wintoki et al, 2012; Bebchuck et al, 2010) we do not find 
statistically significant evidence of a relation between outsiders on the board 
and firm value. This lack of significance holds even when we include in the 
analysis information on the number, nature and independence of the 
committees in which board work is organized, and it is robust to several model 
specifications and econometric techniques. This lack of statistical relation does 
not necessarily mean that board composition does not have an impact on 
performance, but casts doubts upon the statement that board independence, 
per se, is beneficial for firm value. We contribute with this essay to this strand 
of the literature, extending the analysis to include the composition and nature 
of committees in the analysis, and we conclude that the use and independence 
of advisory committees (which have been less noticed in corporate governance 
regulations and recommendations) can improve firms governance, and lead to 
value creation, and we observe that those firms with more numerous and 
independent committees are the ones with higher Q values in our sample.  
Due to the importance of boards of directors for the correct 
functioning of the firm, we believe that more research is needed to analyze the 
role of insiders in the board, and the benefits and adequacy of advisory 
committees, which have been less noticed, both in the academic literature, and 
in the European Corporate Governance Recommendations. Those advisory 
committees, despite being less numerous, are a key distinctive feature that 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Managerial compensation and board of directors are two of the key 
governance instruments available to corporations. As such, they have received 
a lot of attention from academia and policy makers. Academic papers usually 
concentrate on the impact of a unique instrument on various firm 
characteristics and performance, although different governance instruments 
are usually set simultaneously and interact with each other. The impact of 
these interactions has to be taken into account to get a full picture on how 
governance affects firm value.  
Independent boards are considered optimal safeguard of 
shareholders value, by closely monitoring the management team, and 
providing strategic advice and business contacts. The optimal board structure 
has to balance firms’ monitoring and advising needs, information transmission 
and institutional and market constraints. Besides, owners can also use CEO 
incentive pay as a governance mechanism. As such, equity linked compensation 
has been proved to be a powerful instrument to align the interests of managers 
and shareholders and to prevent rent extracting. However, in setting the 
optimal pay structure, compensation committees have to take into account the 
pervasive effects -like implementation of riskier policies, short term strategy, 
accounting restatement, or camouflaged rents- that excessive pay for 
performance might lead to.  
Additionally, when setting the optimal governance structure, 
owners have to take into account that boards and managers interact with each 
other in their functions36 and duties37. Hence, the use of a governance 
                                                     
36





mechanism, aimed at each one of them (board or management), will have a 
non-negligible impact on the other. For example, independent directors might 
have a preference for a certain compensation structure, impacting in this way 
on CEO policy regarding risk, time preferences, dividend policies, etc. By the 
same token, a CEO with high pay performance sensitivity might prefer a certain 
board structure, where loyal board members support his preferred policy 
choices. To take into account these indirect effects is key in the design of firms’ 
optimal governance structure.  
With this study we want to contribute to the analysis on how 
different governance instruments interact with each other, and what are the 
indirect effects of alternative governance instruments. Although cross effects 
are important, there is no agreement in the theoretical literature on what is 
the optimal governance algorithm for a profit maximizing firm. According to 
classical principal agent models (for example, those of Holmstrom, 1979, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991 and Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994), owners can 
substitute costly monitoring with an adequate incentive system, while the 
management power hypothesis states that agency problems recede when firms 
complement (truly) independent boards with pay linked to performance 
(Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002).  
We analyze empirically the relation between board composition 
and CEO pay as alternative instruments of corporate governance. In particular, 
we explore whether European firms use board independence and incentive pay 
as complementary -as Bebchuk, Fried and Walker models of corporate 
governance suggest- or substitutive governance mechanisms- as in classical 
principal agent models of contracting. By providing empirical evidence on this 
                                                                                                                                                        
37
 Boards of directors bring valuable advice and business contacts that influence firm management; while CEO 
and management team are key board members that influence board decisions through their information 
transmission and voting rights.  
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relation, we analyze which of the previously mentioned theories is prevalent in 
the European corporate sector. This question is very relevant in the current 
political debate, as recent reforms in corporate governance regulations in 
Europe (starting around year 2002) aim to improve the monitoring and 
transparency of European corporations. In most countries, regulators include in 
their Governance Codes recommendations for boards with a majority of 
independent directors. Whether this is a value maximizing strategy depends on 
which of the above mentioned theories is prevalent in the European Corporate 
Sector. Despite the ambiguous theoretical predictions, and the current 
involvement of policy makers in board design, there are surprisingly few 
empirical studies focusing on the interaction between CEO incentive pay and 
board composition as alternative or complementary instruments of corporate 
governance.  
This is the first essay (to our knowledge) to study this relation for a 
representative sample of the main western European economies. Previous 
studies, like Guthrie,Sokolowsky and Wan (2012), Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007), Fahlenbrach, (2009), or Chung (2008) study this relation for the US. The 
European corporate sector differs significantly from that in the US. The 
European corporate sector is characterized by high levels of ownership 
concentration, less market development, and a higher presence of block 
holders and banks; all features having a relevant impact on the governance 
mechanisms. Besides, unlike the SOX in the US, governance recommendations 
in Europe are not compulsory and listed firms are free to deviate from the 
recommended governance standards. All of these firm and institutional 
characteristics might have an impact on the role and functions of the board of 
directors, leading to European boards playing a weaker monitoring role than US 




receive higher pay, and much higher stock and stock option incentives than 
their European counterparts (Conyon, Core and Guay, 2011). Additionally, the 
use of equity linked compensation in Europe does not always enjoy the tax 
benefits that are available to US corporations. Due to this difference in taxation 
systems, the use of equity linked compensation could be more linked to 
incentive purposes than total optimization concerns in Europe.  
Because the use of equity linked compensation is not generalized in 
Europe, when studying the relation between board composition and 
managerial pay, we focus on three aspects of incentive pay: the existence, the 
level and the intensity of incentive pay. The existence refers to whether or not 
firms use equity linked compensation (as a governance mechanism); the level 
refers to the total amount of equity linked compensation granted; and the 
intensity refers to the proportion of equity linked compensation in CEO total 
pay. To study these three aspects separately is a contribution of our paper, as it 
provides deeper insight on how board independence and CEO compensation 
interact. This feature is very relevant in Europe where equity linked 
compensation is used in a restricted number of firms. Not accounting for this 
fact, might provide biased predictions.  
In addition to that, we include the monitoring and advisory roles of 
boards in mapping the relation between board activity and incentive pay. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) and Chung (2008) define the board as the 
monitoring body of public corporations, and expect a negative relation 
between board independence and CEO incentive pay based on agency 
considerations alone38. Recent theoretical models predict an ambiguous 
relation when providing strategic advice becomes a key role function. Because 
                                                     
38
 Chung (2008) finds that firms do not change their active wage policies when increasing their board 
independence as a result of SOX. The decrease in pay performance sensitivity comes from the CEO reduction of 
one’s own stock holdings 
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board composition is not uniquely determined by monitoring needs, we include 
in our analysis proxies for the board advising requirements as key determinants 
of board composition, and include them in the study of the joint determinants 
of board composition and incentive pay. We enrich the analysis with a 
sensitivity test where firms differ in their institutional settings, profitability, 
information transparency, and thus, in their monitoring and advising 
requirements. Finally, we include an additional test of entrenchment, where 
board composition partially explains CEO total compensation, direct 
compensation and bonus ratio, and check the adequacy of our results.  
Our results suggest that board independence (measured as the 
proportion of outside directors in the board) and incentive pay (equity linked 
compensation grant to the CEO) are complementary instruments of 
governance in European corporations. A 1% increase in the proportion of 
outsiders on the board implies a 0.194% increase in the proportion of CEO pay 
that is linked to equity (stocks and stock options), and a 1.539% increase in the 
total amount of equity linked compensation that the CEO receives. We also find 
a positive relation between the proxies for monitoring intensity and the 
proportion of equity linked compensation paid to CEOs (the probability of 
receiving equity linked compensation increases with firm size, ownership 
dispersion, and board interlocking, while it decreases with leverage and CEO 
time in role). We also find that the grant of equity linked compensation is 
positively related to firm value, measured by the firm market Q value. We 
interpret this result as evidence that firms use both governance instruments as 
mutual complements to reduce their agency problems. Further sensitivity 
analyses show that this complementarity is not country-based or industry 
specific and it appears in firms with different ownership concentration levels, 




In general, our results are more in line with the proposal suggested 
by Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002) than with agency considerations. The 
probability that the CEO receives equity linked compensation decreases with 
every additional year of duty, and it also decreases when his position is shared, 
which is in line with the prediction that the more powerful CEOs prefer to 
include less incentives in their compensation packages. We find in our analysis 
that firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on the board pay less to their 
CEOs (both salary and total compensation), and provide higher incentives, once 
selection into equity linked plans is taken into account. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a 
review of the literature. A theoretical model of board composition and 
management pay is presented in section 3. Section 4 includes data description. 
Results are explained in section 5, and in section 6 we present additional 
robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
According to agency theory, management compensation is a 
powerful instrument to align the interests of shareholders and management 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001 and Holmstrom 2006). In a corporate 
governance setting, owners can substitute direct monitoring of managers with 
pay schemes linked to firm performance. As monitoring is one of the key duties 
of the board, we should observe a negative relation between board monitoring 
and CEO incentive pay in corporations where ownership and control are clearly 
separated. In a principal-agent framework, incentive pay schemes are more 
powerful when the agent (the CEO) has greater influence on firm output (firm 
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performance). Thus, in order for this instrument to work, a payment scheme 
strongly linked to performance has to be paired (ceteris paribus) with a less 
independent board, where CEO actions are not restricted by loyalty issues, 
burdensome bargaining or strong opposition of board members. Boards of 
directors and compensation contracts could be perceived as substitutive 
governance mechanisms.  
Although this negative relation is key in principal agent models, 
empirical evidence on the relation between board monitoring and CEO 
incentive pay is relatively scant, and has yielded conflicting results. Using US 
data, Denis and Sarin (1999) and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find evidence 
of a negative relation between outsiders on board and managerial ownership, 
while Ryan and Wiggings (2004), Davila and Peñalva (2006) and Coles, Lemmon 
and Wang (2008) find a positive relation. Using US data as well, Conyon (2006) 
demonstrates that compensation committees containing affiliated directors do 
not set greater pay or fewer incentives. 
An alternative theoretical benchmark to explain the relation 
between managerial incentives and board design is the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis suggested by Bebchuck, Fried and Walker (2002). 
They argue that managerial influence over pay arrangements on boards has 
produced considerable distortions on these arrangements. Measures aimed at 
minimizing those distortions should increase shareholder value. This way a less 
entrenched and more accountable board, paired with a managerial pay 
arrangement linked to performance, would lead to an increase in shareholder 
value.  
Supporting this theoretical predicition, Conyon and He (2004) find a 




incentive pay suggesting that both elements of governance are 
complementary. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) find that lower pay 
performance sensitivity is associated with weaker governance, and Mehran 
(1995) finds that equity based compensation is used more extensively in firms 
with more outside directors. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that firms with more 
outsiders on the board award directors more equity linked compensation. 
On the other hand, Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that interactions of the 
corporate governance mechanism with total pay-for-performance and excess 
compensation can be explained by governance substitution in the US. He 
argues that his results are inconsistent with recent claims that entrenched 
managers design their own compensation contracts. Also Maslu (2010) 
analyzes the relation between disclosure, directors pay and board composition 
in Europe. Using a small sample, concentrated on large economies such as the 
UK, France and Germany, Maslu finds that sensitivity of executive pay to 
performance increases with the proportion of top executive serving as board 
directors. 
A recent extant of the theoretical literature emphasizes the fact 
that the directors need to obtain information from CEOs and managers to 
implement better their monitoring and advisory roles. Including information 
sharing in their model, Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) predict an 
ambiguous relation between board dependence and a manager´s equity based 
compensation in a setting where incentive compensation is endogenously 
determined. Also Ozerturk (2005) presents a model where a board of directors 
not completely independent of the CEO set the CEO´s pay. He shows that the 
board’s monitoring intensity and the equilibrium pay-performance sensitivity of 
CEO’s pay are increasing in the board’s independence.  
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Four recent studies, (Guthrie, Sokolowsky and Wan, 2012; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Chung, 2008 and Wuang, 2004) test the 
relation between incentive pay and board independence using the cuasi 
natural experiment provided by the regulatory changes in the US in year 
200239. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find a significant reduction in CEO 
pay and an increase in CEO incentives in firms that changed their ratio of 
independent directors to comply with SOX regulations. These results have been 
questioned by Guthrie et al. (2012) who argue that the negative relation might 
be driven by a single outlier. Guthrie et al. (2012) conclude that board 
independence has no effect on the level of CEO pay. Chung (2008) finds that 
CEOs of firms affected by SOX independence requirement reduce their firm 
wealth, yet there is not a substantial change in the firm management pay 
policies, after changes in board independence. The overall fall in pay 
performance sensitivity might be due to the CEOs´ aggressive stock selling, 
rather than boards changing their active firm policies to respond to 
requirements to increase independence. Finally, Wuang (2004) does not find 
cross sectional association between endogenously determined board 
independence and option pay sensitivity. However, she finds that the level of 
board independence is negatively related to the level of equity based 
component of managerial compensation.  
Finally, a study by Maslu (2010) analyzes the relation between 
disclosure, directors wealth and board composition in Europe. He finds a 
negative relation between stock ownership and greater number of executives 
on the board. His sample is concentrated on large economies such as UK, 
France and Germany.  
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We contribute to this research question adding empirical evidence 
on a complementary relation between board structure and pay incentives, 
using a representative sample that covers the main Western European 
economies. We also include in the analysis the advisory function of boards, and 
we control for the non-random grant of equity linked compensation.  
 
3. THE ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND INCENTIVE 
PAY 
 
3.1 The relation between board composition and incentives in an agency 
model framework  
For a determination of optimal pay incentives, we use the 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) benchmark model of incentive pay. Holmstrom 
and Milgrom stress the fact that the incentive contracts induce the managers 
to exert higher levels of effort, but they also expose them to risk, because 
perfect measures of effort and output are hardly available. Firms have to trade 
off the higher effort levels with contract inefficiency as a result of noise in the 
measures of output and effort.  
Accordingly, the optimal intensity of incentives- in a firm without 
any other governance mechanism- is determined by the sensitivity of firms 
profits to managers´ effort, the volatility of firm profits, the manager degree of 
risk aversion, and the response of firms profits to managers ‘efforts. Incentives 
are more powerful when the manager has greater influence over firm profits, 
when profits respond positively to manager’s effort and when those profits are 
less risky. By contrast, they are more costly to the firm when the manager is 
risk averse and when the cost of effort to the manager is higher.  
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In the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) benchmark model, the agent 
(the CEO) has full responsibility for the firm governance. We extend this 
benchmark model to include the board of directors as an additional instrument 
of governance. When the role of the board is to monitor the management, the 
principal can choose between increasing monitoring effort or the intensity of 
management pay incentives. Thus a monitoring board and a steep pay scheme 
would be substitute instruments of governance (Chung, 2008), and the 
incentive intensity will be lower concomitantly with the higher the board 
monitoring intensity. In our empirical specification, we account for the fact that 
boards have also a duty to advise the management on key strategic firm 
decisions. This influence of the board affects the sensitivity of firm´s profits to 
management efforts – and thus the power of incentives- in two opposing ways. 
By providing advice, the CEO can make more informed decisions 
over firm strategy. This way, an advisory board improves the returns to 
managerial effort. Thus, and advising board can enhance the incentive 
intensity. On the other hand, the influence of the board on the decision making 
process can diminish the impact of the CEO over firm´s profits, when the 
preferred strategy of the board and the CEO differ. The CEO might incur costly 
bargaining with the board over firm strategy, whilst not even being able to 
implement his most desired strategy. If that were the case, then linking CEO 
pay to firm performance would not reward the CEO for his increased effort, 
and the advisory role of boards could be a deterrent to managerial incentive 
pay.  
Whether or not the advising intensity can be paired with steep 
incentive schemes depends on which of the above mentioned effects is 
prevalent. Under certain circumstances, the cost and benefits of an advising 




smaller boards with strong leadership can minimize the bargaining and time 
costs of restructuring processes. On the other hand, an advisory-intensive 
board can be beneficial in sectors with high growth opportunities, despite the 
bargaining and the delay of decision making processes.  
We expect the positive effect over the CEO decision making to 
prevail on average; otherwise an advising board would be inoperative. 
The link between management incentives and board composition 
depends on the relative weight of the advisory and monitoring role of the 
board of directors. The intensity of pay incentives will depend on the structure 
of the board of directors, and this will depend of the monitoring and advising 
needs. We expect to find negative relation between the board monitoring 
intensity and incentive pay.  
On the other hand, the relation between and advising board and 
the effectiveness of CEO incentives is not so clear-cut. As we mentioned above, 
the quality of the information provided by the board, might enhance the 
productivity of CEO effort, while conflicting opinions over firm strategy might 
have the opposite effect. For the board to provide useful advice, the first effect 
has to be prevalent, leading us to expect a positive relation between the 
intensity of pay incentives and intensity of advice provided by the board.  
In this agency model setting, firm characteristics and characteristics 
of the markets where the firm operates are the key relevant determinants of 
board composition. Board structure, in turn, provides a framework for the 
design of the CEO pay structure. Incentives will be prevalent in settings where 
board advice and information sharing are relevant, as in the case of complex 
and growth firms. On the other hand, in firms where the CEO’s chances of rent 
extracting are bigger (for example in bigger firms or in firms with dispersed 
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ownership) a governance structure consisting of a monitoring board and a 
flatter incentive pay is preferable.  
 
3.2 The optimal incentive pay in a managerial power framework  
According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), agency considerations explain 
only partly the design of compensation contracts. This is the case, as 
compensation contracts are not a full result of an “arm’s length” bargaining 
between managers and shareholders. It is in the interest of the CEOs to exert 
power over the board to extract private rents. Their chances of rent extracting 
increase with captured and less independent boards. In an entrenchment 
framework, board composition is not only determined by the firm monitoring 
and advising necessities, but also by the CEO power to set his preferred 
directors. Outside directors are more independent from the CEO, and they 
have more power to prevent CEOs’ rent extracting. Thus, according to 
managerial power hypothesis, the total amount of CEO pay will be closer to 
market level in firms with more independent boards (ceteris paribus), while it 
will be higher when the CEO exerts its power over the board.  
Bebchuk et al. (2002) also stress the importance of defining a truly 
independent board. Although outside and independent directors have in 
theory more freedom to oppose the CEO, there are alternative mechanisms by 
which the CEO can capture the board. The CEO will exert more power over the 
board if he has the power to nominate independent directors. Besides, the 
board can be entrenched if directors have insufficient incentives to oppose the 
CEO (because they have little stake on the firm, because of reputational costs 
or because directors and managers hold interlocked board positions). Also, 




to exert power. When the CEO has reached a critical mass of supporting 
directors within the board, group pressure makes it difficult for individual 
directors to oppose the group on critical issues like compensation, new 
appointments or strategy. In a “support and fire” dynamics of board behavior 
directors have a say on choosing a CEO and replacing him if his performance is 
not adequate, but, once a CEO is chosen directors should either support his 
strategies or replace him.  
According to Bebchuk et al. (2002), pay incentives are an additional 
instrument to improve governance, and prevent rent extracting. These authors 
do not question the desirability of using equity linked compensation (like 
options plans) to compensate executives. However, under a managerial power 
approach, compensation can be used to camouflage rent extracting, preventing 
public outrage. This desire to camouflage might lead to the adoption of 
inefficient compensation structures. Pay arrangements are especially sensitive 
to camouflage in big public firms with transparent compensation 
arrangements. Those are the firms that attract the attention of the press and 
the general public, making regulators more sensitive to pay levels in those 
firms.  
In order to measure to what extent the magnitude and design of an 
adopted option pay scheme is close to what would arise under optimal 
contracting one has to look at the special characteristics of each of the 
individual option plans. The managerial power approach can explain the 
adoption of equity linked compensation plans with insufficient incentive 
power, using this camouflage approach. This way, option plans lose their 
incentive power if they do not filter out the industry effect (when options are 
not indexed or benchmarked), if they allow managers to hedge or undo their 
position (selling and repricing options, hedging, or selling stocks they already 
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held when granted new options), or if options are not correctly priced (optimal 
strike price should depend on factors like managerial degree of risk aversion, 
volatility of the company stock rate of inflation, length of executive contract, 
etc.).  
In short, according to Bebchuk et al. (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004), when a less independent board is in place (due to firm or industry 
specific characteristics, or the CEO having more influence over board 
composition), the CEO will use his influence over the board to set lower 
incentives and higher total compensation for him and his management team40. 
Thus, one could expect firms with more independent boards to set lower pay 
levels and higher incentives in the form of pay performance sensitivity.  
 
4. DATA AND RESEARCH STRATEGY  
 
4.1 Research strategy. 
 
For a study of the relation between board independence and equity 
linked compensation, we use two variables that are widely presented in the 
Corporate Governance literature: for a measure of CEO incentive pay we use 
equity linked compensation in the form of grants of shares and stock options to 
the CEO; for a measure of board independence we use the ratio of supervisory 
directors (those that are not a part of the management team) to the total 
number of directors41.  
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The use of equity linked compensation is not as widespread in 
Europe as it is in the USA. Not every European CEO is selected into equity 
linked plans. Besides, CEOs in firms that use equity linked compensation 
receive, on average, a lower proportion of their annual pay in this form than do 
their US counterparts. Thus, in studying the use of equity linked compensation 
in Europe, three measures of equity linked compensation are relevant: the 
propensity to use equity linked compensation, the intensity of equity linked 
compensation and the level of equity linked compensation.  
The propensity to use equity linked compensation is analyzed 
separately in our study, because not every firm in Europe uses equity linked 
compensation, and those that use it, do not grant equity linked compensation 
every year, systematically. This fact generates a selection problem that we take 
into account using a two-step procedure Heckman (1979). In a first step the 
non-random selection into equity linked schemes is taken into account, while in 
the second step, the extension and intensity in use of CEO compensation 
schemes is explained by managerial and firm factors. Using a two-step selection 
approach, we account for the bias that might appear, as a consequence of non-
random selection into equity linked compensation schemes.  
We use a Heckman regression model to run the following 
regressions:  
 
INCENTIVEit= δ0+ δ1OUTSIDERSit+ δ2AGE it+ δ3CEOWEALTHit+ 
δ4TIMEINROLEit + δ5CEOOWNERSHIPit + δ6LNASSETS it + δ7VOLATILITY it + δ8YEAR 
it+ ρσ1λit(Zit) + εit      (1) 





0INTERLOCKINGit+ϕ11YEARit+ϕ12COUNTRYit+νit   (2) 
 
In the outcome regression, equation (1), the amount or intensity of 
incentives (INCENTIVE) is explained by the proportion of outside directors on 
the board, by the CEO degree of risk aversion, by the degree of asymmetric 
information between the CEO and the owners, and by firm specific 
characteristics and market level conditions. We use two alternative measures 
of incentives as dependent variable: the total amount of equity linked 
compensation granted in logarithm (LOG EQUITY), and the ratio of equity 
linked compensation to total compensation (EQUITY RATIO).  
We include the proportion of outside directors within the board 
(OUTSIDERS) as an explanatory variable to check whether firms use both 
instruments of corporate governance jointly or as complementary. A positive 
(negative) sign implies that firms use both instrument as complements 
(substitutes). We include the variables AGE and CEO WEALTH to proxy for the 
CEO degree of risk aversion, as younger and wealthier individuals are –ceteris 
paribus- less risk averse than older and less wealthy individuals42. We include as 
CEO wealth the logarithm of the value of cumulative holdings over time of 
stocks, stock options and long term incentive plans. Although the variable 
wealth represents the CEO ownership in the firm, and not his total wealth, we 
use this variable as a proxy for CEO wealth, as CEO’s portfolio is usually 
undiversified, and the firm he manages constitutes his biggest source of 
income.  
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The magnitude of the agency problem depends on the degree of 
asymmetric information between the owner and the managers about the CEO 
abilities and effort, and on the alignment of interests of CEO and owners. We 
include CEO seniority within the firm (TIME IN ROLE) to proxy for the 
magnitude of the agency problem. As the CEO gains seniority within the firm, 
the owners learn about CEO’s abilities and effort provision. Thus, one should 
expect the variable that measures time in role to be negatively related to the 
amount and to the proportion of incentives. The alignment of interests of the 
owners and the CEO is related to how much equity linked compensation he has 
been granted up to date. We use CEO wealth divided by firm market 
capitalization (CEO OWNERSHIP) as proxy for this alignment of interests. 
Firm characteristics influence the impact of CEO effort on firm 
output. CEO effort provision will be more attached to firm profits in bigger and 
less volatile firms, and we include firm size and price volatility to account for 
this fact. The returns to managerial effort should be greater in bigger firms 
(Hermalin, 2005; Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Besides, firm size should also have 
a positive impact on incentives as agency problems are greater in bigger firms. 
Firm size is also included to control for firm specific levels of complexity, 
technology, and differences in the production function. As a measure of firm 
size we use the natural logarithm of totals assets (LNASSETS). The volatility of 
stock prices (PRICE VOLATILITY) reflects the firm-specific market risk. 
The term ρσ1λit (Zit) corrects the selection bias in which we would 
incur if we did not take into account the fact that not every CEO is selected into 
incentive pay schemes every year. It contains the correlation,    between the 
probability that the firm has an incentive pay scheme that year, which is the 
dependent variable in the selection regression, and the incentives provided, 
which is the dependent variable in the outcome regression  It also contains the 
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standard deviation of incentives,   , and the inverse Mills ratio, λit(Zit). The 
inverse Mills ratio is a statistical instrument, included in the Heckman selection 
model to account for selection bias. Technically, it is the quotient between the 
density function and the cumulative function of the joint distribution of the 
explanatory variables included in the selection equation: 
         
         
, where zit are 
the dependent variables of the selection equation. The coefficient of inverse 
Mills ratio determines the magnitude of the selection effect. Note that in the 
absence of a selection effect, ρ is very close to zero and the coefficient of this 
term turns out to be insignificant. The last term,    , is the zero-mean normally 
distributed error term.  
In the selection regression, equation (2), the dependent variable 
(INCENTIVEit =1) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO receives 
any kind of equity linked compensation in the year t. We include as explanatory 
variables, variables that measure or proxy for the firm corporate governance 
design (which include the use of alternative governance mechanism), the board 
composition, and firm and institutional constrains. We also include variables 
that measure the monitoring and advising needs, because these needs, 
together with the use of other governance mechanisms, configure the board of 
director’s composition. Including those factors, we prevent an omitted variable 
bias in our measure of the complementary or substitutive roles of boards and 
compensation.  
We have argued in section 3 that, in an agency model framework, 
the board monitoring intensity is negatively related to incentive pay, as owners 
substitute direct board monitoring with CEO incentives. Thus, we expect firms 
with stronger monitoring boards (bigger firms and firms with less leverage) to 




other hand, the advising intensity is positively related to CEO incentives: by 
bringing advice and expertise to the decision making process, the board 
improves the returns to CEO effort, making incentive compensation a less 
costly and more suitable form of pay. In an agency model framework, boards 
with strong advising intensity (boards in more complex firms and firms with 
more growth opportunities) provide more incentives.  
We use firm size (LNASSETS), ownership concentration 
(OWNERSHIP), leverage (LEVERAGE) and CEO seniority (TIME IN ROLE) as 
proxies for the need of monitoring. An increase in firm size increases the 
monitoring needs, as bigger firms are more complex, and this complexity 
increases the chances of rent extracting. Besides, CEOs might favor increases in 
firm size above optimal levels, as bigger firms pay higher salaries. Ownership 
concentration is arguably negatively related to board monitoring, as 
shareholders with a large stake in a firm have an interest to monitor the 
management directly. On the other hand, leverage is supposed to be negatively 
related to board monitoring, as in more leveraged firms, shareholders share 
the benefits of monitoring with debt holders, while bearing all costs. Thus, 
monitoring by debt holders reduces the need of board monitoring. Besides, the 
need for funds can make the firm increase its transparency levels, making the 
CEO’s effort more easily observable.  
Time in role accounts for the power that the CEO exerts over the 
board. A CEO with longer tenure exerts power in choosing his preferred 
directors, which increases his chances to extract private rents. Thus, CEOs with 
longer seniority should be monitored more intensively. On the other hand, as 
CEOs acquire seniority, owners learn about their abilities and effort provision, 
diminishing the need for monitoring. The sign of the variable TIME IN ROLE will 
determine which of these opposing effects is prevalent.  
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The firm’s need for board advice is determined by its growth 
opportunities, and by firm specific, and market, levels of complexity. We use 
firm value (Q) and industry dummies (INDUSTRY) to measure growth 
opportunities, and market levels of complexity. We argue that firms with higher 
market Q are those in need for advising, due to their greater growth 
opportunities. We use industry dummies to control for differences in product 
characteristics and a firm’s specific knowledge. Such variables inform about the 
advice intensity required according to the firm level of complexity.  
Additionally, we include a group of control variables related to the 
firm corporate governance, as a firm with better governance should have lower 
need of using equity linked compensation. Those variables are board size 
(BOARD SIZE), the additional number of board positions in listed companies 
that the CEO is holding (INTERLOCKING), and a dummy variable for whether the 
position of CEO is shared in the firm (MD).  
The CEO number of additional board positions (INTERLOCKING) has 
a two sided impact on the quality of governance. It might measure the CEO’s 
managerial ability, which should be positively related to incentives, but it could 
also reflect board entrenchment, which is arguably negatively related to 
incentives. Interlinked boards can be seen as entrenched boards43, and CEOs 
who have an influence over their pay would prefer less pay performance 
sensitivity (Bebchuk et al., 2002). The sign and significance of the coefficient 
will provide evidence on which of the above mentioned effects is prevalent.  
The number of executives with a job title reflecting a chief position 
(MD) gives us a hint about a firm’s organizational structure. We expect a firm 
where two executives hold a “co-CEO”, “joint-CEO” or “division-CEO” position, 
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to have a less concentrated power structure. Thus, in such few firms, we expect 
the managing director to have less individual power, and we expect a positive 
relation between the number of executives holding a CEO position and the 
grant of equity linked compensation.  
Board size is a board control variable. The impact of board size on 
incentives depends on the relative importance of monitoring and advising role 
of board members. Arguably, larger boards monitor better and provide better 
advice, both actions having a divergent impact of board size on incentives.  
Finally, institutional constrains (like the recommendation to have a 
majority of independent directors, level of shareholder protection, etc.) are 
accounted for with the use of a country dummy and a year dummy. 
 
4.2 Data 
The dataset comprises information on listed companies for the 
main Western Europe Economies during the years 1999-2007. The total 
number of observations is 12 362, which correspond to 2 668 companies in 15 
countries. The panel is unbalanced, containing the first half years of the sample 
a lower number of observations (only 39.19% of the observations correspond 
to the period 1999-2003, while 60.81% of the observations correspond to the 
years 2004-2007). For 334 firms (12.52% of the total number of firms), we have 
information for all the years in the sample; for 57.2% of the companies in the 
sample, we have more than four years of data, which means that over 70% of 
the observations correspond to firms for which we have more than 4 years of 
data.  
For each firm in the sample we have data on governance measures 
and firm book and market values. Information on governance has been 
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obtained from the data supplier BoardEx, while data reflecting firm 
characteristics and firm value have been obtained from Thomson database. 
BoardEx contains information on executive and supervisory directors in every 
firm in the sample. For every director in a firm, BoardEx provides information 
on age, number of board positions, compensation, wealth, director role and 
years of experience. Aggregating this information at firm level, it yields a panel 
on governance measures which include the name of the CEO, his age, time in 
role, compensation, wealth, experience, number of additional board positions, 
and the number of executives with a co-management position44. The dataset 
also includes board size and proportion of outsiders on the board. BoardEx also 
contains an industry classification, which is used to create the industry 
dummies.  
Thomson database contains information on firm characteristics, like 
firm size (market capitalization, assets), leverage, ownership concentration, 
profits (operating profit per share, return on assets, return on equity etc.), risk 
(price volatility), and other firm characteristics. The description of the variables 
used in the analysis is presented in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1. VARIABLE DESCRIPTION  
 
Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables included in the analysis. The first column shows the variable 
name. The second column presents the variable definition, and a label indicating the source of the data. The 
label (a) refers to governance measures obtained from BoardEx database, label (b) refers to information on 
firm characteristics and book and market values, provided by Thomson, while variables labeled (c) have 
been constructed by us transforming the original Thomson and Boardex data. 
Variable Definition  
CEO Individual Characteristics 
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AGE CEO age(a) 
TIME IN ROLE  Number of years the CEO has hold this position at his firm(a)  
INTERLOCKING Number of board positions that the CEO holds in listed firms(a)  
CEO Compensation  
DIRECT 
COMPENSATION  
Sum of all cash based compensation for the period(a)  
EQUITY LINKED 
COMPENSATION 
The sum of shares awarded, estimated value of options awarded 
and long term incentive plans awarded in the period selected(a)  
TOTAL 
COMPENSATION 
Direct compensation plus equity linked compensation(c)  
EQUITY RATIO  Equity linked compensation divided by total compensation(c)  
EQUITY DUMMY =1 if the firm grants equity linked compensation to the CEO in 
the current year; 0 otherwise(c)  
BONUS RATIO Bonus as a proportion of total direct compensation less pension 
Bonus/(Bonus+Salary) (b) 
CEO WEALTH  Value of cumulative holdings over time of stock, options and long 
term incentive plans for the CEO (Total Equity Linked Wealth = 
Value of Total Shares held + Value of LTIP Held + Estimated 
Market Value of Options Held) (a)  
CEO OWNERSHIP  Value of CEO cumulative wealth divided by firm’s market 
capitalization(c)  
Corporate Governance  
BOARD SIZE  Number of board members(a)  
OUTSIDERS Proportion of non-executive directors on the board(c)  
ODB =1 if outsiders > 0.5(c)  
MD =1 if the CEO position is shared by two or more executives (as 
joint CEOs)(c)  
Company Information 
ASSETS Total assets (b)  
OWNERSHIP  Closely held percentage. It is the ratio of number of closely held 
shares to common share outstanding(b)  
LEVERAGE Total debt divided by total assets(c)  
PRICE VOLATILITY  A measure of a stock’s average annual price movement to a high 
and low from a mean price for each year. For example, a stock’s 
price volatility of 20% indicates that the stock’s annual high and 
low price has shown an historical variation of +20% to -20% from 
its annual average price(b)  
Q  The sum of market capitalization plus total assets minus common 
equity, divided by total assets(c) .  
OPERATING PROFIT  Operating profit per share (b)  
ROE  Earnings per share last twelve months/ Prorated book value per 
share * 100(b)  
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ROA  [Net Income before preferred dividends+((Interest expense on Debt-
Interest capitalized)*(1-tax rate))]/Average of last year´s and current 
year’s Total Assets * 100 
(b) 
 
INDUSTRY 45 Industry sectors(a)  
COUNTRY The country where the company is headquartered(a)  
UK =1 if the country of incorporation is United Kingdom (c)  
NEWTECH =1 if BoardEx classifies the firm into one of the following sectors: 
“Electronic and Electrical Equipment”, “Information Technology 
and Hardware”, “Software and Computer Services” (c)  
 
For every CEO in our sample, we have information on his yearly 
compensation. This information contains CEO’s yearly direct compensation, 
which is the sum of salary plus bonus (DIRECT COMPENSATION), the market 
value of shares plus stock options (EQUITY LINKED COMPENSATION, OR 
EQUITY), and the sum of direct compensation plus equity linked compensation 
(TOTAL COMPENSATION). It also contains the proportion of bonus in the CEO 
direct compensation package (BONUS RATIO). With this information we have 
constructed a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the amount of 
equity linked compensation is above zero (EQUITY DUMMY), and the 
proportion of equity linked compensation on total compensation (EQUITY 
RATIO). 
Regarding board composition, BoardEx provides information on the 
total number of board members (BOARD SIZE), and the total number of 
executive and non executive directors on the board. With this information we 
construct the variable OUTSIDERS, as the ratio of non executive directors to 
board size. Outsiders reflects the proportion of non executive directors on the 
board. The variable ODB (Outsider Dominated Board) takes the value 1 if the 
majority of board members are non executive directors.  
The countries included in the analysis (and the number of 




TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE DATA BY COUNTRY 
.  
Table 2 presents the distribution of the data by country. The first column lists the countries included in the 
dataset. The second column presents the total number of observations through all the years in the sample, 
by country. Percentage refers to the weight of each country on the total sample. Finally, the last column 
shows the total number of firms that each country has in the sample 
Country Nr. of Observations Percentage Nr. of Firms  
Austria  50 0.40 27 
Belgium  319 2.58 56 
Denmark 120 0.97 20 
Finland 51 0.41 13 
France 1 163 9.41 229 
Germany 561 4.54 138 
Greece 98 0.79 32 
Ireland 296 2.39 60 
Italy  401 3.24 90 
Luxembourg 46 0.37 13 
Netherlands 483 3.91 93 
Portugal 77 0.62 19 
Spain 328 2.65 61 
Sweden 618 5.00 112 
UK 7 751 62.7 1 707 
Total 12 362 100.00 2 668 
 
In this sample, all Western European countries are represented. 
Coverage differs significantly from country to country, being UK very well 
represented in our sample (UK accounts for 62.7% of the observations). Still, 
for every country we have a representative sample (at least 50 observations for 
the smallest countries), which allows us to make country-based comparisons.  
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3. All monetary 
variables have been deflated using 2005 prices as baseline. We have also 
winsorized the key variables at 1% and 99% in order to minimize errors and 
avoid outliers biasing our results.  
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TABLE 3. SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
For each variable we present the number of observations (Column 2), mean (Column 3) and standard 
deviation (Column 4), and the minimum (Column 5) and maximum (Column 6) values. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 11819  50.7842 7.7571 25 81 
Time in Role 12362 4.564714 4.9929 0 39.8 
Interlocking 12355 1.5625 1.2153 1 18 
Direct Compensation 12362 681.4683 881.734 0 6045.959 
Equity  12362 552.4473 1496.057 0 11954.54 
Total Compensation 12362 1233.916 2089.858 0 16430.54 
Equity Ratio  12362 0.1952 0.283 0 1 
Equity Dummy  12362 0.425 0.494 0 1 
Bonus Ratio  9583 0.232 0.224 0 1 
CEO Wealth  12362 10283.87 32881.06 0 333529.9 
CEO Ownership  12276 0.040862 0.09938 0 0.94976 
Board Size 12362 8.902 4.296 2 36 
Outsiders 12362 .6001 .1843 0 1 
ODB 12362 .6209 .4852 0 1 
MD 12362 0.01928 0.1374 0 1 
Total Assets  12362 11659.66 48103 2.06 378376.8 
Ownership  11742 34.345 24.503 0 100 
Leverage 12357 0.2071 0.1866 0 0.8414 
Price Volatility  8737 33.056 13.196 4.02689 88.22396 
Q  12276 2.002 1.639 0.6911 10.98 
Operating Profit  12321 1.0942 2.642 -3.05 17.088 
ROE  8763 6.59 66.99 -3381.973 3603.438 
ROA  9325 1.06 15.87 -78.76 24.19 
Year 12362 2003.986 2.363 1999 2007 
UK 12362 .6270 .4836 0 1 





An average CEO in our sample received on average 1 234 000 US 
dollars. CEOs receive equity linked compensation in 42.52% of the 
observations, while in the rest (57.48%) CEO pay contains no equity linked 
compensation. As many as 1 759 firms in our sample do not grant options or 
any other type of stock grants to their CEOs during the years 1999-2007. For 
the years when the CEOs received equity linked compensation, this type of pay 
made up to 45.9% of their total pay.  
 
TABLE 4. COMPENSATION AND GOVERNANCE BY YEAR 
Yearly descriptive statistics of key variables in our analysis. Each row shows the yearly average. 
Compensation figures comprise Direct compensation, Equity linked compensation, Total compensation, 
bonus ratio, Equity ratio, Equity dummy and CEO wealth. Board characteristics are Board size, Outsiders and 
Outsider dominated board. The number of observations per year is included in the last row.  
year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Direct  560.34 542.16 497.68 571.64 644.22 748.83 659.85 751.81 838.14 
Equity1  640.45 910.06 789.42 646.59 820.97 872.34 972.11 1031.6 1044.98 
Equity2 442,9 598 510,35 398,92 502,17 519,69 588,17 615,4 632,05 
Total  1003.3 1140.6 1008 970.56 1146.4 1268.5 1248 1367.2 1470.2 
Bonus 0.221 0.226 0.200 0.218 0.22 0.234 0.227 0.236 0.255 
Eq. ratio1 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.50 0.49 
Eq.ratio2 0,16 0,20 0,194 0,17 0,19 0,189 0,21 0,207 0,196 
Eq.dum.  0.40 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.40 
Wealth  8651 13331 8852 6674.7 8236 8823 9918.9 12367 12963 
B. Size  10.75 10.15 9.78 9.5 9.18 8.71 8.42 8.25 8.24 
Outsiders  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.596 0.597 0.596 0.605 
ODB 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.65 
Nr. obs. 493 774 1041 1167 1370 1551 1823 2040 2103 
Notes: (1) Only observations where equity dummy equals one are included   
(2) All observations are included  
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Table 4 shows the evolution of key variables throughout the years 
of our sample. We observe that CEO pay increased continuously after the year 
2002 (it had dropped slightly during the 2001 crisis), until 2007. The evolution 
of equity linked compensation has followed the evolution of direct and total 
compensation, being in year 2007 when CEO pay reached its highest levels (an 
average CEO received 1 470 000 US dollars in year 2007), and in year 2002 
when it was at its lowest. The evolution of equity linked compensation went 
parallel to the state of the public debate on executive compensation during the 
years 1999-2008. The amount of equity linked compensation dropped sharply 
in year 2000, after the technological bubble of the late 1990s exploded. The 
enormous increase in stock option compensation of the late 1990s was seen as 
a key determinant of the speculative era that led to this bubble-burst. We also 
observe a sharp decline in equity linked compensation after the Enron scandal 
was disclosed in October 2001. Due to the Enron scandal, option plans where 
associated with the distortion of management incentives and earning 
manipulation. Several policy makers and academics started questioning the 
effectiveness of this type of remuneration. Still, equity linked compensation 
increased during the expansion period 2002-2007, despite the lively public 
debate on executive compensation, questioning the current levels and the 
structure of executive compensation.  
From Table 4, we also observe that the proportion of observations 
where equity linked compensation is strictly positive has declined throughout 
the years of our sample. However, those firms that do grant equity linked 
compensation pay a higher stake of CEO compensation in this form and the 
proportion of equity on annual CEO compensation, “Equity ratio”, has 




On the other hand, the proportion of outsiders on this particular 
sample of European boards has remained fairly stable until year 2007, even 
though the proportion of firms that have adopted a board with a majority of 
outside directors has increased from the year 2005. This increase already 
started in the period of 2003-2004, when most European countries changed 
their Governance Recommendations, strengthening their independence 
standards. We observe a tendency towards smaller boards.  
In Table 5, we present descriptive statistics, when we split the 
sample by board type (outsider dominated board versus insider dominated 
board), type of industry (firms in the new technology sectors, like Electronics, 
Information Technology and Software, versus firms in traditional sectors) and 
geographic area (UK versus Continental Europe). By comparing the means of 
key variables for firms with different board types and pay schemes, we obtain a 
first approximate insight into which assumptions of the previous described 
models are supported by the European data. Differences in institutional 
constrains might be observed when we split the sample by country, and 
differences in firm complexity, growth opportunities and market conditions can 
be observed when we split the sample by industry.  
 
 
TABLE 5. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY SUBSAMPLES 
In this table, we present descriptive statistics of key variables for different subsamples when we split the 
sample by key control variables. We present means and standard deviations for key variables in firms with 
different board composition (Panel 5A), in different industries (Panel 5B), and firms in the UK versus 
Continental Europe (Panel 5C). In panel 5A, we show the mean and standard deviations of key variables for 
firms with a majority of inside directors (ODB=0) on the board, versus firms with a majority of outsiders 
(ODB=1). In panel 5B, we show descriptive statistics for firms in the sectors of “Electronic and Electrical 
Equipment”, “Information Technology and Hardware”, and “Software and Computer Services” (Newtech=1), 
versus those firms in the rest of the sectors (New tech=0). Finally, in panel 5C we show the different 
statistics when we split the sample by country of incorporation (the UK versus Continental Europe). 
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Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Direct Compensation  432.07 (504.71) 833.72 (1017.58) 
Equity  284.16 (897.25) 716.23 (1744.28) 
Total Compensation  716.22 (716.22) 1549.95 (2441.62) 
Bonus Ratio  0.157 (0.1967) 0.29 (0.22) 
Equity Ratio 0.185 (0.282) 0.201 (0.283) 
Equity Dummy 0.423 (0.494) 0.426 (0.494) 
Outsiders 0.412 (0.096) 0.714 (0.119) 
Board Size  6.77 (2.4) 10.23 (4.66) 
Interlocking 1.27 (0.701) 1.73 (1.41) 
Time in Role 4.87 (5.589) 4.378 (4.581) 
Ownership  35.08 (23.33) 33.86 (25.21) 
Assets 1570.9 (14768) 17181 (59105) 
Leverage 0.166 (0.179) 0.232 (0.186) 
Q 2.17 (1.89) 1.89 (1.44) 





Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Direct Compensation  726.6 (925) 445.79 (549.44) 
Equity  594.8 (1549.2) 331.33 (1155.33) 
Total Compensation  1321.4 (2182.82) 777.12 (1430.4) 
Bonus Ratio  0.239 (0.224) 0.19 (0.206) 
Equity Ratio 0.202 (0.284) 0.16 (0.275) 
Equity Dummy 0.439 (0.497) 0.353 (0.477) 
Outsiders 0.605 (0.1831) 0.571 (0.187) 
Board Size  9.18 (4.3) 7.42 (3.54) 
Interlocking 1.61 (1.27) 1.31 (0.792) 
Time in Role 4.58 (5.02) 4.45 (4.82) 




Assets 13629.7 (52176.1) 1373 (7441) 
Leverage 0.22 (0.185) 0.14 (0.176) 
Q  1.9 (1.51) 2.5 (2.12) 





Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Direct Compensation 705.23 (1017.31) 667.3342 (789.86) 
Equity  412.77 (1421.58) 635.54 (1532.72) 
Total Compensation 1117.996 (2070.966) 1302.875 (2098) 
Bonus Ratio 0.396 (0.19) 0.19 (0.21) 
Equity Ratio 0.1058 (0.238) 0.2483 (0.294) 
Equity Dummy 0.216 (0.411) 0.549 (0.497) 
Outsiders 0.7369 (0.162) 0.5186 0.1438) 
Board Size 11.579 (5.058) 7.31 (2.72) 
Interlocking 1.9366 (1.56) 1.339 (0.876) 
Time in Role 5 (5.71) 4.3 (4.73) 
Ownership 41.42 (25.33) 30.60 (23.19) 
Assets 20171.2 (60171) 10078.76 (91449.85) 
Leverage 0.251 (0.176) 0.187 (0.23) 
Q 1.84 (1.4) 2.09 (1.75) 
 
We observe boards with a majority of outside directors in 62% of 
the observations. From Table 5 (panel 5A) we see that firms with outsider 
dominated boards (ODB=1) are on average more leveraged and are also bigger 
firms (in terms of total assets). We also observe that CEOs working for firms 
with outsider dominated boards earn higher compensation and receive more 
incentive pay. On the other hand, boards dominated by insiders (ODB=0) are 
prevalent in firms with more concentrated ownership. We also observe that 
firms in New Technology sector are smaller, less leveraged and with larger Q 
values. The CEOs working for those firms receive lower compensation and 
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incentive pay, are less connected and hold less tenure within the firm. Boards 
in in the New Technology sector are smaller and less independent. Finally, we 
observe from Table 5, that CEOs working for firms with insider dominated 
boards hold, on average, longer tenure and have more wealth attached to the 
company. The use of equity linked compensation is more widespread in the UK 
that in Continental Europe (Table 5, Panel 5C). We observe an equity linked pay 
component in 55% of the observations corresponding to the UK firms, and in 
21.6% of observations corresponding to firms incorporated in Continental 
Europe. From Table 5 we observe that a CEO working for a firm incorporated in 
the UK receives, on average, a higher proportion of his pay package in the form 
of equity linked compensation (24.8% against an average of 10.5% in the case 
of Continental Europe firms). On average, the UK firms have smaller and less 
independent boards. Calculations using the information on whether a firm has 
granted at least once equity linked compensation to their CEOS show that 
81.9% of the firms incorporated in the UK have paid equity linked 
compensation to their CEOs at least once, while only 45.78% of Continental 
Europe firms have done it. We exploit the differences presented in Table 5 in 
more detail in the robustness checks, where we test whether the relations 
between board independence and equity pay differ significantly in scenarios 
where the use of equity linked compensation is widespread (such as in the UK) 
or selective (such as in Continental Europe).  
 
5. REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
When studying the relation between board independence and 
incentive pay, we focus on three aspects of incentive pay: the existence, the 




whether or not firms use equity linked compensation; the level refers to the 
total amount of equity linked compensation granted; and the intensity refers to 
the proportion of equity linked compensation in total pay. These three aspects 
are measured by (1) a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the CEO 
receives any kind of equity linked compensation in a particular year (EQUITY 
DUMMY) (2) the total amount of equity linked compensation in executive pay 
(LOG EQUITY) and (3) the ratio of equity linked compensation to total CEO pay 
(EQUITY RATIO).  
Table 6 presents the results of an analysis of the relation between 
the level and intensity of incentive pay and board composition, in a Heckman 
selection regression model. The Heckman selection model accounts for the fact 
that not every CEO is selected into equity linked compensation schemes, a 
feature that is common in Continental Europe, as we observe from Table 5.  
To analyze the relation between board composition and the level 
and intensity of incentive pay, we include in the outcome regressions the total 
amount of equity linked compensation in logs (LOG EQUITY) and the ratio of 
equity link compensation to total pay (EQUITY RATIO) as dependent variables 
respectively, and the proportion of outsiders on the board (OUTSIDERS) as key 
explanatory variable. On the other hand, the relation between board 
composition and the existence of equity linked compensation is analyzed in the 
selection equations, which are presented in the lower part of every column in 
Table 6. In the selection equations the dependent variable is a dummy for 
equity compensation in all cases (EQUITY DUMMY).  
Each column presents different specifications of the outcome and 
selection equations, when we change explanatory and control variables. By 
alternating the explanatory variables, we aim to get a deeper insight on the 
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determinants of firms choice of pay structure, and whether firms and 
governance characteristics have a say on how firms choose whether to pay 
equity incentives, or not. In columns (1) and (2) we present a model where the 
dependent variable in the selection equation is the proportion of outsiders 
(OUTSIDERS) alone (along with country, year and industry dummies). This way, 
we present a raw measure of the relation between board composition and 
whether or not firms grant equity linked compensation. In columns (3) and (4) 
we enrich the specification of the selection equation including, together with 
outsider rate, variables that have an impact on the monitoring and advising 
necessities of firm. In columns (5) and (6), we exclude the outside rate for the 
selection equation, leaving as key explanatory variables the proxies for firm 
monitoring and advising needs and other governance variables. We do so to 
study the direct relation between the need of board monitoring and advising of 
the management and the grant of equity linked compensation.  
 
TABLE 6. HECKMAN REGRESSION MODEL WITH SAMPLE SELECTION 
Joint estimation of equations (1) and (2). Panel 6A presents results of the outcome equation (equation 1) 
and Panel 6.B. presents results for the selection equation (equation 2). Different columns present different 
model specifications. The different columns differ by the dependent variable (equity ratio and total amount 
equity compensation in logs) in the outcome equation, and by the different specification of the selection 
equation. In columns (1) and (2) we present a model where the independent variable in the selection 
equation is the outsider rate alone with year, industry and country dummies. In columns (3) and (4) we 
enrich the specification of the selection equation including, together with outsider rate, variables that have 
an impact on the monitoring and advising necessities of the firm. In columns (5) and (6), we exclude the 
variable outsiders from the selection equation, leaving as key explanatory variables the proxies for firm 
monitoring and advising needs. P-values in parenthesis. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
Panel 6.A Outcome Equation 
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Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel 6.B. Selection Equation 


















































































Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nr. Observations 11058 11058 10427 10427 10427 10427 
Censored Obs.  7105 7105 6552 6552 6552 6552 
Uncensored Obs.  3953 3953 3875 3875 3875 3875 
Wald Chi2  592.76 2922.37 579.64 1874.5 579.22 1901 
rho 0.21979 0.0003 0.2295 -0.179 0.2231 -0.199 
sigma 0.2282 1.226 0.2271 1.241 0.2271 1.2435 
lambda 0.050 0.0004 0.0513 -0.222 0.0501 -0.2479 
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Overall in the regressions, we observe a positive and significant 
relation between the level and intensity of pay incentives and board 
independence in European firms. Regression results indicate that those firms 
that grant equity linked compensation use incentive pay and board 
independence as complementary governance mechanisms. The positive and 
significant coefficients of the explanatory variable OUTSIDERS in the selection 
equation indicate that firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on their 
boards are more prone to using equity linked compensation. The positive and 
significant coefficients of the variable OUTSIDER in the outcome equations 
support the hypothesis that, once they have chosen to pay equity linked 
compensation, firms with a higher proportion of outsiders on their boards 
provide higher pay incentives to their CEO.  
From Table 6, columns 3 and 4, we observe that for an average CEO 
receiving equity linked compensation, a 1% increase in the proportion of 
outsiders in the board, implies an increase of 0.194% in the proportion of CEO 
income that takes the form of equity linked compensation, and a 1.539% rise in 
the total amount of CEO equity linked pay. We include additional assumptions 
of agency models regarding risk, effort and noise in the output measurements. 
Looking at the outcome equations, we see that the CEO degree of risk aversion 
is significantly related to the amount and proportion of CEO income that is 
linked to equity. We use AGE and CEO WEALTH as proxies for the degree of risk 
aversion, as younger and wealthier individuals are arguably less risk averse. 
Younger individuals (AGE) and richer CEOs (CEO WEALTH), receive more 
incentive pay (both in absolute and relative terms). We also find that equity 
linked compensation is positively related to firm size (LNASSETS), and 
negatively related to CEO time in role. This negative relation between CEO 




Walker hypothesis, as they state that CEOs are more powerful as they gain 
seniority within the firm, and they can use their power to set higher pay and 
lower incentives. However, it might also be explained by the fact that the 
owners get a better knowledge of CEO abilities and effort provision as the CEO 
gains seniority within the firm, diminishing asymmetric information and making 
incentives less necessary. Finally, we find that the proportion and level of 
equity linked pay is positively related to price volatility, a feature that is 
consistent with several previous empirical studies on executive 
compensation45, even when agency models would predict a negative relation. 
An additional evidence of a positive relation between board 
composition and incentives appears in the selection equations. In every 
selection equation we observe a positive and significant relation between the 
proportion of outsiders on the board and the probability of equity linked 
compensation in CEO annual pay. This relation is positive and significant in all 
model specifications, although it is of less magnitude when we include controls 
for firm characteristics and board monitoring and advising intensities (columns 
3 and 4).  
This positive relation is related to the proposals found in Bebchuk, 
Fried and Walker (2002). To rule out agency considerations, we check whether 
our additional assumptions about the role of the board members also hold. 
Both the Bebchuk et al. (2002) and the agency models derived from Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1991) assume that the role of boards is to monitor the CEO. We 
expand the model to include the advisory role of board members, assuming 
                                                     
45
 See Prendergast (2002) for a literature review on the positive and pervasive empirical relation between risk 
and incentives. Prendergast provides a plausible explanation on this positive relation: in risky environments, 
owners choose managers that have private information about markets, institutions or the firm. Owners have to 
provide greater incentives so that managers do not exploit this asymmetric information to extract rent. Thus, in 
risky environments, equity incentives become more expensive, but firms also face greater agency problems, 
that make them choose steeper pay profiles  
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that both the monitoring and advisory needs of boards jointly determine board 
composition. The inclusion of such controls moderates the coefficient of 
outsiders showing the direct impact of board composition on the existence of 
equity linked compensation from 1.93 to 0.611 (columns 1 to 4).  
In Table 6, columns (5) and (6), we test directly the effect of the 
monitoring and advising needs on the existence of incentive pay. We 
approximate such necessities through different variables proposed in the board 
literature. As proxies for the board monitoring intensity we include firm size 
(LNASSETS), ownership, and leverage. We observe a positive and significant 
relation between firm size and incentives, shown both in the outcome and in 
the selection equation, and a negative relation between ownership 
concentration (and leverage) and equity dummy which is coherent with the 
substitutive character of both monitoring mechanisms: concentrated 
ownership provides natural monitoring to managers, while more leveraged 
firms are equally overseen by bond and equity holders.  
We conclude that there is a positive relation between firms 
monitoring needs and the grant and equity linked compensation, as a basic 
agency model would suggest. However, if monitoring is also carried out by the 
board (to a greater or lesser extent) this positive relation should be substituted 
by a diligent monitoring board. If the board is carrying out its monitoring 
function, the need to design an inefficient (and thus more costly to 
shareholders) contract, disappears. Therefore, in a setting where the direct 
monitoring is carried out by the board, we should observe a nonexistent (or 
negative) relation between CEO incentives and monitoring needs. When we 
observe a positive relation (as it  is the case here) it might imply that firms use 




As proxy for advising intensity we include growth opportunities (Q) 
and industry dummies (that proxy for product, firm and market complexity). 
We find a positive and significant relation between growth opportunities and 
incentives, which means that CEOs working for firms with higher growth 
opportunities (higher Q) have higher chances of receiving equity linked 
compensation.  
Finally, we include CEO time in role (TIME IN ROLE), additional 
number of board positions (INTERLOCKING), board size (BOARD SIZE), and a 
dummy for a joint CEO position (MD) to control for the CEO capacity to exert 
power over the board. Evidence suggests that more powerful CEOs receive 
fewer incentives in their compensation packages: the probability that the CEO 
receives equity linked compensation decreases with every additional year of 
duty, and with the number of executives in top managerial positions (MD). By 
contrast, it increases with the number of additional board positions 
(INTERLOCKING). Board size is not significantly related to the use of equity 
linked compensation.  
Overall, in the regressions presented in Table 6 we find that CEOs 
working for firms with more independent boards have a higher propensity to 
receive equity linked compensation. Besides, those CEOs who are into equity 
linked compensation packages receive a higher proportion of their pay in this 
form, when they work for firms with more independent boards. This positive 
relation holds when we control for industry, firm size, volatility, growth 
opportunities, leverage, ownership structure, characteristics of board, 
governance and institutional differences, and a CEO’s degrees of risk aversion 
and managerial involvement, respectively.  
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This positive relation is in line with the proposal suggested by 
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2002), that board independence can prevent 
powerful CEOs to use their influence to design their preferred compensation 
package. As CEOs are risk averse individuals, they prefer, ceteris paribus, less 
risky compensation, and we should observe less incentive compensation in 
firms with entrenched boards, and more incentive compensation in firms 
where the board is not entrenched, as it is the case of firms with (truly) 
independent boards.  
To rule out agency considerations, we include two additional tests, 
presented in section 6. In our first test, we explore whether the 
complementarity between outsiders on the board and incentive pay differs in 
firms with greater agency problems, or in firms with different advisory needs. 
Our second test is a wider test of entrenchment theories. We want to analyze 
whether CEOs working for firms with more independent boards receive 
significantly different compensation levels, and other compensation incentives 
(like bonus pay). According to Bebchuck, Fried and Walker (2002), one should 
observe that CEOs working for firms with more outsiders on their boards 
receive- along with more equity linked compensation- more incentives in the 
form of bonuses, and lower levels of direct and total compensation.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS TEST 
 
Sensitivity analyses are presented in Tables 7 and 8. In Table 7, we 
analyze whether the relation between board composition and incentive pay 
differs in firms with different institutional settings, different governance 




TABLE 7. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. COMPLEMENTARITIES BY SUBSAMPLES 
In this table, we present the coefficient of the variable outsider rate in a Heckman regression, where the 
data has been split into excluding subsamples by different firm characteristics (Region, Industry, Board size, 
Ownership concentration and firm results). The underlying regression is similar to that presented in Table 6, 
Column 3. In this table, we present only the values of the coefficients of the variable outsider ratio, for both 
the selection and the outcome equation. In all cases the dependent variable is the proportion of equity 
linked compensation to total pay in the main equation, and a dummy for the existence of equity linked 
compensation in the selection equation. We present results for firms incorporated in the UK versus those in 
Continental Europe and Ireland, for firms in the New Technology sectors versus those in traditional sectors, 
and for firms below (above) the median values of key variables (ownership concentration, board size, 














Rho Sigma Lambda 
Panel 7.A Region  
UK  0.124*** 0.702*** 6525 3414 3111 6677.43 0.389 0.219 0.085 
C. Europe 1.06** 0.773*** 3902 3138 764 203.44 -0.425 1.387 -0.590 
Panel 7.B Industry 
High Tech. 0.125*** 0.906*** 1662 1190 472 88.76 0.199 1.325 0.264 
Rest 0.206*** 0.534*** 8765 5362 3403 524.1 0.208 0.221 0.046 
Panel 7.C Board Size 
Small (<=8) 1.4*** 0.836*** 5758 3903 1855 598.96 -0.013 1.25 -0.016 
Large (>8) 0.276*** 0.301*** 4669 2649 2020 432.04 0.074 0.202 0.015 
Panel 7.D Ownership  
High (>31.5) 0.34*** 0.927*** 5185 4098 1087 150 0.308 0.272 0.0838 
Low (<=31.5) 0.144*** 0.234*** 5242 2454 2788 472 0.155 0.206 0.031 
Panel 7. E Operating Profit 
Small (<0.27) 1.17*** 0.673*** 5015 3499 1516 550.5 0.041 1.351 0.056 
Large (>0.27) 0.265*** 0.621** 5412 3053 2359 480.5 0.024 0.197 0.004 
Panel 7.F ROE 
Small(<11.47) 0.15*** 0.81*** 3990 2297 1693 274 0.35 0.234 0.082 
Large(>11.4) 0.23*** 0.366 6437 4255 2182 332.24 0.11 0.220 0.2589 
Panel 7.G ROA 
Small (<4.8) 0.145** 0.661 4260 2476 1784 258 0.3467 0.2411 0.083 
Large (>4.8) 0.216*** 0.405** 6167 4076 2091 377 0.134 0.214 0.029 
 
In Table 7, we run the Heckman regression models for different 
groups of firms. First we run the Heckman regression models separately for 
firms in the UK and for firms in Continental Europe (Panel 7.A). Both in Europe 
and in the UK, we find a positive and significant relation between outsiders on 
the board and equity linked compensation, which might indicate that this 
relation is not driven by institutional differences or country specifications. We 
also find that the coefficient measuring the relation between board 
composition and incentive pay is greater for Continental Europe than for UK. 
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This way, a 1% increase in the proportion of outsiders implies a 1.06% increase 
in incentive intensity in Continental Europe, and it increases this intensity by 
0.124 % in UK. To split the sample by country of incorporation is relevant to 
rule out the possibility that our result is driven by institutional constraints or by 
the different governance structure between Continental Europe, and the 
Anglo-Saxon model represented by the UK. The complementarity found in both 
subsets of firms reinforces our findings and suggests that this optimal 
combination of governance mechanisms is not driven by institutional 
restrictions.  
We also split the sample by economic sector. We test whether firms 
that belong to what has been called “High technology” (those in the 
information technology, electronics and software industries) have a different 
corporate governance pattern than their more traditional counterparts. We 
confront those two groups, as new technology firms are younger and smaller 
firms, they operate in markets with higher growth opportunities, and in less 
transparent settings, where issues like within firm information transmission, 
growth opportunities and risk management are relevant. By contrast, those in 
more traditional sectors are usually firms with a longer tradition, well 
established corporate governance culture; they are larger firms and operate in 
more mature markets (see Table 5.B for descriptive statistics for both groups of 
firms). Running the regressions for both groups of firms separately, we find 
that the complementary use of outsiders on the board, and equity linked 
compensation is less pronounced in the new technology firms. We find that, 
even when the probability of receiving equity linked compensation is greater in 
the technological sector, for observationally equal firms, an increase in board 
independence is associated with a lower increase in equity linked 




that the agency problem between CEOs and firm owners is constant along the 
firm spectrum. We relax this hypothesis, and test whether the 
complementarity is greater in firms with greater agency problems (firms where 
the CEO has more chances to extract private rents). To do so we split the 
sample by board size (Panel 7.C) and ownership concentration (Panel 7.D). We 
find that the positive relation between incidence of incentives and outsider 
rate is greater in firms with more concentrated ownership, and in firms with 
smaller boards (those subgroups of firms should be in less need of board 
monitoring). 
Finally, we find a greater complementarity between outsiders on 
the board and incentives in more profitable firms, that is to say, in firms with 
above median operating profit (Panel 7.E), return on equity (Panel 7.F), and 
return on assets (Panel 7.G). This result does not contradict the hypothesis that 
better governance (leading to better results) is related to the complementary 
use of alternative instruments of corporate governance available to 
corporations.  
In Table 8 we check the prediction of the entrenchment models 
which states that CEOs in firms with less independent boards receive more pay, 
and fewer incentives. We run a simultaneous equation model with board 
composition and CEO pay as dependent variables. As explanatory variables we 
include firm, board and governance characteristics. We use simultaneous 
equation models, instead of Heckman regression models, because all CEOs 
receive some kind of direct and total compensation, and thus there is no 
selection into compensation, and no benefit of a Heckman selection model. We 
run the following system of simultaneous regressions: 
 




RSHIPit+ β5TIMEINROLEit+ β6LNASSETit+ β7PRICEVOLATILITYit+ β8-16YEARit+ εit (3) 
OUTSIDERSit=γ0+γ1LNASSETSit+γ2TIMEINROLEit+γ3CEOOWNERSHIPit+
γ4BOARDSIZEit+γ5LEVERAGEit+γ6INTERLOCKINGit+ γ7MDit+ γ8Qit+ γ9-16YEARit +γ17-
31 COUNTRYit +γ32-72 INDUSTRYit+νit   (4) 
To measure CEO pay we use alternatively CEO total compensation 
(LNTOTAL), direct compensation (LNDIRECT) and BONUS RATIO (measured as 
the proportion of bonus in direct compensation). We include equity ratio as 
well, to allow comparisons with our previous Heckman regression models. 
When we include equity ratio as dependent variable, only the observations 
where positive equity linked compensation has been used are included. We 
explain CEO pay by board, firm and CEO characteristics previously included in 
our models.  
In our simultaneous equation regressions, the proportion of 
outsiders in the board (OUTSIDERS) is explained by proxies for the need to 
monitor and advice the management team. As proxies for monitoring need we 
include LNASSETS, TIME IN ROLE, OWNERSHIP, BOARDSIZE, LEVERAGE; as 
proxies for advice requirements we include INTERLOCKING, Q, and industry 
dummies. Year and country dummies are included to control for market and 
institutional constraints. Results for this simultaneous equation model are 
presented in Table 8.  
 
TABLE 8. SIMULTANEOUS DETERMINATION OF BOARD COMPOSITION AND 
COMPENSATION  
In the equation explaining CEO pay, the dependent variable is (1) total pay (2) total amount of equity linked 
compensation, (3) direct pay, (4) bonus ratio and (6) proportion of equity linked compensation on total pay. 




the dependent variable is (1) total pay (2) total amount of equity linked compensation, (3) direct pay, (4) 
bonus ratio and (6) proportion of equity linked compensation on total pay. The dependent variable in the 
board equation is outsiders in all cases. In column (1) only those observations where we observe positive 
equity linked compensation are included, in column (3) only those observations with positive bonus ratio are 
included. P-values in parenthesis. Stars refer to *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Year  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
Nr. of Obs. 3875 6645 4587 6778 
R-sq (Eq. 1) 0.1011 0.4798 0.1857 0.4928 
R-sq (Eq.2)  0.4773 0.5262 0.5669 0.5243 
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Regression results in Table 8 does not provide support of the 
entrenchment hypothesis. A CEO working for a firm with a more independent 
board receives lower direct and total compensation. When the proportion of 
outsiders on the board increases, the equity proportion of total pay increases, 
while the compensation in terms of bonuses decreases. In all, we find that 
outsider dominated boards use more intensively equity linked compensation 
and, as Bebchuk, Fried and Walker suggest, pay lower salaries to their 
management team.  
  
7. CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, we use a representative sample of listed firms for 
the main Western European Economies to explore the relation between board 
independence and CEO incentive pay as alternative instruments of corporate 
governance.  
Analyzing this relation can provide a better understanding on how 
different corporate governance instruments interact with each other, and how 
firms, by adequately combining the different corporate governance 
instruments at their dispose can reach more efficient governance, and thus 
improve firm value. By far, this is the first paper, to our knowledge, to test this 
interaction using a representative sample of European countries.  
Our paper departs from existing empirical literature in three 
different ways. First, it provides European evidence of a question which is 
predominantly analyzed using US data. A second contribution is the study of 
the existence and the amount of equity linked incentives separately. By doing 
so, we address one of the key features of executive compensation in Europe: 




is in the US. Unlike in the US, not every firm uses equity linked compensation in 
Europe, and those who do it, do not grant it every year. Finally we add the 
advisory role of boards to its functions. The advisory role of board members is a 
key feature to explain board composition and thus, the structure of CEO 
compensation. In this setting, the relation between management pay and 
board design is not only determined by agency considerations. The use of one 
or another governance mechanism will depend on the relative importance of 
board functions and on the CEO preferences over its pay.  
Our analysis suggests that European firms use board composition 
and incentive pay schemes as complementary governance instruments. We 
find evidence of a positive and significant relation between the amounts of 
equity linked compensation granted to European CEOs and board 
independence, taking into account the different roles of the board (monitoring 
and advising) together with the CEOs degree of risk aversion and managerial 
abilities. This positive relation holds when we control for industry, firm size, 
volatility, other governance mechanisms (leverage and ownership structure), 
growth opportunities, return on equity and governance and institutional 
differences. 
Evidence found in our European data suggests- as Bebchuk and 
Fried alerted- that equity linked incentives are just a partial remedy to avoid 
rent extracting- and that firms combining incentives pay and board 
composition are able to handle better their governance problems. Our results 
show the complementary relation between board independence and the 
intensity of CEO incentive pay is larger in more profitable firms. In terms of 
policy implications, our analysis supports a corporate governance European 
policy that encourages jointly the use and transparency in the incentives pay 
systems and the existence of strong boards.  
































El trabajo que se presenta para la colación del grado de doctor ha 
tenido como eje central el análisis de la composición del consejo de 
administración, como generador de eficiencia y beneficio empresarial. Nuestro 
interés en la relación entre la composición del consejo y el valor empresarial 
surgió de la constatación de una tendencia generalizada a reforzar la 
independencia de los consejos de administración en aras de una mejor 
supervisión y control, incluso cuando no existe suficiente evidencia empírica de 
que dicha independencia sea generadora de valor.  
Para entender esta relación hemos analizado dos aspectos 
específicos que pensamos impactan significativamente en el funcionamiento 
del consejo a la hora de adoptar decisiones y, en última instancia, en la 
generación de valor. Estos dos elementos diferenciales son el empleo de 
comités, para una mejor transferencia de información entre consejeros 
internos y externos por una parte, y el uso de incentivos en la remuneración 
del consejero delegado, para facilitar la alineación de intereses, por otra. Estos 
dos análisis, que ocupan los capítulos dos y tres, han venido precedidos por un 
primer capítulo que presenta el estado de la cuestión del gobierno corporativo 
en Europa.  
Para realizar esta tesis hemos compilado una base de datos 
representativa de las principales economías de Europa occidental que recoge 
información detallada de gobierno corporativo, información económico-
financiera y de mercado de 2 668 empresas de 15 países de la Unión Europea 
durante el periodo 1999-2009. De esta forma, además de contribuir al análisis 
del funcionamiento de los consejos de administración y la remuneración a 
miembros del equipo directivo, una aportación relevante de nuestra tesis es el 
uso de datos europeos. En general, los estudios empíricos acerca de elementos 




ejecutivos, se han concentrado en el sector corporativo americano debido a 
una mayor transparencia en los datos sobre gobierno corporativo en EE.UU., y 
una mayor tradición investigadora en este campo. Los estudios existentes 
usando datos europeos son escasos y, por norma general, suelen estar 
centrados en un único país. En nuestro estudio, las principales economías de 
Europa Occidental están representadas. Al abarcar varios países, obtuvimos 
conclusiones que no están condicionadas por factores institucionales o de 
mercado que afecten a un país en concreto, ya que evitamos la homogeneidad 
que surge de la similitud en los sistemas de gobierno corporativo entre 
empresas de un mismo país. El análisis de datos europeos es también 
importante en la actualidad, puesto que en la última década hemos sido 
testigos de la mayor actualización y homogeneización de los códigos de buen 
gobierno de los países de Europa occidental que se haya dado jamás. Usar una 
muestra representativa de los países europeos en nuestro análisis permitió 
conocer mejor el sistema corporativo europeo, y estudiar cómo se han 
adaptado las empresas a los importantes cambios institucionales, económicos y 
empresariales de los últimos diez años, y si estos cambios han propiciado la 
mejora de los sistemas de gobierno corporativo para los que fueron diseñados.  
En nuestro estudio hemos explorado una característica muy 
especial de los datos europeos, como es la gran variedad de estructuras de 
consejos de administración, debida a la coexistencia en un mismo espacio 
económico de marcos institucionales tan diversos como el anglosajón, el 
germánico, el escandinavo, o el francés. Esta gran variedad -junto a la 
flexibilidad en la aplicación de los códigos- permite a las empresas una gran 
capacidad de elección en el diseño de su estructura de gobierno corporativo. 
Explotamos esta libertad de elección de las empresas en dos ámbitos: la 
autoselección en el diseño de la estructura interna del consejo de 
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administración en comités por una parte, y la autoselección del diseño de la 
remuneración al consejero delegado por otra. La metodología utilizada- el 
modelo de Heckman- permite, además de estudiar las relaciones de interés 
entre la independencia del consejo y el uso de comités o la remuneración con 
incentivos, analizar cuáles son los determinantes que inciden en que una 
empresa decida emplear una forma de gobierno corporativo sobre otra (que 
utilice de forma intensiva comités o que utilice remuneración ligada a acciones 
para incentivar al consejero delegado).  
La primera de nuestras preguntas de investigación ha sido 
respondida en el capítulo 2 al estudiar la relación entre independencia del 
consejo y valor empresarial, a través de la estructura interna de consejo y su 
trabajo en comités. En nuestro modelo de consejo, la eficiencia está 
relacionada con una correcta transmisión de información entre miembros del 
equipo directivo y consejeros externos. Para analizar si la transmisión de 
información llevada a cabo a través de estructuras de comités mejora la 
eficiencia de consejos independientes, hemos planteado dos hipótesis 
contrastables: (1) que el uso de comités conlleva incrementos de valor 
empresarial y (2) que la mejora de gobierno corporativo que supone la 
introducción de comités depende de los requerimientos de asesoría y 
supervisión por parte de las empresas. Así, el uso (y la independencia) de 
comités asesores es más beneficiosa en entornos empresariales complejos, y 
en empresas con mayores expectativas de crecimiento, mientras que el uso de 
comités supervisores es más beneficioso en entornos con mayores problemas 
de agencia (empresas más grandes, o empresas donde el consejero delegado 
acumula mayor poder de decisión).  
La comparación de los resultados del modelo base con los del 




aspectos de la creación de comités, nos permitió obtener una doble evidencia. 
En primer lugar, la relación positiva y significativa entre el número y el nivel de 
independencia de los comités y el valor de la empresa. Una vez ampliado el 
análisis a los diferentes tipos de comité pudimos comprobar que son los de tipo 
asesor sobre los que recae el protagonismo de dicha relación. Además, y 
usando en todo momento técnicas econométricas que corrigen el sesgo 
derivado del hecho de que la creación de comités no es aleatoria, nuestros 
datos mostraron que al introducir información sobre comités de tipo asesor, la 
relación entre la independencia del consejo y el valor de la empresa se tornaba 
positiva y significativa. Esta circunstancia no es refrendada ni en el modelo base 
ni el modelo extendido con información genérica sobre comités o referida a los 
comités de tipo supervisor; en cualquiera de estos casos se confirma la 
irrelevancia del nivel de independencia del consejo en línea con un buen 
número de trabajos sobre gobierno corporativo. 
Respecto a la segunda de la nuestras hipótesis, pudimos demostrar 
que la relación entre el uso de comités asesores y supervisores y el valor de la 
empresa difiere según el contexto empresarial y productivo en el que la 
entidad se desenvuelve. Se puso así de manifiesto la relación positiva entre el 
uso de comités de naturaleza supervisora y el valor de la empresa en el 
segmento de empresas de mayor dimensión, segmento donde las necesidades 
de supervisión y control son previsiblemente más perentorias. También 
pudimos constatar que los comités de tipo asesor sí tienen un impacto positivo 
en industrias o sectores intensivos en nuevas tecnologías, por otra parte 
ausente en las empresas pertenecientes al resto de los sectores de la muestra.  
Este análisis contribuye al debate actual sobre la idoneidad de 
consejos de administración independientes como generadores de valor 
empresarial, así como a la incipiente literatura acerca del uso e independencia 
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de comités y su contribución a la mejora del gobierno corporativo de la 
empresa. Una contribución fundamental de este estudio es que, en vez de 
habernos concentrado en cada elemento (comités y consejo) de forma 
separada, como hacen estudios anteriores, los hemos introducido en el análisis 
de forma conjunta, examinando de forma detallada los requerimientos de 
asesoría y supervisión por parte de la empresa, junto con el uso e 
independencia de comités de tipo asesor y supervisor.  
La respuesta a la segunda de nuestras preguntas ocupó el capítulo 
tercero, en el que hemos estudiado la determinación conjunta del nivel de 
independencia del consejo y de la estructura de remuneración al consejero 
delegado como instrumentos alternativos de gobierno corporativo. Para ello, 
hemos analizado empíricamente si las empresas europeas utilizan la 
independencia del consejo de administración y la remuneración incentivada 
como instrumentos de gobierno corporativo complementarios, como postulan 
los modelos de atrincheramiento, o sustitutivos, según postulan los modelos de 
agencia clásicos. De acuerdo a estos últimos los propietarios pueden sustituir la 
supervisión directa a los managers con una remuneración ligada a incentivos, 
de forma que predicen una relación de sustitución entre consejos de 
administración independientes (con mayor capacidad de supervisión) y la 
remuneración incentivada al consejero delegado, en forma de acciones u 
opciones sobre acciones (Holmstrom y Milgrom, 1991). En el lado opuesto 
encontramos los modelos de atrincheramiento, propuestos por Bebchuck y 
Fried (2004), que parten de la suposición de que la remuneración al consejero 
delegado no es el resultado de una negociación “entre iguales”, entre el 
consejero y los accionistas, ya que el consejero delegado tiene gran poder de 
influencia sobre el consejo y los comités de remuneración, y utiliza dicha 




resultados. Aunque otorgar acciones y opciones sobre acciones al consejero 
delegado puede en parte aliviar esta extracción de rentas privadas, también 
puede generar problemas (como la toma de excesivos riesgos empresariales, 
estrategias muy focalizadas en el corto plazo, incremento de la volatilidad de 
valores de mercado, etc.). Es por ello que los modelos de atrincheramiento 
proponen que las empresas cotizadas utilicen de forma conjunta la 
remuneración ligada a incentivos y la independencia del consejo como 
instrumentos complementarios de gobierno corporativo.  
Para obtener una relación lo más detallada posible entre la 
independencia del consejo de administración y la remuneración incentivada 
como instrumentos alternativos de gobierno corporativo, hemos analizado de 
forma diferenciada tres conceptos de remuneración incentivada: la existencia 
(si las empresas otorgan o no remuneración incentivada), el importe (el valor 
total de dicha remuneración), y la intensidad (la proporción de incentivos 
dentro de la remuneración total) de dicha remuneración incentivada. El estudio 
de estos tres conceptos de forma separada constituye una contribución 
adicional de esta tesis, puesto que permite comprender mejor cómo ambos 
instrumentos de gobierno corporativo (consejos de administración 
independientes y remuneración incentivada) interactúan. Además, estudiar de 
forma separada la introducción de programas de remuneración incentivada y el 
importe total o la proporción de los mismos es necesario en el caso europeo, 
puesto que la remuneración ligada a acciones y opciones sobre acciones no 
está tan extendida en Europa como en EE.UU.. En Europa no todas las 
empresas utilizan remuneración ligada a acciones, y aquellas que lo hacen, no 
la utilizan cada año de forma sistemática. No tener en cuenta este hecho 
diferencial podría generar un sesgo de selección que nosotros hemos intentado 
corregir con el uso de un modelo econométrico (el modelo de Heckman), que 
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permite entender qué factores influyen en la decisión de poner en marcha 
estos planes por una parte, y qué factores pueden ser decisivos en el volumen 
total de los mismos.  
Nuestro análisis empírico puso de manifiesto que existe una 
relación de complementariedad entre la independencia del consejo de 
administración y el pago de incentivos (acciones y opciones sobre acciones) al 
consejero delegado. Los análisis de sensibilidad realizados mostraron que esta 
relación de complementariedad no es específica de un país o industria en 
concreto, y aparece en empresas con estructuras de capital diversas, diferentes 
tamaños de consejos y diferentes perfiles de ingresos. Esto significa que las 
principales empresas cotizadas europeas combinan mayores niveles de 
independencia de sus consejos de administración con una mayor proporción de 
incentivos en la retribución anual al consejero delegado. También encontramos 
en nuestros datos una relación positiva entre variables que miden la necesidad 
de supervisión y la probabilidad de que el consejero delegado reciba acciones u 
opciones sobre acciones como parte de su remuneración. Además, las 
empresas con una mayor proporción de consejeros ejecutivos en nuestra 
muestra pagaron una remuneración menor al consejero delegado (tanto 
remuneración directa en salario y bonus como remuneración total, incluyendo 
el importe de la remuneración ligada a acciones y opciones sobre acciones), y 
una mayor proporción de incentivos. En general, los resultados de nuestro 
análisis estuvieron más en línea con las propuestas de Bebchuck y Fried, que 
abogan por la utilización conjunta de consejos independientes y remuneración 
incentivada para reducir los problemas de agencia entre propietarios y 
managers, y evitar la extracción de rentas privadas por parte de los miembros 




La aportación del consejo de administración al valor de la empresa 
es difícilmente cuantificable, puesto que depende de elementos cualitativos, 
como el capital humano de los consejeros, la transmisión de información entre 
consejeros externos y miembros del equipo ejecutivo, la confianza entre los 
miembros del consejo, y entre éstos y el consejero delegado, etc. Es por ello de 
gran relevancia, para el diseño de modelos de consejos de administración 
eficientes, encontrar regularidades empíricas que nos ayuden a entender los 
mecanismos internos de funcionamiento de dichos consejos, y creemos que, el 
estudio sobre cómo las empresas combinan la independencia del consejo con 
otros elementos de gobierno corporativo a su alcance mejora nuestro 
conocimiento acerca del funcionamiento interno de los consejos, y facilita la 
cuantificación de su aportación al valor de la empresa.  
Los resultados de nuestro estudio tienen también claras 
aplicaciones normativas. Por una parte hemos mostrado que el uso conjunto 
de consejos independientes, con elementos diferenciadores, como comités de 
tipo asesor dentro de los consejos, o remuneración incentivada puede ayudar a 
mejorar los resultados empresariales. Además, mostramos que el número e 
independencia de los comités supervisores dentro del consejo no está 
estadísticamente relacionado con una mejora del resultado empresarial, o con 
la independencia del consejo. Esto es así aunque las diversas recomendaciones 
de gobierno corporativo en Europa establecen claramente la necesidad de 
creación de comités auditores, de remuneración y de nombramientos (todos 
ellos de carácter supervisor) así como la idoneidad de su independencia. Estas 
mismas recomendaciones no inciden en el uso de comités asesores, que han 
sido menos estudiados en la literatura económica, y que constituyen en 
nuestros datos un rasgo distintivo relacionado con el incremento del valor 
empresarial.  
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Para finalizar, es nuestra intención utilizar y mejorar la extensa base 
de datos que hemos creado para emprender nuevos proyectos de 
investigación, que permitan avanzar en el conocimiento de los instrumentos de 
gobierno de las empresas. El estudio de la interrelación entre diferentes 
instrumentos de gobierno corporativo y el análisis de los comités asesores del 
consejo como generadores de valor, puede contribuir a entender mejor el rol 
del consejo de administración como generador de valor empresarial. Dada la 
importancia de los consejos de administración para el correcto funcionamiento 
de la empresa, y el avance en la investigación en la ultima década en este 
campo, nuevos estudios aprovechando la extensión y calidad de las bases de 
datos servirán para establecer regularidades empíricas que puedan ser 
utilizadas tanto en la creación de modelos económicos, como en la mejora de 
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